Domestic Terrorism in the Canadian News Media: a Framing Analysis of Canadian-Connected Terrorism in 2013 Newspaper Articles by Campbell, Sasha K.
Domestic Terrorism in the Canadian News 
Media: a Framing Analysis of Canadian-
Connected Terrorism in 2013 Newspaper 
Articles 
 
by 
 
Sasha K. Campbell 
 
 
A thesis 
presented to the University of Waterloo 
in fulfillment of the 
thesis requirement for the degree of 
Master of the Arts 
in 
Sociology 
 
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2015 
 
© Sasha K. Campbell, 2015
 
 
ii 
 
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION 
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including 
any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. 
 
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Abstract 
Terrorism is one of the most politically and rhetorically significant issues shaping the world 
today, and a popular topic in the news media. Canada is no exception. Recently, the problem of 
domestic (or homegrown) terror has emerged as a complex and emotionally potent phenomenon, 
one seemingly on the rise. However, there is an absence of media scholarship investigating this 
issue from a Canadian perspective. This study examines the Canadian news media’s treatment of 
Canadian-connected terrorism. Central to the journalistic discourse are frames, which serve to 
define, assess, characterize, moralize, and contextualize terrorism for readers. Frames provide 
narratives for key aspects such as alleged suspects, arrests, plots, police activities, and 
legal/political responses. A qualitative framing analysis approach is employed to identify and 
discuss news framing of Canadian-connected terrorism via extensive inductive coding of 173 
Canadian news articles from print and online media sources, spanning January 1st – December 
31st, 2013. Recurrent frames are established using evidence from the articles and discussed in 
terms of the messages they send about the nature of domestic terrorism/terrorists, their usefulness 
for understanding terrorism as a multifaceted global problem, and, where feasible, theoretically 
informed explanations for the use of specific frames. Findings indicate that the Canadian news 
media favours terrorism as a topic, but does not provide particularly informative articles. The 
reasons for this discrepancy proved varied, complex, and intimately linked with the way the 
mainstream news media – and other powerful organizations – operate and interact. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Research Questions 
1.1 Introduction 
Terrorism is one of the most politically and rhetorically significant issues of our 
time. It is a particularly insidious kind of violence, because it attacks not only our 
physical selves and property, but “our sense of security, both as individuals and as 
societies” (Thorup, 2010, p. ix). If the aim of terrorists is to unsettle, to gain notoriety, 
and to instill fearful images of themselves as dangerous, unpredictable enemies of the 
state in the public consciousness, then an increasing number of modern-day terrorist 
groups can count themselves successful. Finding and eliminating terrorist individuals or 
organizations is a critical objective for governments, militaries, and intelligence agencies 
in Canada and the world over. As law professors Ramraj, Hor, and Roach (2005, preface) 
point out, “anti-terrorism law and policy have become matters of global concern”. 
Modern counter-terrorism efforts, they continue,  
[cross] boundaries between states and between domestic, regional and 
international law. It also crosses traditional disciplinary boundaries between 
administrative, constitutional, criminal, immigration, and military law, and the 
law of war (Ramraj, Hor, & Roach, 2005, preface). 
 
The event most foundational to creating the demand for and nature of modern 
counter-terrorism is the terrorist attack known ubiquitously as ‘9/11’. On September 11th, 
2001, the United States suffered four organized terrorist attacks which destroyed the 
World Trade Center towers and struck the Pentagon, destroying a significant part of this 
symbolic building as well. Shortly thereafter, the United Nations Security Council 
enacted Resolution 1373, calling on all states “to ensure that terrorism was treated as a 
serious crime” (Roach, 2007, p. 5).  September 11th and Resolution 1373 are what thrust 
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terrorism into the spotlight as a persistent ‘global concern’ over the past thirteen years. 
Since 2001, many global powers have come to see terrorism as a very serious threat. As a 
result, these nations have enacted serious defensive measures and redefined their laws in 
unprecedented and controversial ways. There has been much debate in Canada over how 
to understand terrorism, how we ought to combat terrorism, and whether we are doing 
enough, among other concerns (Roach, 2007; RCMP, 2009; Parent & Ellis, 2011). NGOs, 
government, intelligence, and military bodies, and academics from a wide variety of 
disciplines have weighed in, contributing to the public discourse on terrorism. 
A sociological perspective may attend to the creation of meaning in the public 
discussion of terrorist phenomena. Labeling acts of violence or subversion as ‘acts of 
terror’, and their perpetrators as ‘terrorists’, lends these actions and people a special aura 
of dread and danger rarely afforded to the common criminal. As noted, the reactions to 
terrorism have been quite significant, and have radically changed foreign and domestic 
policies of many countries – including Canada's. Wars have been waged under the banner 
of keeping citizens safe from terrorists, and fears of terrorism are used to justify 
controversial bills which drastically alter citizens’ democratic, constitutionally-
entrenched rights and freedoms (Hardin, 2004).  
A growing number of terrorist attacks are perpetrated not by foreign radicals, but 
by those living, often legally and legitimately, in the same country in which the attack 
takes place. Frequently, these radicals are citizens themselves. Take, for instance, the 
2006 case of the Toronto 18: a group of eighteen radicalized young men, most of whom 
were minors at the time, plotted horrific acts of violence against Canadians and Canadian 
institutions, reportedly including plans to “attack the Parliament Buildings, storm CBC 
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offices in Toronto, take hostages, and even behead the prime minister” (Wilner, 2008, p. 
1). These young men had such an impact, and their acts were so shocking, that some eight 
years later they are still brought up in the news media. Wilner (2008, p. 2) asks us to  
consider that none of the young men rounded up in Ontario was a foreign 
national… most were born, raised, and educated in Canada, while those who had 
been born abroad had moved to Canada as youngsters. 
 
Furthermore, Wilner (2008, p. 3) posits that “the general trend since the 2001 attacks [of 
September 11th] has been the diminution of centrally orchestrated international terrorism 
matched by a concurrent rise in localized and unaffiliated terrorism”. Pregulman and 
Burke’s (2012, p. 1) study corroborates the claim that “incidents of ‘homegrown 
terrorism’… have increased in aggregate since 9/11”.  The increasing problem of 
domestic terrorism on Canadian soil has garnered significant media attention – as have 
reports of radicalized Canadians involved in terrorism overseas.  
While most people are widely aware of the existence of terrorism, and that it 
poses a threat to national security, until recently, very few Canadians have firsthand 
experience with terrorism. “With few exceptions,” a military historian and terrorism 
specialist  maintains, “Canada's [pre - 9/11] experience of terrorism was less frequent, 
less lethal, and less disruptive than those of many other countries” (Charters, 2008, p. 3). 
These few exceptions took place almost exclusively between 1960 and 1985, meaning 
that there is an almost-twenty-year gap between Canada's last major experiences with 
terrorism, and the attacks of September 11th, 2001, after which terror incidents of all 
kinds skyrocketed. Even with the increase in domestic terrorism, nearly all of the recent 
terrorist plots in Canada were (fortunately) thwarted before any loss of life occurred.  
However, last year may have signaled the beginning of the end for this period of 
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relative peace. In a span of just two days in 2014, Canadians saw two deadly domestic 
terror attacks take place in Quebec and Ottawa. On October 20th, Martin Couture-
Rouleau hit two Canadian Forces members with his car; Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent 
died as a result of injuries sustained in the attack. Two days later on October 22nd, 
Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot Corporal Nathan Cirillo to death while the Corporal stood 
guard at Ottawa’s War Memorial. Both Couture-Rouleau and Zehaf-Bibeau were known 
to be Muslim converts, a fact that was widely reported in the media (Bell, 2014a). A 
quick review of late 2014/2015’s press trends show that these tragic events received 
widespread news coverage, driving up the already-high amount of publicity afforded 
terrorism and the ‘terror threat’. Furthermore, media discussion of these incidents helped 
foment, if not introduce, controversies and complexities surrounding the public’s 
perception of terrorism, including the relationship between domestic terror and foreign 
radical groups like ISIS/ISIL, and the role of the mental health system in identifying, 
treating, and preventing radicalization and violence. Until recently, most Canadians had 
never witnessed a terrorist attack on their own soil, and the impact of news reports on 
how Canadians think about and respond to terrorism should not be dismissed. 
As psychologists Friedland and Merari (1985, p. 591) caution, “terrorism is highly 
effective in inducing fear and worry, even when the actual damage it causes is moderate”.  
Implicit in this statement is the recognition that seeing and/or learning about damage 
caused in a terrorist attack affects people emotionally, even if no one was hurt or killed. 
Similarly, news stories about the radicals-next-door, including sensational details about 
plots, weapons, and violent ideologies, might be emotionally unsettling, and engender 
feelings of risk and fear.  
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Research has long suggested that media framing has important and real effects. 
We know that exposure to media hype about crime elevates fear and perceptions of risk; 
likewise, Nellis and Savage (2012, p. 748) demonstrated that for their sample of 
Americans, “exposure to terrorism-related news is positively associated with perceived 
risk of terrorism to self and others”. Shoshani and Slone (2008, p. 53) showed Israeli 
young adults TV news clips, and found “higher posttest levels of anxiety, anger, 
stereotypes, and negative enemy perception in the terrorism versus nonterrorism media 
exposure”. But, curiously, upon extending the implications of Shoshani and Slone’s 
findings, Friedland and Merari (1985, p. 591) concluded that 
terrorism appears to have failed to produce the attitudinal change desired by its 
perpetrators, the high levels of fear notwithstanding. On the contrary, terrorism 
caused a hardening of attitudes, strong opposition to any form of political 
reconciliation with terrorists, and widespread support for extreme counterterrorist 
measures. Terrorism, in other words, proved to be counterproductive. 
 
Even if the effect of terrorism usually is not victim acquiescence and a win for the 
terrorists, the experience of terrorism cannot be ignored as an emotionally potent life 
event. If just reports of terrorism can cause feelings of fear and insecurity, that is reason 
enough to study the nature of such reporting. In particular, the emerging significance of 
domestic terrorism as a sociopolitical, emotional, and ethical issue, combined with the 
potency of the news media as a vehicle for relaying information, makes it all the more 
relevant to examine what messages are presented in news coverage of domestic terrorists 
and terrorist events. 
This study uses qualitative frame analysis, a popular social 
science/communications research tool, to locate semantic messages about the nature and 
characteristics of domestic terrorism in the news. Media, especially news media, provide 
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legitimized ‘lenses’ or ‘frames’ for understanding what domestic terrorism is, how and 
why it happens, and how we should think about and respond to it. Uncovering these 
frames and their component elements, as I have attempted to do here, necessitates a 
careful, substantively- and theoretically-informed reading of Canadian news media, with 
close analytical attention to what they say about the phenomena. 
1.2 Research Question and Research Objectives 
Having established the importance of modern news media (and frames) as 
vehicles for passing on the stories that help people make sense of their world, the main 
research question guiding this project is: how were domestic and Canadian-connected 
terrorists and terrorist events portrayed (i.e. framed) by the Canadian news media in the 
year 2013?  
There are a few sub-questions I must confront in the process of answering the 
research question above. What are the media telling Canadians about domestic (or 
‘homegrown’) terrorism? Some specific areas of interest are: what qualities might media 
ascribe to the terrorist, the plots/weapons, their motivations, and the implications of the 
terrorist act or event? Who are the authorities the media turns to when discussing 
domestic terrorism? Moreover, what kind of information is upheld as meaningful? Which 
(real or proposed) responses to domestic terrorism are portrayed as favoured/accepted, 
and which are criticized or diminished in importance? In a broader, more generalized 
sense, what recurrent themes and messages emerge in the Canadian media’s 
conceptualization of domestic terrorism?  
To address this question, and all questions that may branch from it, I have 
examined the framing present in 173 articles from nearly 40 Canadian newspapers from 
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across the country, ranging from large-scale national publications like the Globe and 
Mail or Maclean’s, to regional/local papers like the Kitchener-Waterloo Record or the 
Hamilton Spectator. Each of these articles has been coded line-by-line, using reputable 
qualitative data analysis software, to distinguish frames or elements of frames. My 
analytical objective is not only to accurately and consistently identify and describe 
relevant, useful codes representative of frame elements, but also to use these codes to 
structure frames that typify and (to the highest degree possible) encapsulate the Canadian 
news media’s recent presentation of domestic terror and related issues. 
1.3 Research Definitions 
Strong, clear, conceptually valid definitions are essential for a successful research 
project (Berg & Lune, 2012). The following definitions introduce and clarify the central 
concepts this research is built on. 
For the purposes of this study, domestic terrorism1 is any act of terrorism 
committed: 
1. by Canadian citizens, within Canada's borders 
2. by non-Canadian citizens, living in Canada2 
3. by Canadian citizens, in a country other than Canada 
                                                          
1 I am aware that this is a broad definition and includes situations which others may not consider truly 
‘domestic terrorism’. However, the situations are similar enough – and distinct enough from the general 
idea of terrorism as something perpetrated by some culturally remote Other – that I believe they can be 
grouped together unproblematically. Additionally, this definition both a) allows access to a greater pool of 
articles, and b) gets at the part of the framing most interesting to me: how does the news media handle 
instances of terrorism that could hurt Canadians ‘in our own backyard’, and/or instances of terrorism 
committed by our own? 
2 The terror suspects I am describing here are technically non-citizens, meaning they are not legally 
‘Canadian’, but are people who have legally lived and worked within Canada’s borders.  
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‘Terrorism’ furthermore, does not refer to any particular academic or official 
definition of the phenomena, but is an emergent definition coming from the news article 
database. As my main research question asks how the Canadian news media defined, 
presented, and framed terrorism, it would be counterintuitive to impose an external 
definition. The articles making up the database were collected via targeted keyword 
searches; therefore, each one is an example of what Canadian newspapers presented as 
domestic terrorism in the year 2013.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In this literature review, I have endeavoured to construct a narrative that takes the 
reader from the earliest identifiable instances and sites of terrorism-like violence to its 
development into the dreaded and destructive phenomena which transfixes our world 
today. This includes definitions, redefinitions, justifications, and responses, as well as 
methods, beliefs, tactics, and contextual details from choice case studies illustrating 
relevant or definitional aspects of terrorism. The instances discussed were selected 
because they appeared in more than one reputable academic source as representative of a 
‘progression’ in the practice of terror, or because they offered a particularly good example 
of something recurring and pervasive in terrorism. Some brief historical analysis 
contrasts differences and similarities in instances and types of terrorism. The focus of this 
thesis is not a comparative analysis of terrorism through the ages, but a modern-day 
framing analysis of news media; nonetheless, I believe it is important to rest any theories, 
discussions, or conclusions that may arise on a solid foundation of factual, historical 
information about the overall phenomenon of terrorism. 
One question emerged as pivotal, but disturbingly obscure: what exactly is (and is 
not) terrorism? In an effort to address this question, I reference and critically assess 
working definitions of terrorism employed by governments, NGOs, and academics, as 
well as some ‘common-sense’ understandings of terrorism. As this thesis focuses 
centrally on domestic terrorism in a Canadian context, both Canada’s history with terror 
and domestic terrorism are discussed in special detail. Finally, particular attention is 
given to literature exploring terrorism using media analysis techniques, and especially to 
the studies which helped inspire and inform my methodological approach in this thesis. 
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2.1 Definitions of Terrorism 
The historical analysis is based on two assumptions. The first is that despite 
specific similarities (death, destruction, political/national/ideological rivalries, etc.), 
terrorism was and is somehow different from other types of brutal political violence. The 
second is that there are enough commonalities amongst a variety of seemingly 
disconnected, disparate events in world history to trace a meaningful ‘history of 
terrorism’ – however different these events may be from what we now consider terrorism. 
For example, in the modern context, the idea or label of terrorism is typically invoked to 
indicate physical and/or psychological violence by non-state actors (like al-Qaida), as 
opposed to brutality or oppression by the official ruling body (like the French Revolution 
or Russian governments throughout history). As Miller (2013, p. 1) says, 
We have become accustomed to conceptualizing “terrorism” as an illegitimate 
effort by subnational, clandestine factions [emphasis added] to sabotage existing 
government systems and do great harm to innocent civilians in the process. 
However, this has not stopped scholars from applying modern understandings of 
terrorism to retroactively characterize certain historical events as terrorism, events 
involving various actors – frequently including governments and/or militaries – because 
symbolic brutality and fear-as-control were dominant facets (Miller, 2013, p. 2). The 
Kishinev Pogrom, for instance, was perpetrated against Russian Jews by the ruling Tsarist 
monarchy, but has been qualified as terrorism from a modern point of view because of the 
emotional and psychological effects they were intended to have, and partially succeeded 
in inflicting, upon the target Russian Jewish community. Says Goldstein (2013, p. 587), 
To my mind, the Bund revolutionary Vladimir Medem’s words that ‘The events in 
Kishinev… [were] a terrible blow. People with weak nerves sank into depression. 
Some lost their senses out of sheer despair. Others began to reconsider their 
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worldviews,’ sum up the situation after the Pogrom in light of its harsh and tragic 
consequences.3  
Though state terrorism has taken a backseat to revolutionary, religious, and ideological 
terrorism in the past half century, this has not limited academics from contextualizing a 
great deal of historical brutality as precursors to modern-day terrorism. Nor have any 
particular norms delimiting terrorism stopped modern governments, NGOs, and the 
media from creating addendums to existing definitions of terrorism, and applying the 
term to describe an ever-widening array of acts and situations – including ones that recall 
the past.  
For example, The United States Senate Armed Services Committee (USSASC) 
recently released a statement referencing the difficulty of distinguishing state and non-
state actors, saying, 
These [cyber terrorist] threats come from a range of actors, including: (1) nation 
states with highly sophisticated cyber programs (such as Russia or China), (2) 
nations with lesser technical capabilities but possibly more disruptive intent (such 
as Iran or North Korea), (3) profit-motivated criminals, and (4) ideologically 
motivated hackers or extremists. Distinguishing between state and non-state 
actors within the same country is often difficult [emphasis added] – especially 
when those varied actors actively collaborate, tacitly cooperate, condone criminal 
activity that only harms foreign victims, or utilize similar cyber tools (Clapper, 
2015, p. 2). 
While this acknowledgement of the blurred lines between state and non-state terrorism 
seems appropriate to me, the news media has been observed to extend the 
‘terrorism/terrorist’ designation to such hitherto unrelated crimes such as gang shootings 
                                                          
3 Interestingly, these Pogroms had a similar effect on the Jewish community as more recent Palestinian 
terrorist attacks have had on modern Israeli citizens: the Kishinev Pogroms helped galvanize the Zionist 
movement, which expanded and diversified “after – and as a consequence of – the Pogrom” (Goldstein, 
2013, p. 588). Gaviriely-Nuri and Balas (2010) report that, rather than being cowed by the violence, Israelis 
who have been victimized by terrorist attacks tend to become more anti-terrorist in their perspectives, 
and more determined to wipe out the terrorist threat. 
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(“Alberta teens receive maximum for shooting boy, 5, while he slept”, 2013) and 
domestic abuse (Berrington, 2012). Though it has, ostensibly, been going on for 
centuries, and certainly, some historical patterns may be observed, there seems to be no 
hard limits on what terrorism actually is and is not.  
Of course, there exist ‘common-sense’ understandings of terrorism, the mediated 
possible roots of which are explored in this thesis. However, if an average Canadian were 
to try to rigorously and critically answer the question, ‘what makes something a terrorist 
act, or someone a terrorist?’, using just the information from the government and the 
news media, it would be understandable for him or her to arrive at the (somewhat 
disappointingly tautological) conclusion that the only exclusive, non-contradictory, and 
consistent trait common to everything that we now know as terrorism is the fact that 
someone called it that. While acknowledging this ambiguity, it seemed nonetheless 
helpful to touch on the assortment of definitions present in the ‘expert’ literature – 
publications from government/security agencies and academic researchers. 
2.1.1 Government/Security Sources 
 According to CSIS, Canada’s security and intelligence organization, “terrorism is 
still the leading threat to Canada’s national security” (CSIS, 2014, p. 42). A previous 
CSIS (2011, p. 7) publication identified terrorism as a kind of political violence, 
including,  
an act or omission undertaken, inside or outside Canada, for a political, religious 
or ideological purpose that is intended to intimidate the public with respect to its 
security… or to compel a person, government or organization… from doing or 
refraining from doing any act, and that intentionally causes one of a number of 
specified forms of serious harm. 
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This definition is abridged from the one found in the Canadian Criminal Code, and is the 
same one the RCMP use (Government of Canada, 2015). The American Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents” (CIA, 2007).  
The best governmental definition I found was from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, also American, who recognizes that “there is no single, universally 
accepted, definition of terrorism” (FBI, 2005, p. iv). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given their 
awareness of terrorism’s ambiguity, the FBI’s own definitions of terrorism are close to 
academic in their complexity and thoroughness. Some main elements the FBI ascribe to 
terrorism are: a) the unlawful use of force and violence against a government or civilians 
for the sake of intimidation or coercion, b) being either domestic (located within U.S. 
territory) or international acts of political/ideological violence and coercion that are 
considered criminal inside U.S. jurisdiction, and c) further divided into terrorist incidents, 
acts that did occur, and terrorism preventions, planned acts which were “interdicted 
through investigative activity” (FBI, 2005, pp. iv-v). 
It is possible that Western political/military/intelligence agencies’ definitions of 
terrorism are purposely vague, so that they may be used to their maximum utility in 
mutable situations where national security is at risk. In spite of this, all the above 
definitions share what might be contextually regarded as foundational aspects of 
terrorism: violence, coercion/force/control, political/ideological motives, and threat 
towards civilians or ‘noncombatants’.  
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2.1.2 Academic Sources 
Studies have found over 200 definitions of terrorism (Matusitz, 2013, p. 2). I have 
only referenced a few here. Conte performed a case study of definitions of terrorism in 
four countries. He found that, despite the existence of a comprehensive and humanitarian 
approach offered by the UN, “there is no overwhelming consensus within the 
international community on a definition of terrorism, so that individual States have been 
required to formulate their own definitions of the term” (Conte, 2010a, p. 425). 
Reinforcing the idea of vague but consequential common-sense understandings of 
terrorism is the claim that “in its popular understanding the term ‘terrorism’ tends to refer 
to an act that is wrong, evil, illegitimate, illegal, and a crime” (Conte, 2010a, p. 7). In 
terms of popular usage, 
The term has come to be used to describe a wide range of violent, and sometimes 
not-so violent, conduct (especially in the hands of the media since 11 September 
2001). Acts characterised as terrorist in nature can occur both in conflict and 
peace-time. They may constitute crimes in domestic and international law, and 
they are motivated by a complex matrix of reasons and ideals. Their 
characterisation can also depend upon the person or institution using the label and 
may even change over time. To give two striking examples, the list of most 
wanted terrorists kept by the United States featured, at one time, Yassir Arafat and 
Nelson Mandela, both of whom were subsequently awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize: evidence that this is a highly political and controversial issue. In the months 
prior to his death, Yassir Arafat was in again described as a terrorist by the United 
States Administration (Conte, 2010a, pp. 7-8). 
 
This excerpt nicely encapsulates the subjectivity in defining terrorism, furthermore 
pointing out the shifting and highly politicized application of ‘terrorist’ as a label. One 
man in the example, Nelson Mandela, is popularly viewed in the West as a civil rights 
leader for ending South African Apartheid. After Mandela’s death, Britain’s Prince 
Charles, U.S. President Barak Obama, and other Western heads of state came out to 
officially pay their respects (Clark, 2013). Contrast that with Yassir Arafat, the Palestinian 
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leader who is yet again “described as a terrorist” (Conte, 2010a, p. 8). It is reasonable to 
explain this remarkable difference as an ideological extension of the U.S. administration’s 
support for the state of Israel, which denies the Palestinians’ right to independence; 
perhaps ‘the enemy of my friend is my enemy, too’ when it comes to identifying 
terrorism. Even those who challenge law and order and the status quo may be absolved 
and even embraced, so as long as the political consequences are favourable.4 
Schmid and Jongman’s definition has become quite popular in the social sciences, 
and is widely accepted as the best definition of terrorism that we have today due to their 
intensive methodology. To develop their definition, they “gathered over a hundred 
academic and official definitions of terrorism and examined them to identify the main 
components” (Matusitz, 2013, p. 2). Essentially, Schmid and Jongman (1988/2005) 
performed a content analysis, correlating violence, political goals, causing fear and terror, 
indiscriminate, arbitrary targeting, and the victimization of civilians/noncombatants. The 
authors generalized terrorism as  
… an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent actions employed by 
(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or 
political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are 
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative 
or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. 
Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist 
(organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the 
main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, 
or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or 
propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid & Jongman, 1988/2005, p. 28). 
                                                          
4 The inverse can be observed in the U.S. administration’s attitude towards Afghani mujahedeen during 
the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, when they were seen as rightfully defending their home against the 
Americans’ political rival, the Soviet Union. Militia – including a young Osama bin Laden – were even 
trained and supplied in CIA-founded camps by American operatives. Official opinion of the same groups 
drastically changed when the trained mujahideen began joining groups like al-Qaida and otherwise 
continuing the fight against what they saw as encroaching outside forces, including Western interests. 
From the American perspective, this was “a classic Frankenstein’s monster situation” (Burke, 1999).  
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Cowen echoes aspects of this definition, arguing that “terrorism is a spectacle produced 
for viewers, many of whom live apart from the violence staged events” (2006, p. 233). 
One pithy remark has it that “terrorism is theater” (Jenkins, 1974, p. 4). This appears to 
be an apt description of how audiences in the West process terrorism. For the majority of 
Canadians and Americans, terrorism is something encountered through the nightly news, 
rather than something they expect to encounter in their everyday lives.5  
One logical reason that terrorism has escaped clarity and consensus of definition 
is the fact that groups and individuals rarely identify themselves as terrorists voluntarily. 
As Matusitz (2013, p. 2) explains, “terrorism is a pejorative term”. When self-labelling, 
people favour terms akin to “freedom fighter” (Gupta, 2008, p. 6). “In the Arab/Islamic 
world,” Gupta elaborates, those whom the West considers terrorists are known to 
sympathizers as “‘Shahid’ or ‘martyrs’” (2008, p. 6). Openly claiming to be a terrorist has 
lost whatever appeal it may once have had. The last group to self-identify as ‘terrorists’ 
were the Jewish extremist group Lehi, active in the British mandate of Palestine during 
the 1940s; even then, other Jewish nationalist groups rejected the label, reinforcing its 
status as a pejorative term by instead declaring that the British were the terrorists (Gupta, 
2008). Gupta’s (2008) study reveals some of the confusion and complexity inherent in 
pinpointing and addressing terrorism, illustrating the practical defining characteristics of 
terrorism as relativistic and changing depending on whose side one is viewing the 
conflict from.  
                                                          
5 Despite recent attacks on our home soil, this statement is still true in a relativistic sense: when compared 
to the citizens of Israel/Palestine, much of the Middle East, and some parts of Africa and Eastern Europe, 
we in the West (especially Canada) have enjoyed a significant degree of freedom from terror attacks. 
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Actions and methods condemned as terrorism, when they are perpetrated by one’s 
opponents, may be considered perfectly acceptable when adopted by one’s allies. The 
French revolutionary Robespierre thought of terror “as either a weapon of oppression 
when utilized by despots of monarchical rule, or as a means of liberation when dispensed 
in the name of the people” (Miller, 2013, p. 37). Robespierre, of course, thought himself 
to represent the people, making his applications of terror “justice… an emanation of 
virtue [resulting] from the application of democracy to the most pressing needs of the 
country” (Miller, 2013, p. 37). This perspective became codified in the Robespierre 
government’s increasingly draconian policies, including “severe police laws, permitting 
the authorities to make sweeping arrests on the basis of little more than suspicion and 
rumor” (Miller, 2013, p. 38). Unlike a situation of traditional warfare, revolutions, 
guerrilla warfare, and the like are almost inherently sites of shifting meanings and 
uncertain realities. Whether the revolutionaries/guerrillas are fighting to grab power by 
any means necessary, or struggling to maintain control, the unstable power dynamic puts 
a limit on any one group’s ability to propagate their privileged definitions, except within 
their own established sphere of influence. 
This is an important point to consider when trying to understand terrorism. It is 
something of an ethical, political, and historical minefield trying to “[distinguish] a 
terrorist from a ‘revolutionary’, an ‘insurgent’, a ‘freedom fighter’, a ‘martyr’ or an 
ordinary criminal” (Shughart, 2006, p. 9). Both the ‘terrorists’ and their targets see 
themselves as the victims, their actions justifiable and rooted in righteous defense. A look 
into the history of terrorism will help further illuminate how this happens. 
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2.2 The History of Terrorism 
“International terrorism is not a new phenomenon,” (2010, p. 7) Conte tells us. It 
is “one of a number of genres of political violence, which also include war, genocide and 
ethnic cleansing among its main categories” (Miller, 2013, p.1). Though terrorism and 
terrorist groups might materialize during any of the above forms of conflict, and 
frequently have been associated with such events, terrorism (domestic and international 
alike) is thought of and treated as a distinct entity. 
The practice of terrorism has gone through many transitions and fluctuations in 
popularity from its bloody origins to the present day. A foray into the history of terrorism 
reveals ancient militant groups with similar structure, practices, methods, and goals to the 
terrorists of today: notably, the Jewish Zealots and the Muslim Assassins. From the 
beginning, religion was integrated into terrorism. Referring to the Zealots and other 
seminal groups, Rapoport (2002) notes, “religion determined every purpose and tactic of 
this ancient form [of terrorism]”. 
The Jewish Zealots, or sicari, who attempted to violently subvert the Roman 
occupation of Palestine, are widely reported as the earliest example of a socially and 
politically motivated group using terrorist tactics (Shughart, 2006, p. 13). The word sicari 
is “a generic Latin term derived from sicarius, ‘dagger-man’ [used to] denote the Zealots” 
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 55), a reference to their penchant for quick, stealthy 
stabbings of Roman soldiers and officials. The Jews found Roman rule humiliating and 
oppressive after enjoying more than a century of independence, and revolted in 
“spontaneous hotbeds of insurrection” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 56). The sicari 
were able to channel the latent violence born of the widespread humiliation felt by 
the Jewish people. They were able to organize and then direct that violence 
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against the Roman “invader,” as well as against those members of the Jewish 
community whom they considered to be traitors to the national cause (Chaliand & 
Blin, 2007a, p. 57). 
Much like typical modern-day non-state terrorist groups, the sicari realized they came 
from a position of weakness, and adopted “an indirect strategy aimed at keeping the 
adversary off balance by waging an essentially psychological campaign… [evolving] 
over time and in response to circumstances” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 58). The 
Romans reacted in kind, hoping to strike a psychological blow by crucifying 2000 Jews.  
Chaliand and Blin (2007a, p. 56) further explain, “it was the first use of terror in a 
war that was to last several decades”. Here we see terror used as a tool by both the 
insurgent sicari and by the ruling Romans. This ‘first’ is significant for yet another reason 
– it is one of the oldest examples of how the idea of purity is often central to radical and 
extremist movements. The sicari sought Jewish political purity, by attempting to subvert 
and excise Roman rule and establish a Jewish government, and Jewish religious purity, 
by brutalizing other Jews “whom they felt to be insufficiently scrupulous in their piety” 
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 57).  In this regard, the sicari can be compared to modern-
day Islamic fundamentalist groups, whose strict adherence to an absolute version of 
Islamic belief frequently leads them into vicious and bloody conflict with neighbouring 
groups, societies, or nations with somewhat different interpretations of correct Islamic 
doctrine and practice.6 
                                                          
6 Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups might be the most topical example, but they are by no means the 
only other group to cling to an absolutist purity that scathes inwardly as well as outwardly. Ideological 
entities including the Canadian Communist party (Laxer, 2004), the Irish Republican Army (Derkins, 2003), 
Maoists, and the German Nazi party (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a) exhibited the same tendencies, manifesting 
as group shaming and purges. 
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 The second documented example of an ostensibly terrorist organization is that of 
the Islamic group known as the Assassins, originating from Iran and Syria. The Assassins 
earned their place amongst the forerunners of terrorism by 
[co-opting] the use of terror to psychological ends and [targeting], among others, 
a foreign, Christian power: the Crusaders. The terrorists themselves were 
animated by an unshakeable faith that allowed them to sacrifice themselves 
willingly in the course of a mission in the certainty that they would ascend 
directly to paradise (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, p. 61). 
The group developed out of a “less moderate [i.e. more radical]” (Chaliand & Blin, 
2007a, p. 62) Shi’ite Muslim movement, a result of the schism between Sunni and Shi’ite 
Muslims that persists to this day. The Assassins’ main goals were the establishment of 
theocratic Shi’ite rule wherever they were active, and the annihilation of anyone who 
they saw as opposed to their cause (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, pp. 65-70). They were 
known for their ritualistic use of bladed weapons, their methods of disguise and 
infiltration, intimidation through murder, and for their adherents’ willing acceptance of 
suicide missions – in fact, most Assassins died in the course of carrying out their crimes 
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007a). This is a familiar story, and as Chaliand & Blin (2007a, p. 70) 
tell us, “over the centuries, volunteers for death would become an integral element of the 
history of terrorism, as can still be seen today in the status enjoyed in certain quarters 
by… suicide bombers”. Also familiar is the fact that – much like the sicari before them, 
and countless others after them – the Assassins turned their blades upon fellow Muslims 
that they believed to be heretics or traitors just as easily as they did against Christians or 
political rivals (Chaliand & Blin, 2007a, pp. 71-73).  
 Though these groups were active centuries ago (around 6 B.C.E. for the sicari 
Zealots, and during the early 1000s A.D. for the Assassins) echoes can be seen in the 
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ideologies, actions, beliefs, and statements emanating from modern-day fundamentalist 
religious terrorist organizations. However, the choice to use terroristic measures stems 
from more than the motivations of extremist fervor and hatred alone, a complexity often 
overlooked in some discussions of terrorism. According to Chaliand and Blin (2007a), 
both of these early cases involved situational contingencies which led to the decision to 
adopt such strategies. As the authors explain, 
taking up the arms of terrorism was a logical choice for the Assassins, as it had 
been for the sicarii. Its effectiveness made it the primary weapon in their strategic 
arsenal and eventually defined the sect’s very essence for posterity (Chaliand & 
Blin, 2007a, p. 60). 
These two organizations are at the very root of what we now identify as terrorism, in 
many ways establishing precedents for other terrorist groups (especially those from the 
Middle East).  
 In the following centuries, terror became largely a weapon of armies, rather than 
civilian upstarts. One of the foremost proponents of terror was the nomadic Mongol 
horde, active across both Asia and Europe from 1206 – 1370 A.D. The Mongols “relied 
on the terror they inspired in civilian populations and armies to prevent uprisings in their 
wake” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, p. 86). In his Discourses, Macchiavelli characterized the 
Mongol invasions as notably horrific, a “kind of war most frightful and cruel” (1950, pp. 
302-304); he theorized that they engaged in this cruelty because they were driven out of 
their homeland by famine or calamity, and were now attempting to usurp new lands and 
utterly destroy the inhabitants and their culture, so as then to possess these lands and their 
resources for themselves. Macchiavelli cleverly pinpointed a theme recurring in various 
contexts throughout the history of terrorism: that it often arises out of a sense of 
desperation and need. While scarcity was hardly the only reason behind the Mongol 
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invasions, it is a problem inherent in the nomadic lifestyle. The need to search for new 
resources when old ones were exhausted is a quintessential part of a transient existence, 
and this certainly applied to the Mongols, as did cultural values extoling strength, 
conquest, and the avenging of perceived wrongs.  
The Mongols acquired resources through trade as well as conquest, but their 
reputation as traders, is overshadowed by their vicious battle tactics meant to fully 
humiliate the enemy and set an example for others. Among the Mongols’ reported deeds 
were massacring entire cities, using captured civilians as human shields (while sacking 
their human shields’ native cities or towns), leaving piles of skulls, torturing enemy rulers 
to death, mass rape, and cannibalism (Hays, 2012). The Mongols were known and feared 
across Europe and Asia for their brutality. Cities were known to surrender tribute or let 
the Mongols loot at will rather than face the wrath of the horde (Hays, 2012). Their 
tactics alone were not unique, but the fact that their empire was based on intimidation, 
subjugation and control via psychological warfare at least as much as it was on physical 
violence is notable as an instance of widespread, effective terrorism. 
 Famed English social and legal philosopher Hobbes envisioned a rule by terror, 
wherein fear of authority granted the dominant authority power and strength (Hobbes, 
[1651] 1996). Hobbes was not thinking of the itinerant Mongol horde, but of nations 
ruled by cruel despots. He wrote this shortly after the Thirty Years’ War, a horrific 
conflict involving nearly every powerful European nation of that time. The Thirty Years’ 
War was atypical for its time, since it was a war “in which terror was used 
systematically” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, p. 85). Part of what made the war so vicious 
was the fact that it was a war of religion as well as politics, pitting Catholic and 
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Protestant states and groups against each other (Miller, 2013, pp. 21-23). Terror was used 
as a weapon of war by the various European militaries, private mercenaries, and civilian 
guerillas. The French marquis de Sourdis, for example, killed a number of random locals 
from a town his forces captured, and then strung up their corpses in a nearby forest in the 
hopes that anyone passing through would spread the word of his victory (Chaliand & 
Blin, 2007b, p. 91). This instance, not unlike the atrocities perpetrated by ISIS/ISIL on 
civilian communities in Iraq and Syria, exemplifies the terrorist ethos of casually 
exploiting civilians, using violence and death as symbolic messages, and – interestingly – 
putting a conscious priority on spreading the news of the attack. Part of how the nomadic 
Mongols managed to exploit powerful European and Asian cities was through their 
reputation; galling tales of torture, death, and destruction were reason enough for some 
rulers to sacrifice their treasures and their pride. Perhaps the marquis de Sourdis expected 
similar results. “Terrorism [as] theater” (Jenkins, 1974; Cowen, 2006) was beginning to 
take shape. 
The Thirty Years’ War was ended with the peace of Westphalia in 1648. The 
diplomats who gathered at Westphalia found the abject violence of the war and its cost to 
human life abominable. The resulting accords instated mechanisms to ensure no one 
nation could dominate all others. They established principles of tolerance and 
international non-interference, stipulating that no state could rightfully meddle in the 
affairs of another (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, p. 91). The peace of Westphalia was quite 
effective, for a time, putting an end to wars of religion and the terrorism associated with 
them.  
However, in 1789, “terror assumed an altogether different aspect. No longer a 
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minor instrument of the military apparatus, it had become a basic tool of the apparatus of 
the modern state” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007b, pp. 91-92). Over a century after Hobbes 
theorized about the ‘rule of terror’, the actual word terrorism was coined by Burke to 
describe the events of the French Revolution, where roughly 40,000 executions by 
guillotine were conducted “in order to instill fear in the minds of the ‘enemies’ of the 
revolution… [or] to terrify an aristocrat or a supporter of the French monarchy into 
submission” (Gupta, 2008, p. 7). Violence flourished during and after the French 
Revolution, as “the monarchy ceased to maintain its authority and competing factions 
vied to fill the vacuum of power” (Miller, 2013, p. 35). As traditional French institutions 
and loci of power crumbled, Miller (2013, p. 35) explains, an unstable series of new 
institutions arose, with “new frameworks of political legitimacy being invented almost 
daily”. Each new institution strove to secure its legitimacy by publicly executing its 
‘enemies’ – a distinct and ruthless show of symbolic violence, sending the message that 
they would not tolerate any threat to their newfound power.7  
As the Revolution progressed, the dominant Robespierre government took up 
increasingly brutal and extremist measures, including campaigns to eliminate not only 
counterrevolutionaries, but those who were “indifferent… [or] passive towards the 
Republic” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, pp. 108-109). Robespierre himself was an 
ideological purist, determined to “cleanse society of the filth that pollute it so as to begin 
afresh on new foundations” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, p. 110). Of course, he did not work 
alone. Executions were ordered and enabled by committees and laws. Acts like the Law 
                                                          
7 The gruesome executions and bloodshed did not actually function as an effective coercive measure or a 
deterrent; during the revolution, these groups winked in and out of existence, often replaced by others of 
their ilk (Miller, 2013, pp. 35-6). 
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of 22 Prairial “allowed anyone to be accused of being an enemy of the revolution… [and] 
abolished all the legal guarantees that had survive to that point” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, 
p. 109). Furthermore, the Committee of Public Safety dismantled the previous separation 
of executive, legislative, and judiciary branches, and promptly took command of all three. 
Rulers used xenophobia, character assassination, and wars to legitimize their actions and 
justify the savagery against their own people (Chaliand & Blin, 2007c, pp. 109-111). The 
French Revolution illustrates a government which simultaneously believed it was 
‘fighting the enemies of the people’, and yet was itself the primary enemy of the people, 
committing terrorism against its own citizens by robbing them of their rights and trying to 
control them through fear and murder. The rhetoric employed has some disturbing 
parallels to modern-day governments’ responses to the threat of terrorism: the whittling 
down or removal of civil rights, blurring of the lines between branches of government 
and their jurisdictions, and introducing vast increases in the power of government bodies 
to decide (in secrecy and/or with decreasing accountability and supervision) the fate of 
citizens they deem somehow suspicious.  
2.3 Contemporary Terrorism 
Rapoport (2002) delineates “four waves of rebel terror” in the modern world 
(1800s – present day).8 These waves are anarchist (1880s – 1920s), anti-colonial (1920s – 
1960s), new left wave (1960s – 1990s), and religious (1979 – present day) (Rapoport, 
2002). Subsequent historians of terrorism have borrowed from and built upon Rapoport’s 
                                                          
8 This may seem to be a very broad range to label ‘contemporary’, but I chose it because – as I will 
demonstrate – it is during this timeframe that we may observe the beginnings of the styles of terrorism 
most relevant in today’s world. 
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four waves. Many of the books and articles I consulted for this literature review 
emphasize the same movements as Rapoport, mostly supporting his chronological flow 
(i.e. proposed timelines/eras) as well (Shughart, 2006; Chaliand & Blin, 2007a-2007e;  
Miller, 2013).  
Shughart (2006, p. 7) condenses and slightly changes Rapoport’s ideas, describing 
“three stylized waves [of terrorism]… terrorism in the service of national liberation and 
ethnic separatism, left-wing terrorism, and Islamist terrorism”. Shughart’s take on 
Rapoport’s work is reductionist, yet highly compatible nonetheless. National liberation 
and ethnic separatism can be correlated to anti-colonial terrorism; left-wing terrorism can 
be linked to both anarchist and new left wave terrorism; and Islamist terrorism is part of 
the religious wave. I discuss contemporary terrorism using the four terms and labels I 
found most inclusive and useful as distinctions characterizing variations of terrorism. 
These are a) anarchist, b) national liberation and ethnic separatist, and c) religious, with 
the addition of d) state terrorism, as identified in Chaliand and Blin (2010a, p. 229). 
A ‘wave’ may be thought of as a period of time dominated by a particular type, or 
variation, of terrorism (Rapoport, 2002). All four variations have old roots, but have 
persisted into modern times. We may observe the Palestinian people’s timeworn conflict 
with Israel, the Freemen-on-the-Land movement in Canada and the United States, and the 
infamous international terrorist organization al-Qaida, or the more recent ISIS/ISIL. 
Furthermore, modern-day states like Iran and North Korea have been declared terrorist 
regimes by the United States, citing human rights abuses against their own citizens as 
well as international aggression. Each wave/variation may share common characteristics 
with others; they are not discrete, but they do provide a useful idea of the developmental 
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‘path’ of contemporary terrorism.  
Before discussing the first three waves, I want to address state terrorism. State 
terrorism emerges repeatedly as part of other waves and variations of terrorism. It is not a 
wave of contemporary terrorism; its heyday, if it had one, would likely have been during 
the time of the French Revolution and the Pogroms. I have recognized state terrorism in 
this discussion because it recurs again and again as an important factor shaping terrorism 
phenomena today. As I will demonstrate, anarchist terrorism was largely inspired and 
fueled by the cruel and unstable Russian state, and national/ethnic liberation terrorism is 
fundamentally a conflict between a population that feels subjugated and the ruling 
majority. Religious terrorism and state terrorism have a complex relationship: sometimes 
state terrorism occurs in response to religious terrorism, and in other cases, a religious 
dictatorship may be branded a ‘terrorist state’. Acts of terror have been committed by 
states during war, as well as against their own people, historically and into the present 
day. Some of the most potent modern examples come out of Latin America: death squads 
in Brazil, suppression of Indians in Guatemala, abuses by the Argentine military, the 
Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, and the notably brutal counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency measures employed by Peru by Fujimori’s government. Africa has 
also seen its share of state terrorism in the last forty years: the dictatorships of Taylor in 
Liberia, Nguema in Guinea, and Idi Amin in Uganda, civil war in Sierra Leone, and the 
Rwandan genocide (during which rape was routinely used as suppression, punishment, or 
to break the will of women and their families). In the Middle East, massacres have 
occurred against the Kurds by the Turkish state, and against the Sunni population by 
Syria. Saddam Hussein’s regime was known for “the systematic deployment of terror at 
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every level” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 230), especially against Kurds and Shiites. In 
Asia, Cambodian dictator Pol Pot committed genocidal massacres, and in one year, the 
Suharto regime in Indonesia murdered between 300,000 and 500,000 known or suspected 
Communists (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, pp. 229-230). These are just a few examples of a 
worldwide phenomenon. 
2.3.1 Anarchist/Left-Wing Terrorism 
Rapoport (2002) lists anarchist/left-wing terrorism as the first wave of 
contemporary terrorism. A type of anti-government terrorism, left-wing terrorism is 
specifically related to left-wing extremist political ideology. Left-wing terrorist 
organizations typically endorse violent action against capitalist institutions, the 
bourgeoisie, and what they see as an exploitative, classist status quo. The peak of left-
wing terrorism occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with anarchist 
terrorism and Russian terrorism. Indeed,  
It was ‘anarchism’ and ‘anarchists’ – as well as nihilists, dynamiters, Blanquists, 
assassins, revolutionists, fanatics – rather than ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ which 
were used in most of the nineteenth century to describe what we would today term 
terrorist acts (Thorup, 2010, p. 103). 
 Anarchist terrorism has been summarized as “bomb attacks as a means of propaganda” 
(Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 113). Rapoport (2002) delves deeper, explaining that 
The Anarchist doctrine has four major points: 1) Modern society contains huge 
reservoirs of latent ambivalence and hostility. 2) Society muffles and diffuses 
them by devising moral conventions to generate guilt and provide channels for 
settling some grievances and securing personal amenities. 3) However, 
conventions can be explained historically, and therefore acts we deem to be 
immoral, our children will hail as noble efforts to liberate humanity. 4) Terror is 
the quickest and most effective means to destroy conventions. The perpetrator 
frees himself from the paralyzing grip of convention to become a different sort of 
person, and society's defenders will respond in ways that undermine the rules they 
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claim are sacred. 
During the mid-1800s, the United States and Europe were experiencing hitherto 
unknown levels of technological progress and socioeconomic transformation due to the 
continuing Industrial Revolution, increased life expectancy, and an unprecedented 
amount of immigration. These factors and others combined to facilitate the development 
of two main socioeconomic classes: proletariat and bourgeoisie, worker and capitalist 
(Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 115). As more people migrated from rural areas to live and 
work in the city, the average person’s job changed from that of a farmer to a factory 
employee. Conditions in early Industrial Revolution-era factories were harsh and 
dangerous, with long workdays, little freedom for workers to refuse orders and few 
workers’ rights. Cities quickly became overcrowded, with the working class vying for 
even the worst of paying jobs so as to avoid life on the street or in one of the era’s dismal 
poorhouses (the injustice and cruelty of which became famously immortalized in literary 
works such as Dickens’ Oliver Twist). However, life was significantly less grim for those 
who owned the means of production. The capitalist upper classes had the privilege of 
political and social influence inaccessible to the working classes, though their wealth was 
built on the labour of those toiling in their mills, mines, and factories. While many social 
philosophers, such as Adam Smith, argued in favour of the capitalist system, certain other 
thinkers took a less optimistic view, decrying its inherent inequalities, as well as the many 
abuses and vulnerabilities suffered by the working classes. Socialism, communism, and 
other movements and ideologies with an emphasis on workers’ rights and greater 
socioeconomic equality arose in response to Industrial-era working conditions. Marx and 
Engels, the fathers of classic and contemporary sociological perspectives such as 
Marxism, conflict theory, and many others, based their analyses on the Industrial 
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European economy and social conditions. Anarchism is of the same family as 
communism, socialism, and other pro-worker/anti-establishment politics, but is typically 
the most extreme version; both communism and socialism are notably more pro-
establishment in the sense that these ideologies allow for the existence of a government 
or ruling body (though the right government is one supposedly by the people, for the 
people, limiting if not precluding private ownership of social goods and restricting the 
ability for individuals to capitalize on the means of production). Anarchism, on the other 
hand, was against not only the perceived inequality and oppression of the capitalist 
economic system, but the idea of big government (i.e. beyond community-centered rule) 
itself. 
While some anarchists subscribed to more moderate views, limiting their 
activities to nonviolent meetings, rallies, and publications, anarchists such as Pytor 
Kropotkin advocated “propaganda by deed… [to awaken] popular consciousness” 
(Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 116). Across Italy, Spain, America, and France, anarchists 
paired impassioned public statements condemning capitalism and inequality with violent 
attacks on people and places they saw as symbolic of the reviled social order. Prominent 
anarchist terrorists include Emile Henry, who turned to terrorism in an effort to avenge 
miners who had gone on strike, but had been ignored by the mining company. Henry 
placed a bomb in the company’s offices; however, the bomb was discovered and taken to 
a police station, where it exploded and killed five people. Henry rationalized his actions 
in typical extremist fashion, saying, “the building was inhabited only by bourgeoisie; 
hence there would be no innocent victims… the bourgeoisie as a whole should expiate its 
crimes” (Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 129). He later bombed a café in Paris, killing one 
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person and injuring others, after which he stated, “the bourgeoisie did not distinguish 
among the anarchists… [since you, the bourgeoisie] strike indiscriminately, we, too, 
strike indiscriminately” (Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 129). Anarchist terrorism faded 
when leading figures in the anarchist movement called for an end to propaganda by deed 
(Hubac-Occhipinti, 2007, p. 130). Nonetheless, certain aspects of the anarchist 
extremists’ ideologies and political rhetoric are still alive in some more extreme left- and 
right-wing groups. 
Just as the suffering and oppression of the working classes endemic to Industrial 
Revolution-era Europe incited movements of radical anarchism, state terrorism (which 
also victimized the lower/working classes of society) played a part in fostering discontent 
and desperation as well. Russia, for example, has a long history of state terrorism via 
secret police and totalitarian rulers, from the Tsarist monarchy to the Communist era.9 It 
is important to note that Russian anarchist and left-wing terrorism, which was a seminal 
force driving the anarchist movement in Europe and abroad, was developed largely as a 
reaction to the state’s repression and abuse of the lower classes. Particularly notable was 
the Tsarist regime’s state terrorism against the Jews. For centuries, campaigns of death, 
torture, and destruction known as Pogroms were regularly launched against Jewish 
communities in order to limit their numbers and wealth, and to ensure subservience to the 
Tsar (Ternon, 2007). Goldstein (2013, p. 587), for example, refers to the galvanizing 1903 
“terror attacks perpetrated against the Jews of Kishinev [or] the Kishinev Pogrom”. 
                                                          
9 During the Soviet period, leaders like Joseph Stalin wielded totalitarian levels of control over his people 
and party, killing millions in his attempts to create an ideologically pure Communist state. Like 
Robespierre, Stalin ruled through propaganda and fear, manipulating the media and using his secret police 
to execute or exile anyone he saw as a threat – including fellow party members, such as his former 
comrade Leon Trotsky (Harris, 2013, pp. 97-119). 
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Social systems of serfdom and classist tyranny oppressed the numerous poor of all 
religious backgrounds. 
In response, socialist revolutionaries began printing documents calling for the 
assassination of the ruling Romanov family, and the murder of landowners (Miller, 2013, 
p. 66). This intensified in the mid-1800s – early 1900s, individuals and minor 
revolutionary groups had been bombing, assassinating, and otherwise assaulting the 
Tsarist government and its representatives with some regularity from the 1840s onwards, 
culminating with the Bolshevik  revolution of 1917 (Miller, 2013, pp. 66-75). The 
propagandists were a significant, though not always successful, force in the Russian 
socialist revolution, used to recruit, set standards, and communicate (Rapoport, 2002; 
Ternon, 2007, pp. 140-141). Through propaganda we learn of Russian radicals’ utter 
dedication to the cause, as shown in circulated materials idealizing the revolutionary as  
‘a doomed man’…his identity and consciousness are dominated by one single 
notion – the total passion for the revolution. To accomplish this goal, he must 
liberate himself first from all connections to the civil order and the state, which he 
seeks to destroy (Miller, 2013, p. 68). 
 
Here, another dimension of the nature of radicalism and terrorism is made explicit. 
Before taking extreme, violent actions against a society, the perpetrators begin to see 
themselves as no longer connected to that society, and that society as representative of 
them. Additionally, some appear to manifest a detachment from the self; one’s life is 
consumed by the cause, and any personal goals become sublimated into the revolution, 
the purity of the movement. As former Weatherman Brian Flanagan says, “when you feel 
you have right on your side, you can do some pretty horrible things” (PBS, 2015). 
 Rapoport (2002) cites two reasons for the anarchist wave beginning in the late 
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19th century: doctrine and technology. First, he confirms the power of the propagandists, 
saying, 
Russian writers, particularly Nechaev, Bakunin, and Kropotkin, created a doctrine 
or strategy for terror, an inheritance for successors to use, improve, and transmit. 
Participants, even those with different ultimate objectives, were now able to learn 
from each other (Rapoport, 2002).  
Furthermore, Rapoport (2002) comments on terrorist groups as situated in a broader 
social context. He states that,  
… if one compares Nechaev's Revolutionary Catechism with the Training Manual 
Bin Laden wrote for Al-Qaeda, the paramount desire to learn from the 
experiences of both friends and enemies is clear (Rapoport, 2002). 
Technology, as mentioned at the beginning of this section on left-wing terrorism, was in a 
state of flux during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. New technologies were changing 
not just the state of labour and the possibilities for invention, but the very nature of 
human interaction. Railroads, the telegraph, and newspapers allowed people to travel, 
share information, and learn in ways previously unthinkable. People were able to 
immerse themselves in a vast world of facts, ideas, and perspectives never before 
accessible to the common citizen. As Rapoport (2002) surmises, 
The transformation in communication and transportation patterns is the second 
reason that explains the timing and spread of the first wave. The telegraph, daily 
mass newspapers, and railroads flourished in this period; and subsequently 
throughout the 20th century, technology continued to shrink time and space. 
Naturally, these new technological conditions provided a fertile breeding ground for the 
spread of ideologies from around the world. It was now easier than ever for groups like 
the anarchists to recruit members and disseminate materials. Rapoport’s (2002) analysis 
suggests that since its dawning, mass media has been connected with radicalism. 
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The legacy of the late 19th century anarchists laid the groundwork for a slew of 
leftist revolutionary groups to take up terrorist methods. In the United States, the 
Weathermen (or the Weather Underground Organization) committed several bombings, 
attempted bombings, and other terrorist acts from 1969 to 1987 (Kushner, 1998, pp. 145-
151). Taking their name from a Bob Dylan song, the Weathermen started as a student 
organization with anti-war, anti-capitalist, and anti-government values (The Port Huron 
Statement, 2006). Having decided peaceful protests were ineffective, the group started 
riots and declared war on the American government. These tactics gained them the media 
attention they desired (PBS, 2015). The Symbionese Liberation Army, “a group of 
Berkeley radicals led by… an escaped convict”, also in the United States, “adopted its 
rhetoric from Communists and South American revolutionaries” (Sullentrop, 2002). They 
embraced the concept of “‘urban propaganda’”, which called for selective violence 
“aimed at capturing media attention” (Sullentrop, 2002). The SLA claimed responsibility 
for murder, but are perhaps best known for the kidnapping of Patty Hearst, whose 
grandfather and father were Hearst Corp. press barons. The high-profile drama of 
Hearst’s kidnapping put the SLA in the media spotlight (Sullentrop, 2002). These two 
left-wing radical groups help characterize terrorism as theater in the 20th century. 
In Germany, another leftist, anti-capitalist student group known as the Red Army 
Fraction (RAF), also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, executed hijackings and 
shootings, killing more than 30 people from the late 1960s and to the mid-1980s (‘Who 
were the Baader-Meinhof Gang?’, 2007). The ideological plan behind the killings is 
unclear, but the BBC (2007) tells us that 
Some analysts believe the RAF had hoped to push the state to a breaking point, 
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goading it into introducing a series of illiberal measures that would whip up anger 
within the left and spark some form of civil war. 
A radical left-wing movement known as the Red Brigades were active in Italy 
from 1970 to 1984. “At its peak the organization had thousands of active members” 
diffused throughout Italy (Stanford University, 2012). They gained notoriety for attacking 
property rather than people, such as arson and raids on right-wing organizations’ offices; 
however, they were responsible for the kidnapping and murder of Christian Democrat 
leader Aldo Moro (Stanford University, 2012). 
 The Weathermen, SLA, Baader-Meinhof Gang, and the Red Brigades are all part 
of what Rapoport (2002) defines as the “new left wave”. The Vietnam war, he says, 
“produced the psychological requisites” (Rapoport, 2002) for this new wave of groups 
emerging from the West, but hostile to the West’s values and agenda. They saw 
themselves as “vanguards for the masses of the Third World… [standing up] against the 
American Goliath” (Rapoport, 2002). The new left wave provides an interesting parallel 
to modern-day domestic terrorism – like many of the ‘average Canadian boys’ who 
become radicalized, these groups were made up of people who adopted terrorist 
ideologies because they began to identify with a culture other than the one they were 
raised in, and subsequently became obsessed with righting what they perceive as 
injustices or oppression against that culture.  
2.3.2 National Liberation and Ethnic Separatist/Anti-Colonialist Terrorism 
The next wave, national liberation and ethnic separatist, or anti-colonialist 
terrorism, is set up in opposition to an occupying force. The ancient sicari were of this 
type. A more modern historical example were the Carbonari, an Italian secret society 
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(circa 1809) dedicated to overthrowing Napoleonic occupation of Italy. Groups like this 
espouse “alternative conceptions of political legitimacy” (Miller, 2013, p. 43). For 
instance, the Carbonari initiation ceremony was a political, anti-despotic, and satirical 
adaptation of traditional Catholic ritual, including “symbols of Catholicism that were to 
be used violently against the French occupiers” (Miller, 2013, p. 43). Italy is a strongly 
Catholic country, but the Pope at the time had allied himself with Napoleon, forcing the 
Carbonari to subvert Catholic tradition in their goal to expel the French and gain 
independent rule. The fact that the secret society lifted their initiation ritual from a 
Catholic template indicates the religion’s cultural saturation; the fact that they 
“deliberately mocked” (Miller, 2013, p. 43) the ritual shows that they no longer accepted 
the authority of the mainstream church, and additionally, that national independence took 
primacy over religious loyalty. Like the sicari, the Carbonari were a clandestine group 
with no formal military, “favoring the dagger and poison in the combat against Bonaparte 
and his Italian ally, the Pope” (Miller, 2013, p. 44). National liberation/ethnic separatist 
groups are most often at a power differential with their opponents, and thus adopt 
subversive methods. 
Prior to the rise of Islamic terrorism, national/ethnic terrorism was the foremost 
type of modern terror. Says Shughart (2006, p. 14), 
… much of the terrorism of the post-Second World War period originated in the 
grievances of ethnic and religious groups marginalized politically in artificial 
nation-states created by the colonial powers in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 
Arbitrary borders and inflexible rulers plagued the people of Central Asia, the Balkans, 
Palestine, and the Middle East generally. Shughart (2006, p. 14) claims that events in 
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these regions, including left-wing terrorist groups declaration of solidarity with the 
oppressed peoples, “can be said to be the root causes of all three waves of modern 
terrorism”. While all three waves are certainly connected to some degree, it is important 
to recognize the propensity for more-or-less independent formation of terrorist groups. 
Shughart (2006, p. 14) admits that the terrorism which arose in Europe and the Middle 
East does not explain today’s Latin American terrorists, the Tamil Tigers, or ‘cult’ 
terrorist groups like Japan’s Aum Shinriyko.10 Notable “separatist or autonomist ethnic 
movements in the West” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 227) include the Irish Republican 
Army, the military wing of the Spanish Basque Homeland and Freedom group, and 
Canada’s FLQ. 
The first domestic terrorist organization in Canada, the Front de liberation du 
Quebec (FLQ), was a French Canadian separatist group active in the 1960s. FLQ tactics 
included using stolen dynamite to bomb mailboxes in Anglophone areas, the Montreal 
Stock Exchange, RCMP offices, and Montreal City Hall, among other targets they felt 
were representative of the Anglophone domination of French Canada (Whitaker, 2010). 
They had a manifesto and a publication, through which they communicated threats 
intended to foster fear and intimidation, as well as to recruit sympathetic individuals. In 
addition to bombings, and theft, the FLQ orchestrated two successful kidnappings. The 
FLQ became bolder with time, ‘coming out’ on national radio, escalating violence, and 
threatening to kill members of Parliament (Whitaker, 2010). In response to increased 
                                                          
10 Cases like Aum Shinriyko, a Buddhism-based new religious movement which carried out deadly sarin 
attacks in 1994 and 1995, are closer to religious terrorism than any of the other waves/varieties. Similar to 
the infamous American group the Manson Family, who killed innocent people to precipitate a race war 
they believed to be imminent, a doomsday philosophy and a charismatic leader are at the heart of this 
instance of ‘cult’ terrorism. 
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FLQ aggression, and requests from Quebec politicians, Prime Minister Trudeau enacted 
the War Measures Act. This act suspended habeus corpus and gave police liberal powers 
of arrest. Most politicians supported Trudeau, but others criticized the implementation of 
the War Measures Act as an excessive reaction. Still others expressed support for the FLQ 
(Whitaker, 2010). The FLQ Crisis was a controversial period in Canadian history, and 
perhaps bespeaks something about ethnic separatist terrorism. In this case, the FLQ 
appealed to the discontent of a significant ethnic/cultural minority, and were seemingly 
tolerated before they began to take hostages and threaten lives. Furthermore, Trudeau was 
criticized for compromising the rights and freedoms of Canadians, even in an effort to 
protect Canadians, perhaps because he was attempting to protect them from other 
Canadians. However, domestic terrorism in general is a thorny issue, and the 
aforementioned controversies could be more related to this difficulty than to ethnic 
separatism in particular. 
 The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the most familiar national/ethnic 
liberation efforts, as well as one of the most longstanding. The Palestinian National 
Liberation movement, or PLO, has been struggling to achieve an independent Palestinian 
state since its inception in 1964 (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 225). This case is a good 
example of the power differential common to this variation of terrorism. “The PLO... 
sought… to undermine Israeli society through guerrilla warfare,” explain Chaliand and 
Blin (2007e, p. 226.). However, the “impossibility” of waging successful guerrilla 
warfare against the Israelis “caused the Palestinian organizations to fall back on terrorist 
activities” (Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 226). The 1968 diversion of an El Al flight 
between Athens and Cairo began the PLO’s campaign of “‘publicity terrorism’” 
 
 
39 
 
(Chaliand & Blin, 2007e, p. 226) designed to bring their dispossession to the attention of 
the West. They succeeded in getting the West’s attention; however, what sympathy they 
may have garnered did not help them gain a homeland. The PLO were branded a terrorist 
group by Israel shortly thereafter. Since then, Israel has continued to move further into 
the West Bank, and Palestinian groups and individuals have resorted to tactics such as 
hostage takings, suicide bombings, and homemade rockets. While Israel recognizes the 
PLO as the voice of the Palestinian people, they do not acknowledge Palestinian claims 
to sovereignty.  
 Another, similar conflict is that between Russia and Chechnya. This situation 
shares many features with the Israel-Palestine conflict: for instance, the fight is between a 
small, poor, strongly religious, highly nationalistic population and a stronger, better-
established, ‘legitimate’ state. Like Israel, Russia refuses to acknowledge the Chechen 
claim to land and independence, instead maintaining that they are part of Russia and 
subject to Russian rule. After the USSR split, a Chechen National Congress was formed, 
and campaigned for recognition as a nation. Russian President Boris Yeltsin dismissed the 
Chechen request, arguing that, unlike the Baltic and Central Asian states, Chechnya had 
never been an independent entity. Like the Palestinians, Chechen militants have attacked 
targets such as schools, shopping centers, and theaters, mostly using bombs (Bhattacharji, 
2010). 
2.3.3 Religious (Islamist) Terrorism 
The contemporary roots of the newest and currently strongest wave, Religious 
(Islamist) terrorism, may be traced back to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, wherein 
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religious fundamentalists overthrew the American-backed Shah.11 The Islamic 
fundamentalist ethos subsequently caught on throughout Central Asia and the Middle 
East, likely nurtured by the sociopolitical instability, poverty, and increasing Western 
hegemony which followed in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1989 (Shughart, 
2006, p. 8). Nationalist/ethnic and revolutionary groups in the Middle East looked to 
religion for a framework to inform and justify their messages, beliefs, and methods. 
Following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the American-trained and equipped 
mujahedeen who had forced them out dissolved into a variety of different groups, some 
staying local, and others branching out to places like Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, and 
Kashmir – places known today as terrorist hotspots (Migaux, 2007, p. 297). Wherever 
they went, these groups strived to establish Islamic law, expel non-Muslims or ‘heretical’ 
Muslims from the region, and fight what they saw as Western encroachment. Tactics like 
bombing, suicide bombing, hostage taking, hijacking, and others were considered 
acceptable, even at the cost of civilian lives. Their reputations preceded them, helping the 
ex-mujahedeen convert and recruit “a second generation of marginalized youths in search 
of an identity” (Migaux, 2007, pp. 296-297). 
The most notorious jihadi organization to rise from the Afghani war was al-Qaida, 
led by Osama bin Laden, the son of a Yemeni billionaire with ties to the House of Saud. 
Bin Laden distinguished himself as a charismatic figure during his long history working 
                                                          
11 I put (Islamist) in brackets rather than writing Religious/Islamist, as I did in the previous subsection 
headings, because not all religious terrorism prominent in the 20th and 21st centuries has been Islamist; 
one cannot generalize about religious terrorism in the same way one may generalize about national 
liberation, ethnic separatist, and anti-colonialist terrorism (which all seem to describe the same thing, give 
or take certain minutiae). Many terrorist groups have been founded in the name of one religion or another 
throughout history. However, it is not unfair to characterize Islamist terrorism as the face of modern 
religious terrorism, especially in the past fifteen years. 
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for religious and nationalist anti-Western and anti-secularist causes (Lentini, 2013, p. 84). 
He was responsible for the shift in the Islamic fundamentalist movement from seeking 
just “to establish sharia in their own countries… to a global struggle” (Lentini, 2013, p. 
91). The global struggle, which led to deadly attacks on Western soil, was contextualized 
by bin Laden and al-Qaida as a mission of revenge, “necessary and as a form of 
recompense for killing Muslim civilians, and a means to attempt to dissuade them [the 
West] from killing more of his co-religionists” (Lentini, 2013, p. 93). In reality, Bin 
Laden’s efforts at global struggle have resulted in more death and destruction in Muslim 
lands than anything else in recent history, via the ongoing ‘War on Terror’. He did, 
however, do a great deal to publicize the Islamic fundamentalist cause. 
In addition to established tactics (e.g. sending audio/video/written statements to 
news media), al-Qaida’s methods of recruitment included such novel tactics as using the 
internet. Al-Qaida affiliated websites, accessible around the world, sent messages about 
the terrorist group’s goals and desires: for example, to kill ‘heretical’ Muslim leaders 
(Lappin, 2011, p. 5). Currently, ISIS/ISIL are using the same strategies, with a distinct 
emphasis on recruitment. Videos posted online by foreign converts, such as Canadian 
John Maguire, may serve two or more functions: they call on Western Muslims to give up 
their lives of ill-gotten safety and security to join radicals fighting to avenge oppressed 
fellow Muslims, and also, they include threats against an “unsuspecting” Western 
population (Bell, 2014). Blogs from the wives of ISIS/ISIL fighters extol the virtues of 
marrying jihadis and raising the next generation of Islamic warriors (Amarasingam, 
2014). This is in addition to videos posted with no other goal than to spread horror, fear, 
and intimidation – for instance, videos of beheadings or of towns being razed.  
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History illustrates how spreading word of one’s exploits, even purely symbolic 
ones, is essential to successfully cultivating a sense of legitimate and impending threat. 
However, unlike the Mongols, the anarchists, or even the FLQ, modern-day terrorists 
have a new advantage in the internet. Through the internet, these groups can reach an 
unprecedented audience, promote their views, give orders, and send powerful explicit and 
implicit messages designed to cause fear. Websites like liveleak.com, youtube.com, and 
other video hosting sites provide terrorists with a direct voice; they no longer have to rely 
even on news networks to broadcast their messages of psychological warfare and/or 
recruitment. It was in 1974 that Jenkins (p. 4) famously concluded that “terrorism is 
theater”. He further explains this characterization by saying, 
Terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the 
electronic media and the international press. Holding hostages increases the 
drama. If certain demands are not satisfied, the hostages may be killed. The 
hostages themselves often mean nothing to the terrorists. Terrorism is aimed at the 
people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is theater [emphasis mine] 
(Jenkins, 1974, p. 4). 
As more and more ‘stages’ become available to the terrorist, the theatrical element 
emerges as increasingly more significant to examine. This fact bolsters the relevance of 
the research conducted here. This thesis is not on terrorism itself, but rather, on the 
media’s coverage of terrorism – probing the Canadian news media’s role in the ‘theater’ 
that is modern terrorism. 
2.4 Domestic Terrorism 
Domestic terrorism is very similar to terrorism as described by Schmid and 
Jongman (2005), and appears frequently in the history of contemporary terrorist 
organizations and attacks. The goal is to cause fear and panic amongst the target 
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audience; to this end, domestic terrorists use violence to draw attention to a political or 
ideological cause. They firmly believe that society has gone wrong, whereas they are in 
the right, and the only (or most effective) way to correct things is through violence. 
Nearly every terrorist/extremist group is willing to kill or injure its own people, for 
various reasons, so this in and of itself ought not to be so shocking. Nonetheless, 
domestic terrorism carries a special horror as it confronts us with the enemy within 
(Wilner, 2008). “For all intents and purposes,” Wilner (2008, p. v) says of the Toronto 18, 
“the group was autonomous, self-generated, and independently trained. Worse, its 
members were Canadian, through and through [emphasis mine]”. The fact that these 
young men, who were raised in ostensibly good Canadian communities, were willing to 
engage in jihadist-inspired violence against their own government and civilians, is 
mentioned as particularly disturbing. 
Another complexity of domestic terrorism is that while religious narratives (the 
lens through which we commonly understand international or foreign terrorism) may 
feature dominantly in some domestic terror attacks or ideologies, they are found in 
addition to secular extremist heuristics centered on issues like protecting the 
environment, protesting economic corruption, or protesting government repression of 
personal freedom. These concerns may be more relatable to a secular Canadian audience, 
and thus more controversial to lump in with other sorts of terrorism. For example, in 
regards to eco-terrorism, Neville and Smythe (2009, p. i) ask, “does [the Canadian 
military’s] mandate therefore extend to eco-terrorism, or are such acts better addressed as 
cases of civil disobedience, under the purview of the police and judiciary?” Of course, 
there is a meaningful difference for most people between plotting to detonate a 
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homemade bomb in a crowd of unsuspecting civilians, and blowing up a piece of 
industrial equipment, but both are terrorist tactics. How types of terrorism presented in 
the media are identified and differentiated, and how any differences (including value 
judgements and favoured responses) are constructed, are among the questions and 
considerations explored in my research.  
Not only is domestic terrorism arguably considered more appalling and more 
complicated than international terrorism, it is rapidly becoming more feared. In the CSIS 
2013 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada (p. 4), special reference is made to 
the threat posed by “homegrown violent extremists”. In a poll from the same year, 
Canadians prioritized domestic terrorism and cyberattacks as the most threatening 
concerns, significant to note when most participants also expressed the belief that Canada 
is at a medium or high risk for terrorist attacks (‘This week: New poll reveals that 
Canadians are most worried about cyberattacks and home grown terrorism’, 2013). 
“We’re not worried about al-Qaeda,” says the survey’s architect, “we’re worried about 
Canadians. We’re worried about people in our communities” (‘This week: New poll 
reveals that Canadians are most worried about cyberattacks and home grown terrorism’, 
2013). In this study, news stories written for people in Canadian communities, and, 
unfortunately, written about people from Canadian communities are scrutinized for how 
they portray domestic terrorism and its relationship to our society. Could the news media 
framing be reinforcing and/or encouraging suspicion against fellow Canadians? This is an 
important issue to address due to its potential impact on Canadian society and culture, the 
psychosocial wellbeing of Canadian citizens, and other consequential aspects shaping and 
guiding life in this country. 
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Moreover, the severity of the recent domestic terror attacks in Quebec and on 
Parliament Hill can only have increased Canadians’ level of worry about domestic 
terrorism. The recent attacks, and the looming threat of terrorism in general, were the 
primary justifications for Bill C-51, which passed in June 2015. Bill C-51 extends the 
powers of judges and CSIS agents in unprecedented ways, and reduces the burden of 
proof investigators and police forces are subject to – trends which have been ongoing 
since the Anti-terrorism act of 2001 (Department of Justice, 2015). This thesis cannot 
claim to make any conclusive statements about the impact news framing has had on 
Canadians’ willingness to trade traditional legal procedures, rights, and freedoms for the 
promise of security. In addition to addressing a void in the sociological research on 
terrorism in the media (framing studies specifically focusing on Canadian content), 
revealing the implicit and explicit messages found in Canadian news articles on domestic 
terrorism may help shed light on an issue which is indisputably at the crux of our nation’s 
politics. While acknowledging the limitations of this thesis, it is worthwhile to consider 
the benefit that future, more expansive qualitative document analysis research has to offer 
social scientists. Such research could prove indispensable for gaining a better 
understanding of how perspectives and ideals related to terrorism are developed and 
permeated within culture and subculture(s); in turn, the findings of this research (e.g., the 
views/interpretations championed and the solutions/responses recommended) could be 
compared with actual government practices. Do government actions align with mediated 
suggestions? How about the levels of dissent, support, or controversy Canadians express 
about particular legal/political decisions versus others? The information above, as well as 
findings of previous studies discussed in the following chapters, indicates that this would 
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be a fertile topic for scientific investigation. 
2.5 Domestic Terrorism in the Canadian Context 
 Cohen and Corrado (2012, pp. 67-68) claim that “throughout its history… Canada 
has not been a frequent target of either domestic or international terrorism”. In the period 
between the start of the Cold War, but prior to 9/11, Cohen and Corrado (2012, p. 68) tell 
us that acts of terror in Canada 
… have been rooted in environmental or animal-rights issues, designed to compel 
the government, an industry or corporation, or an individual to change their 
position or behavior on a specific issue, such as clear-cutting forests, performing 
abortions, or testing pharmaceuticals on animals, rather than to achieve the mass 
killing of civilians. 
The authors appear to differentiate between this and political terrorism based on the idea 
that terrorists motivated by environmental or animal-rights issues are performing their 
acts of terror with more of a utilitarian bent (i.e. to stop a specific thing from happening), 
than the goal of mindlessly killing civilians. Ultimately, this argument betrays some 
misunderstanding of the motivations of political terrorists, for whom the mass killing of 
civilians is not an end unto itself, but a ways of achieving notoriety and calling attention 
to a particular cause. The attacks, kidnappings, and assaults on civilians perpetrated by 
these terrorists serve to demonstrate that the terrorist group is willing to kill and die for 
the advancement of their ideology, which often calls for powerful groups or individuals 
to, as Cohen and Corrado (2012, p. 68) say, “change their position or behavior on a 
specific issue”, such as foreign policy or the treatment of ethnic minorities within 
Canada. However, there is a grain of truth to their statement on the nature and rarity of 
terrorism in Canada.  
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Counting the FLQ Crisis of 1960s Quebec, there had only been four notable 
terrorist attacks directly affecting Canada pre-2001.12 The second was the October 1982 
bombing of a missile manufacturing plant in Toronto, which injured ten people 
(‘Timeline: Canada’s brushes with terror’, 2014; Antliff, 2004). The bombing was 
committed by an anarchist collective with radical environmentalist and feminist beliefs; 
known as the Squamish Five, or Direct Action, the small group was active in Canada 
during the early 1980s. Its recruits included a suburban anti-porn activist and a member 
of the socio-politically inclined Vancouver punk rock band the Subhumans (Antliff, 2004, 
p. 74). While the Toronto bombing was the most high-profile, other acts of ‘propaganda 
by deed’ attributed to the Squamish Five were the May 1982 bombing of an 
environmentally controversial British Columbia hydro substation, which caused $5 
million in damages, and in November of the same year, the firebombing of three 
pornography stores accused of selling violent material (Donovan, 1989). The RCMP 
arrested the Squamish Five in 1983 (Antliff, 2004). 
Third was the tragic 1985 bombing of Air India Flight 182 – still considered the 
worst terrorist attack in Canadian history – where 329 people, mostly Canadians, were 
killed when a bomb was detonated aboard a passenger plane that departed from Toronto 
(Public Safety Canada, 2014). This attack was attributed to Sikh nationalists (Cohen & 
Corrado, 2012), one of whom resided in Vancouver. Canadian security organizations 
were later blamed for failing to share crucial information that may have prevented the 
                                                          
12 For reasons of limited time and space, I have left out of this thesis the history of genocide and terroristic 
violence perpetrated during the colonization of Canada between and amongst English and French settlers, 
as well as various Native groups, and racist attacks on Chinese labourers/settlers in the early 1900s. The 
state oppression of Indigenous Canadian culture via residential schools may also be discussed 
meaningfully within this context. 
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deadly attack (Encyclopaedia Britannica Editors, 2015).  
The fourth infamous attack came in December 1989, when Marc Lépine, a young 
Quebec man with a personal and political grudge against feminists, opened fire on 
students at the Montreal tech school École Polytechnique (Bindel, 2012). According to 
notes and statements left by Lépine, he believed feminism was ruining both society and 
his own life. He specifically targeted women, killing fourteen young female students and 
injuring ten others, as well as injuring four men before turning his gun on himself. Media 
at the time were reluctant to link Lépine’s act to political or ideological reasoning, 
characterizing him as a “madman… [for whom] the women just happened to be in the 
way” (Bindel, 2012). Police would not disclose the contents of his suicide note on the 
grounds that it might inspire copycat killings; the founder of a feminist-positive, anti-
sexist group Men Against Sexism holds that “‘the public felt too uncomfortable with the 
political explanation’” (Bindel, 2012).  
Though Lépine’s misogynistic political motivations were eventually revealed, 
official averseness to proclaiming his acts as such illustrates how Canadians at the time 
did not think in terms of terrorism. Lépine’s attack was cast in the same light as those by 
people with strictly personal, apolitical antipathies: for instance, the P.E.I. bomber, active 
from 1988 to 1997, who simply wished for “‘revenge against society’” (‘No day parole 
for P.E.I. bomber’, 2002), or the Concordia professor whose professional resentments led 
him to shoot and kill four of his own colleagues in August 1992 (Concordia University 
Archives, 2008). Today, it is reasonable to assume that the École Polytechnique shootings 
would have immediately attracted media attention as a domestic terrorist attack. 
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After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, and following Canada’s participation in 
the War on Terror, Canada saw a sharp increase in terror incidents, including plots, 
attempts, and suspects. One of the first major events of this nature was the 2006 case of 
the ‘Toronto 18’, which saw eighteen Toronto men accused of plotting to blow up targets 
like the Toronto Stock Exchange, CSIS headquarters, and a military base, as well as 
behead the Prime Minister. Each of the men charged was Muslim, and,  
They hoped, apparently, that their actions would avenge the deaths and injuries 
suffered by Muslims abroad at the hands of the United States and its allies and 
end Canada’s involvement in the war in Afghanistan” (Dawson, 2014, p. 64).  
It was the Toronto 18 which truly introduced to Canada the idea that Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism, previously an international phenomenon, could be a problem 
here at home, “with real consequences for Canadians” (Dawson, 2014, p. 64), and 
furthermore, that these terrorists might be of the homegrown variety. Many Canadians 
initially remained skeptical about how serious the terrorist threat actually was due to the 
young age of most of the suspects (ranging from under eighteen to thirty years old), 
questions surrounding the role of suspected RCMP agent provocateurs, and the fact that 
charges were eventually stayed against four of the adults and three of the youths 
(Dawson, 2014). However, as the case progressed and more details were revealed, “it 
became clear that a catastrophe was narrowly averted, the police had not entrapped the 
offenders, and the terrorists… had acted with serious and sustained intent” (Dawson, 
2014, p. 65).  
Though they did not succeed in their plans, Canadian scholar of terrorism Lorne 
Dawson (2014, p. 65) cites the case of the Toronto 18 as the event that showed that “the 
threat to Canada from some of its own citizens [is] as real as that faced by Britain, the 
 
 
50 
 
United States, and other countries”. The question of why Canada’s own citizens would 
turn against it was repeatedly addressed in the media buzz following the arrests 
(Blatchford, 2013). It is a complex question, made more so by the diverse backgrounds of 
the men involved; of the ten adults convicted, most were middle class, university or 
college educated, and radicalized within Canada. Only one had a prior criminal record 
(Dawson, 2014, p. 77). Many were quick to point to religion as a factor, and – while it is 
an important part of personal and group identity and certainly of consequence to examine 
– Dawson (2014, p. 85) cautions that the significance of religion “must be [assessed] on a 
case-by-case basis and not a priori”, as “most of the young men appear to have come 
from secular, nominal, or at best moderately religious backgrounds”. The Toronto 18 
shared “an intense, coherent religious rhetoric and sense of purpose”, but blended 
traditional religious ideals with secular youth culture, “mixing the catchphrases of Islamic 
fundamentalism with the lingo of the gangster rap culture of white youth” (Dawson, 
2014, p. 85).  
While identifiably part of the wave of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, it may be 
enlightening to compare cases like the Toronto 18 with many of the radical leftist groups, 
specifically Rapoport’s new left wave, that formed across Europe and North America in 
the 1970s. Commonalities include the modernization of old ideologies and the melding of 
these with aspects of modern youth culture and political concerns, largely educated and 
middle-class origin of members, and the justification of terrorism in supposed defense of 
oppressed foreign peoples. Such a study might highlight possible trends in domestic 
terrorism and radicalization phenomena, something which would likely help academics, 
lawmakers, and security officials better understand present-day domestic terrorism. 
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In the years following the Toronto 18’s 2006 arrest, Dawson (2014, p. 65) tells us, 
“a number of other young Canadian Muslim men have been arrested on similar terrorism 
charges”. The amount of detail varies from case to case, with often just the barest facts 
available. In 2008, Momin Khawaja became the first person charged and convicted under 
Canada’s anti-terror law for financing terrorism overseas and creating a remote-control 
detonator. Khawaja is currently serving life behind bars (‘Timeline: Canada’s brushes 
with terror’, 2014). The RCMP made somewhat mysterious arrests of three Canadian 
men in 2010, claiming that in an operation dubbed ‘Project Samosa’ they had uncovered 
ties to an international terrorist plot. Two of these men were convicted in 2014, while the 
third was found not guilty. The next year, Tahawwur Rana, a Canadian citizen, was 
arrested and found guilty of supporting a plot against a Danish newspaper that ran 
cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed (‘Timeline: Canada’s brushes with terror’, 2014).  
The rate of terror busts continued to rise, and 2013 saw the deaths of two 
allegedly radicalized Canadians in Algeria, the arrest of two men living and working in 
Canada charged with conspiring to attack a VIA Rail passenger train, and the arrest of 
two Canadian-born citizens over a plot to bomb the B.C. legislature during Canada Day 
festivities. Each plot, but most explicitly the latter, was said to be “fueled by al-Qaida-
related ideology” (‘Timeline: Canada’s brushes with terror’, 2014). In October of 2014, 
an automobile attack by Martin Rouleau-Couture killed a Canadian soldier in Quebec. A 
couple of days after this attack, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed another soldier 
outside the Ottawa Parliament building, then stormed the Parliament building itself, 
dying in the attempt. The attacks appear unrelated, other than that both men are believed 
to be recent converts to Islam (Bajekal, 2014). A variety of other internal terror threats 
 
 
52 
 
have been identified by the RCMP and CSIS since 2006, including over 200 potentially 
radicalized religious extremists, environmentalists, and political protestors (Dawson, 
2014; Tello, 2014). 
 Two important facts can be deduced from the preceding information. First, 
incidents of Canadian-connected terror have unquestionably been occurring more and 
more frequently over a short period of time. Second, these incidents can almost all (if not 
absolutely all) be characterized as domestic terrorism. Domestic terrorism appears to be 
the predominant type of terrorist threat to Canada. As the events described in this short 
overview of Canadian-connected terrorism illustrate, the most dangerous Canadian-
connected terror attacks and plots have involved Canadian citizens or residents 
themselves. This seems especially true of the plots and attacks over the last fifteen years.  
 Intimately linked with the danger of domestic terrorism is the problem of ‘foreign 
fighters’, young Canadians who travel overseas to fight with ISIS/ISIL or other radical 
groups in conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq. As of April 2015, security officials 
estimate that at least 300 Canadians “are believed involved in jihadi terrorism here and 
overseas” (McLeod). This situation is disturbing for many of the same reasons as 
domestic terrorism committed within Canada’s borders – while the idea of personal threat 
to Canadians within their own homes and communities is lessened, there remain the 
disquieting implications arising from the idea of people born and raised in Canada, 
integrated into Canadian society, and with first-hand experience of an (ostensibly) 
ordinary Canadian life. Furthermore, there is a growing concern about the threat these 
‘foreign fighters’ pose should they survive and return to Canada. As intelligence officials 
explained to the Ottawa Citizen, 
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Those who survive and return to Canada as trained terrorist fighters present a 
greater danger. Authorities especially fear the longer-term cumulative effect the 
foreign-fighter phenomenon could have on domestic safety and security (McLeod, 
2015). 
CSIS director Michel Coulombe and RCMP deputy commissioner Mike Cabana, quoted 
in the above article, use the foreign fighter problem to justify expanded Canadian 
counter-terrorism laws and increased freedom and jurisdiction for security forces. These 
measures, such as those outlined in Bill C-51, will not be used to “make CSIS a secret 
police force” (McLeod, 2015), nor to target environmentalists or other activist groups. 
These assurances are made in response to the criticism Bill C-51 has encountered, from 
both government and civilian sources. The foreign fighter issue is an aspect of domestic 
terrorism which has become increasingly significant in public discourse, notable even 
within the over-arching framework of domestic terrorism’s rising notoriety. 
Domestic terrorism has emerged as an active and troubling phenomenon relevant 
to Canadian society on multiple levels, from the daily newspapers available to the 
average citizen to the highest levels of government and security organizations. This thesis 
rests upon the idea, (hopefully well) justified above, that the issue of domestic terrorism, 
including its ongoing evolution and consequences, is one which deserves careful and 
continuing academic attention.  
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Chapter 3: Framing Analysis: a Methodological Review 
Frames are literally all around us. We encounter framing whenever we read a 
book or a newspaper, turn on the television, or go to the supermarket. Furthermore, we 
engage in framing ourselves whenever we try to teach, preach, or explain things to others. 
It is impossible to avoid framing when creating or translating ideas, explanations, or 
narratives from thoughts or ideas into meaningful communication (Entman, 2004). 
Framing analysis has proven to be a popular method across disciplines, including 
political science (Herman & Chomsky, 1988), economics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
sociology (Benford & Snow, 1988; 2000), and, particularly, in communications studies. It 
has been the most frequently utilized theory in top mass communication journals since 
the beginning of the 21st century (Entman, 1993; D'Angelo & Kuypers, 2010, p. 1), and 
has been noted for its efficacy in the analysis of news media (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).  
Since Goffman (1974) integrated the theory of framing analysis into sociology 
with his seminal work Frame Analysis: An essay on the Organization of Experience, it 
has grown in popularity as a way to study multiple aspects of social life and culture. 
Goffman helped enable this by parsing what had formerly been the language of 
journalists and communications scholars into an interactionist-sociological way of 
thinking. Goffman’s (1974, p. 13) classic Frame Analysis was (somewhat 
characteristically) concerned with frames strictly as “the organization of experience – 
something that an individual actor can take into his mind – and not the organization of 
society”. However, other sociological thinkers have expanded upon this focus on the 
organization of experience, using framing studies to make reference to the larger 
organization of society and the interplay between the macro (society) and the micro 
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(individual) (D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010).  
Naturally, any method which has enjoyed such widespread popularity has also 
become very diversified, with perhaps little tying it together in practice. Entman (1993, p. 
51) declares that, 
Despite its omnipresence across the social sciences and humanities, nowhere is 
there a general statement of framing theory that shows exactly how frames 
become embedded within and make themselves manifest in a test, or how framing 
influences thinking. 
This presented a challenge when researching framing analysis for the purposes of my 
study, as I strove to find the right kind of theoretical and methodological support for my 
research question and research conditions. Fortunately, different scholars’ definitions of 
what frames consist of and what they do seem often to agree, and I was able to find a 
satisfactory level of detail on these topics to inform my own work. 
3.1 What are Frames? 
In the very same article wherein he bemoans the fractured state of the framing 
paradigm, Entman (1993) compiled some basic, conceptual traits of frames and framing. 
He explicates, 
Whatever its specific use, the concept of framing consistently offers a way to 
describe the power of a communicating text. Analysis of frames illuminates the 
precise way in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the 
transfer (or communication) of information from one location – such as a speech, 
utterance, news report, or novel – to that consciousness… to frame is to select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the 
item described (Entman, 1993, pp. 51-52). 
Schulenberg and Chenier (2012, p. 7) echo Entman's (1993) definition of frames, 
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describing framing “as a way of promoting a particular version of reality”. Nelson & 
Wiley (2001) posit that frames are how people establish and re-establish hierarchies 
among values. 
D’Angelo and Kuypers’ (2010) compilation Doing News Framing Analysis offers 
a broad look at the different ways framing is defined by a variety of skilled, experienced 
researchers. It is largely from this book that my understanding of frames and framing 
analysis was cultivated and clarified. Entman, a widely-published and seemingly quite 
influential figure in frame analysis, is cited throughout the book (Lawrence, 2010; van 
Gorp, 2010; Reese, 2010) and contributed his own highly informative chapter. Building 
on his previous characterizations, he summarizes framing as “the process of culling a few 
elements of a perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections 
among them to promote a particular interpretation” (Entman, 2010, p. 336). Reese (2010, 
pp. 21-22) tells us that  
Frames, as a semantic equivalency, refer to structures in various locations 
(cultural, symbolic, and psychological), raising the often confusing question of 
where does the frame reside? Based on my own definition of frames as organizing 
principles, the frame is always an abstraction and finds its manifestation in 
various locations. 
Frames are commonly seen as a way to promote a particular version of reality. How 
framing is accomplished (i.e., how frames work) is a much more complicated question; 
understanding this is crucial to understanding the approach and findings in this thesis. 
3.2 How do Frames Work? 
Fully developed frames “perform four functions: problem definition, casual 
analysis, moral judgment, and remedy promotion” (Entman, 2010, p. 336). What this 
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means is that frames act comprehensively (i.e., calling upon multiple aspects of a topic or 
linking several different judgements) to define what is real, possible responses to 
situations, what is right to do, and what is best to do. When used successfully, frames 
“introduce or raise the salience or apparent importance of certain ideas, activating 
schemas that encourage target audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular way” 
(Entman, 2010, p. 336). Frames may be introduced and/or propagated by any group, in 
support of any agenda, from the government and the military to corporations to activist 
groups (Benford & Snow, 2000). 
Framing devices, specific rhetorical components through which a message may 
emerge and travel, are essential to how frames operate. Frequently, frames are made 
manifest by utilizing techniques of placement within the text, repetition, and/or 
association with culturally familiar symbols (Entman, 1993; Reese, 2010). If the headline 
of an article promotes a particular understanding, that understanding may be more potent 
than frames buried in the article text. Consider the message a hypothetical news story 
titled ‘Crime Increases as Homeless Population Grows’ sends through these few but 
impactful words. Even if the article text explains that the increased crime rate comes 
from rising instances of crime against the vulnerable homeless population, the simplistic, 
glance-over reading of the headline still stands to engender the idea that the homeless are 
the cause of crime. Placing frames within the summary, introductory paragraphs, or 
alongside the ‘facts’ of an article (especially if certain frames are more 
interpretive/opinion based than factual) also constitutes ideal placement. Repetition of a 
quote, concept, fact, or ideal also serves to convey and reinforce a frame – such as when 
an article features recurring mentions of a group’s numbers, sending the message that the 
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group is some combination of powerful, growing, and/or worth paying attention to. When 
a frame is associated with culturally familiar symbols, the meaning of the established 
symbol can be used to indicate how the framers desire audiences to view the newer 
comparison. An example is Greenpeace’s widespread definition of genetically modified 
crops as “frankenfood” (Nisbet, 2010, p. 50). Conceptually linking genetically modified 
crops, which remain a subject of debate and uncertainty for many people, with 
Frankenstein’s monster imagines these crops not as the product of progressive science 
and a public boon, but as the result of conceited scientific excess and as a potential 
danger to humanity. Catchy terms and buzzwords are but one way language acts as a 
powerful framing device. Redefinition is another; Nisbet (2010, p. 50) notes how 
American religious conservatives have “relabeled the medical procedure known as 
‘dilation and extraction’ as ‘partial birth abortion’”, changing the popular terminology in 
an attempt to emphasize the gorier aspects of the procedure, and thus produce an 
emotional, anti-abortion response from the public. 
Furthermore, as frames are created by “selecting and highlighting some features 
of reality while omitting others” (Entman, 1993, p. 53), understanding the selection 
process underpinning media framing is key to understanding how frames work. News 
media framing 
… is known to be influenced by multiple factors, including the journalist personal 
belief system, his working conditions, the editorial position and journalistic 
practices in his organization, as well as more distant factors such as the economic 
environment, the political climate, and by broader ideological and cultural 
conditions prevalent in his society (Provalis Research, 2014). 
This excerpt helps illustrate the relationship between groups, frames, individuals, and 
society. Various ‘climates’, or conditions, foster the acceptance and development of 
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certain frames, while minimizing the importance of others. However, the individual (in 
this case, a journalist) may act as a frame-creator as well as a frame-transmitter, 
presumably more successful as one or the other based on variables such as his or her 
editors and professional norms. 
It is important to note that the simple existence of a frame does not guarantee its 
adoption, nor does the popularity of a frame mean it is accepted universally and 
unconditionally, even within a particular audience. Converging with Goffman’s (1974) 
focus on individual interpretations and Hall’s (2006) attention to the process of encoding 
and decoding frames, Entman (1993, p. 53) cautions that “the presence of frames in the 
text, as detected by researchers, does not guarantee their influence on audience thinking”. 
Hall (2006, p. 165) argues against the understanding of framing as a one-way, cause-and-
effect phenomenon, saying, “the audience is both the ‘source’ and the ‘receiver’ of the 
television message”. As reality exists outside language, the audience must decode 
incoming messages in order to meaningfully incorporate these messages into their lives. 
Hall proposes three hypothetical positions from which a message may be deconstructed. 
There is the dominant-hegemonic position, which accepts the message at face value; the 
negotiated code or position, which accepts some aspects of the message while 
questioning or adapting others; and finally, the oppositional code, which interprets the 
message from a standpoint of strong individual values, seeing it as merely the expression 
of a particular (privileged) viewpoint (Hall, 2006, pp. 171-173).13 
                                                          
13 An example of the oppositional code in action might be certain groups’ rejection of the ‘terrorist’ label 
and the re-application of this pejorative term to the group’s accusers or enemies – e.g., the Jewish 
nationalist groups who did this to the British occupiers during the 1940s. 
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While it is true that audiences have their own minds and are capable of making 
any number of diverse judgements about incoming frames, many studies have illustrated 
the power of framing.14 Kahneman and Tversky (1984) used hypothetical scenarios 
involving probability to demonstrate that framing can determine how well people notice, 
understand, and remember a problem, in addition to how they evaluate and respond to it. 
Reese (2010) argues that the American news media’s framing of certain conflicts as a War 
on Terror helped legitimize the conflicts, as well as perpetuate the legitimacy of the ‘War 
on Terror’ narrative itself. Similarly, Brewer and Gross (2010, pp. 180-181) reviewed 
“largely… quantitative research, particularly experiments”, and found that 
… considerable evidence supports the conclusion that issue-specific partisan 
frames introduced by elites and broader storytelling frames used by journalists 
can influence public opinion on policy matters. 
Furthermore, Entman (2010) showed how media power is framed as liberal (i.e., having a 
liberal bias), while de Vrees (2010, p. 205) discovered that “the valence of news frames 
affected participants’ economic expectations and support for the enlargement of the EU”. 
The influence of news framing is such that some scholars have called for the 
development of a standard by which to judge how well the media perform the inevitable 
task of framing. For example,  
The media should provide enough information independent of the executive 
branch that citizens can construct their own counter-frames of issues and events. It 
is not enough for the media to present information in ill-digested and scattered 
morsels. Rather, what citizens need is a counter-frame constructed of culturally 
resonant words and images, one that attains sufficient magnitude to gain wide 
understanding as a sensible alternative to the White House’s interpretation 
(Entman, 2004, p. 17). 
                                                          
14 Seemingly, the dominant-hegemonic and/or negotiated positions are significantly more common than 
the oppositional code. 
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Theoretical papers outlining the concepts and ideas behind frame analysis, along with 
practical studies applying the methodology, show the great promise frame analysis has as 
an approach to critically analyzing the news. Studies like these confirm the prevalence of 
detectable frames in the news media, offer clues to what that framing might look like and 
focus on, and hint at the sort of broader effects journalistic framing may have on a 
population. 
3.3 Why Frame Analysis? 
I was attracted to the methodology of frame analysis because it is a method for the 
study of documents, which is a central component of this thesis. My research question 
deals directly with how Canadian newspapers portrayed domestic terrorism in 2013, and 
framing/frame analysis is the best way to characterize and investigate this topic. On a 
deeper level, it is a useful tool in a study of messages disseminated on a national scale, 
messages whose content may serve to provide heuristics through which Canadians 
understand and make decisions about themselves, their government, their culture and 
their values (Gavriely-Nuri & Balas, 2010, pp. 417-419). One of the reasons framing 
analysis is relevant to sociology is because it helps sociologists understand documents 
comprehensively for their place in the lives and schemas of individual people, and 
subsequently, society. That said, I wish to emphasize that at this stage I am only 
concerned with isolating and discussing the frames found in my news article database, 
and I am not equipped to carry the research any further except in a purely speculative 
fashion. Nonetheless, I am pleased to know that my findings have the potential to be a 
part of more extensive research in the future, perhaps as a basis for comparison alongside 
surveys of Canadian public opinion regarding the issues at the heart of the frames 
 
 
62 
 
discussed herein. 
Another reason I settled on frame analysis methodology was the number of other 
studies which applied it to similar questions as mine, in a similar context. While I was 
unable to find any studies of terrorism in the Canadian media to serve as an example for 
my own research, I came upon several international studies which I have used as 
reference points. Tischauser (2010), for one, explored anti-Arab and anti-Muslim bias by 
comparing the New York Times’ coverage of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War and the 
Israeli-Gaza conflict of the same year. The author examined the journalistic language and 
contextualization of the two conflicts, discussing the ideological slant of the coverage in 
relation to U.S. interests. Tischauser’s (2010) theoretical approach was conflict-based; he 
relied heavily on the Propaganda Model of Herman and Chomsky (1988). I found his 
study enlightening, but concluded that I wanted to take a (relatively) more ‘neutral’ 
approach to my analysis. Andén-Papadopoulos (2008) addressed the way the Abu Ghraib 
torture photographs transformed the American news media coverage of the prison, the 
military, and the War on Terror, contributing to counter-framing which challenged the 
dominant American narratives of good and evil. Gavriely-Nuri and Balas (2010, p. 410) 
pointed to the “annihilating framing” common to Israeli television coverage of wounded 
soldiers during the Second Lebanon War, providing a good example of identifying and 
discussing frames designed to “blur basic components of an object, phenomenon or event 
in order to exclude it from the public discourse”. Being familiar with their study certainly 
helped me identify similarly selective framing in my own database. Norris, Kern, and 
Just’s (2003) book on the framing of terrorism tracked the evolution of U.S. news 
coverage of terrorism after 9/11, specifically noting how impressions of threat and risk 
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were cultivated. Overall, the single substantive study most influential on my thesis’ 
development was Reese’s (2010) chapter “Finding Frames in a Web of Culture: the Case 
of the War on Terror”. Reese’s study offered some very helpful insights on the role of 
frames in the media, how to conduct news framing research, and the different approaches 
one could take to framing analysis. Furthermore, he dealt with “media jingoism and 
marginalization of dissent” (Reese, 2010, p. 19) in the creation of the War on Terror, 
issues which emerged as all too relevant within the Canadian context. It was from Reese, 
along with Entman (1993; 2004; 2010), that I learned most of what I needed to know 
about the practical aspects of conducting a news framing analysis. 
The final reason for my choice is that frame analysis is a flexible methodology. It 
is friendly to qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods research, and it can be adapted 
to a variety of contexts. Knowing this, I felt comfortable that I would be able to address 
my research questions within my research context, successfully fitting the methods to my 
study. 
3.4 What Sort of Frame Analysis? 
I elected to do a qualitative, code-based frame analysis. The predominant reason 
for this choice was that a qualitative frame analysis was simply the method which best 
suited the research question; a question centering on what constitutes the portrayal of 
domestic terror in the Canadian news media.15 The necessary inquiry is one probing the 
                                                          
15 A secondary reason is my prior experience and comfort with qualitative research. However, if the 
research question would have been significantly better served by using a quantitative or mixed methods 
research design, I would have chosen to investigate, develop, and execute a design of this nature. Ensuring 
the method is complimentary to the research question and the spirit of one’s inquiry is more important 
than choosing a method one has firsthand experience with. 
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qualities of the frames and the processes by which they are created. 
I used Reese’s (2010) study on the news media’s framing of the War on Terror as 
a basis for comparison and, to a significant degree, an inspiration. Not only was his 
subject matter similar to mine, I identified with many of Reese’s (2010) theoretical 
standpoints and approaches to research. His methods were similar to mine, having 
selected a sample of 226 news texts from USA Today which featured the War on/against 
Terror(ism) as part of the headline or main text (Reese, 2010, p. 29). I was somewhat 
more stringent with article criteria, as Reese (2010, p. 29) “didn’t make any distinctions 
between editorials or news articles”, whereas I purposefully weeded out strictly-opinion 
articles. Naturally, Reese had more articles, which may have led to different advantages. 
Reese (2010, pp. 18-21) views frames as existing in a “web of culture”, and 
employs a grounded, qualitative methodology of frame analysis. He rejects what he 
surmises as a traditional “how” orientation (i.e., framing effects analysis) in favour of an 
emphasis on the “what” of frames and framing (i.e., identifying frames in their cultural 
environment). Reese ‘s (2010, p. 19) method emphasizes the importance of identifying 
framing devices, which he exemplifies as “specific linguistic structures such as 
metaphors, visual icons, and catchphrases that communicate frames”. I, too, have placed 
an emphasis on uncovering framing devices, which the next two chapters will explore in 
more detail. Additionally, Reese (2010, pp. 19-20) continues, 
… the what of framing (analysis) leads the researcher to examine latent aspects of 
the text, such as reasoning devices (e.g., problem definition and moral 
evaluation…) as well as specific keywords that constitute the concepts underlying 
frames (e.g., the words game and competition are integral discourse elements of a 
strategy frame in political campaign news…). 
I agree with Reese (2010) on this point, as latent aspects of the text/frames can make up 
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some of the most foundational, if subtle, supports for any given frame. Furthermore, the 
latent aspects are harder to isolate, and thus stand to be more likely to go unquestioned 
(unnoticed even) by the audience. “If the what of frames are explored,” Reese (2010, p. 
20) tells us, 
it encourages an analysis that delves into the contextualization of topics – social, 
historically, culturally – and urges the framing researcher to look closely at the 
particular features of the frame… the specificity that is engendered by the what of 
a framing study helps in the end to uncover the culturally relevant and resonant 
theme that illuminates unique social and political understandings. And these are 
the sorts of frames that have the greatest implications for understanding the how 
of framing. 
In the case of my research (and Reese’s), the social, historical, and cultural 
contextualization of frames is a highly potent topic, considering the far-reaching and 
broadly impactful nature of modern terrorism.  
Finally, Reese (2010, p. 21) offers a helpful metric for assessing the significance 
of frames, saying that, “the significance of frames increase as they become more 
overarching and broadly reaching”. Of course, “the bigger the frame… the more difficult 
it can be to isolate and measure the social influence process [i.e., the how]” (Reese, 2010, 
p. 21). The difficulty of measuring the social influence of frames is certainly something I 
struggled with in the early stages of this thesis. While I wanted to investigate social 
effects and discuss them in comparison with the frames I discovered, I lacked the time 
and resources to conduct the additional studies that would be necessary to gather any real 
data on public opinion/social effects.  
However, I diverge from Reese (2010) in that I choose to also acknowledge what 
he considers to be the how of framing. Reese (2010, p. 20) describes the how as a 
process-centric approach, conceiving of frames as “strategic resources, constructed and 
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wielded by an individual or group”. While I am, of course, limited in my conclusions to 
the data in my news article database, which mostly offers information on the what of 
frames, in analyzing and discussing the frames I uncovered, it became worthwhile to talk 
about the potential intersections between the interests of powerful groups (such as 
privileged speakers) and the narratives espoused or disregarded by the news media. Such 
discussion is informed partially by the latent aspects of frames, including inexplicit but 
prominent framing devices, partially by my research into the history of terrorism, and 
partially by the theoretically-versed sociological imagination. 
My frame analysis is based on a thematic content-analysis-style coding. Thematic 
coding means that codes were developed to reflect themes found in the articles. Codes 
became more defined as the analysis progressed; Chapter 4 (analytical techniques) goes 
into more detail regarding the processes of coding and frame development. My unit of 
observation was words/sentences/references. However, holding to the qualitative nature 
of the thesis, the emergent themes made up my unit of analysis. Like Reese (2010, p.29), 
I approached frames as being “embedded across a body of discourse and speakers” – as a 
result, the frames I accepted as most salient were those which popped up across a wide 
variety of articles, events, and contexts. Definitions and examples are available for 
review in Chapter 5 (data analysis) and in Appendix A. 
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Chapter 4: Analytical Practices and Analytical Tools 
4.1 Analytical Practices: Rationale for Codes 
Codes were, for the most part, built inductively.16 This means I created them from 
the content in the articles. Whenever something appeared to be an important part of the 
media narrative or the construction of the topic, I created a code for it. This includes both 
overt messages such as politicians vowing to combat terrorism, and more subtle factors 
such as the sort of people quoted or presented as authorities in the article.  
Another way I created codes was by using my theoretical and substantive 
knowledge of issues surrounding terrorism in the media. This is how I formed my first 
few codes; about 10-15 in total were developed this way. Both ways of code-building 
were informed by the literature I consulted: existing publications showed me things I 
might expect to find in articles about terrorism, and other scholars’ definitions and 
distinctions helped support my confidence in my own. Nunn (2007, p. 90), for instance, 
makes the (somewhat intuitive) distinction between “[human] victims or property-based 
targets”, similar to my separate codes for Deadly Attack and Potential Damage/Violence 
to People versus Damage to Property. 
I completed nineteen rounds of coding, divisible into two phases: the first, to 
identify and define the codes, and the second, to make sure I did not miss any instances in 
the articles. This was a concern of mine because of the inductive process. Some codes 
took shape later than others, necessitating retroactive coding in certain articles. I kept 
notes detailing when I developed a new code, including the name of the article I first used 
                                                          
16 Exceptions were my few starter codes, such as the Speaker variable, or Deadly Attack – elements I knew 
would be part of all or most articles, or things that I was certain would come up in at least one. 
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it in – thereby, I knew which articles were ‘behind’ in the coding. Using these 
procedures, I developed roughly 91 codes by the time data analysis was finished. 
Additionally, I kept track of how much time I spent during each coding session. Overall, 
more than sixty hours went into reading, developing, coding, and refining the data.  
Not all of the codes proved fruitful beyond the article or two that inspired them; 
nevertheless they were useful to have as ‘benchmarks’ to refer to when assessing the 
codes as a whole. A few of these less frequent codes were included in the final discussion 
and analysis because I felt they were significant or interesting to talk about.  
For a full list of codes as they appeared in MAXQDA during the data analysis, 
including definitions, examples, and frequencies, see Appendix (A). 
4.2 Analytical Practices: Building Frames 
After both rounds of coding were complete, I began the actual frame analysis. 
Frames were developed from thematically convergent combinations of codes, or from 
particularly potent codes. Certain frames were built upon comparing a set of two or more 
codes which answer the same question or cover the same theme, for example, Pro-
Academic/Pro-Knowledge Sentiment and Anti-Academic/Anti-Knowledge Sentiment, or 
any of the over seven codes ascribing motive to the terrorist (such as Terrorists Socially 
Motivated, Economic Causes of Terrorism, and Anti-Western Goals or Motives). 
Sometimes frames contributed to other frames: for example, Relevance of the Terror 
Suspect’s Personal History and Character is a frame unto itself, but also helps support 
Terrorism (Especially Domestic) is a Serious, Escalating, and Deadly Threat. Further 
and much more specific information on how each frame was built can be found in the 
data analysis section. 
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4.3 Analytical Tools: MAXQDA 
Coding and analysis in this thesis was accomplished with the aid of a computer-
assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). The use of CAQDAS enjoys great 
support in the social sciences, including endorsement from Hafner (2015, p. 104), who 
used MAXQDA to identify patterns in transcribed interviews and field notes, and Koenig 
(2004, p. 1), who proposes that CAQDAS can serve to “extend… recent advances in the 
empirical measurement of frames”. 
I chose to use CAQDAS to ensure that I was, as much as possible, basing my 
frames on tangible, concrete evidence that would be available for continuous review of 
my own or by other researchers. I found this to have been a good decision, one which I 
would recommend or repeat in the future. I have a better idea of which codes/themes in 
my data are the strongest or weakest than I would if I had not used CAQDAS to perform 
coding. I am better able to discuss and defend my conclusions, and furthermore, my 
research is more open to examination by others. As an additional benefit, my finished 
coding is accessible for future research. I can continue the research by adding and 
analyzing more articles, and/or articles from different years. 
I used the VERBI GmbH software MAXQDA (1989). MAXQDA is a CAQDAS 
that has been used for over twenty years to accomplish “qualitative and mixed methods 
data analysis” (VERBI GmbH, 2015). The software performs a variety of helpful 
functions, such as basic word counts, coding and categorizing, and visualizations such as 
maps, word clouds, and code relations.  
I found MAXQDA suitable for several reasons. First, I found the interface more 
intuitive than that of competing software like nVivo. Creating and tagging codes were 
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simple click-and-select or drag-and-drop processes. Additionally, MAXQDA allows the 
researcher to assign different colours to different codes and subcodes: this was a great 
boon when trying to visually assess an article or paragraph with a lot of codes, and when 
editing, deleting, or recoding specific instances. Another point in MAXQDA’s favour 
was its purported versatility in handling different types of documents (some articles in 
my database were in .doc or .docx file format, others were .pdf). While it is true that one 
can create MAXQDA databases with all of these filetypes and more, I still ended up 
having to go through the tedious process of editing and re-saving certain articles in a new 
format due to serious bugs in the original files.  After dealing with several bugged files, I 
decided to convert each article to Microsoft Word. I experienced no more article-related 
impediments after that. Finally, one moderately influential reason I chose MAXQDA is 
that I was gifted a copy that I could install on my personal computer. As a graduate 
student on a very tight budget, this alone made the software an efficient choice compared 
to the alternative programs, which would either have required me to buy them, or to 
code/analyze exclusively in university computer labs. 
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis: Findings and Discussion  
5.1 Framing Devices 
I found the following framing devices to be present in the Canadian news media’s 
treatment of domestic terrorism. Framing devices serve to communicate messages 
definitional to each specific frame (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 52). The use of a particular 
framing device may not always mean the same thing, or may mean multiple things, 
supporting more than one distinct frame. Interpreting framing devices and assessing their 
relevance is a context-dependent process, and the bigger picture must be kept in mind. 
Below I have assembled an overview of the most foundational framing devices, noted as 
such for quantitative frequency and/or in qualitative strength.17  
5.1.1 Repetition of Data 
The Toronto Star article titled “Anti-government sovereign citizen movement 
claims 30,000 members and growing in Canada” repeatedly mentions how the Freemen 
movement is growing, that there are already 30,000+ members (according to the group), 
and that this growth is a dangerous thing. I have tracked each instance of the topic and 
bolded the relevant words or phrases. 
Brian Alexander is a self-proclaimed Freeman-on-the-Land and one of a growing 
number of Canadian followers of the so-called "sovereign citizen" or "Natural 
Persons" movement [emphasis mine] (Moore, 2013). 
A few lines down the article repeats the number given in the headline. 
                                                          
17 Qualitative strength means communicative potency, or how well the framing device expresses the 
frame/how essential it is to the frame’s existence. 
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The Law Society of B.C. and B.C. Notaries have both issued warnings about 
Freemen, which the law society said in a bulletin last year may number as many 
as 30,000 in Canada [emphasis mine] (Moore, 2013). 
Furthermore, 
In June, about 80 people paid to hear [Freeman guru] Clifford spread the 
sovereign gospel at a seminar in Victoria [emphasis mine] (Moore, 2013). 
 
Still later, readers are reminded, 
… [the FBI] warns the movement will likely grow [emphasis mine] (Moore, 
2013). 
The above quotes exemplify the use of repetition as a framing device. Elsewhere in the 
article, Freemen-on-the-Land are characterized as hotheaded political dissidents with the 
propensity for violence, considered domestic terrorists in the United States, and given to 
tying up the courts with ridiculous demands and criminal behavior. And, of course, 
they’re growing in number. Note that this point is reinforced in various ways, by citing 
numbers (80 seminar attendees, 30,000 group members), as well as statements indicating 
that the movement is growing and will likely continue to grow in the future. 
5.1.2 Repetition of Quotes 
Different journalists writing for a variety of Canadian newspapers displayed the 
same practices in terms of using or prioritizing sources or quotes. A quote from one high-
profile individual could often be found across many articles. Take the following quote 
from RCMP Assistant Commissioner James Malizia: 
"At no time during the investigation was public security at risk” (‘Home-cooked 
terror; RCMP arrest two in Canada Day plot to blow up B.C. legislature’, 2013). 
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This same quote appeared, verbatim, in articles from newspapers including the National 
Post, the Kitchener-Waterloo Record, and the Red Deer Advocate, as well as the Halifax-
based Chronicle-Herald. Repetitions such as this happen in part because newspapers, 
especially smaller publications, borrow from one another; but also, seemingly, because 
the quote or statement at hand is viewed as essential or central to properly telling the 
story. The repeated information then becomes part of the default understanding of the 
issue or event. As a result, messages that are repeated within a certain context often 
become focal frames themselves.18  
5.1.3 Privileging or Prioritizing of Certain Voices 
 The promotion of certain voices over others is possibly the most impactful 
framing device, one which helps create and support nearly all frames found in the articles 
(Entman, 2010 & 2012; Reese, 2010). The news articles I analyzed exhibited a consistent 
reliance upon quotes, statements, and information from a definable set of speakers. The 
news media established these speakers as legitimate sources of information about 
domestic terrorism, be it a specific event or as a general phenomenon. In a years’ worth 
of news articles discussing a variety of unique domestic terrorism-related events or 
topics, eight main speaker categories emerged.19 They are, in order of frequency: 
                                                          
18 It is important to acknowledge that many Canadian papers are owned by the conglomerate PostMedia, 
which distributes stories amongst its papers. Therefore, the repetition is more a consequence of corporate 
consolidation of the Canadian media than an emergent property of journalistic practices. Nonetheless, it is 
still worth discussing as – despite the reasons why it has occurred – repetition is part of the Canadian 
media and helps shape the framing found therein. 
19 Other sources, such as corporate speakers, were occasionally found in the articles, but their 
contributions were marginal and brief. 
 
 
74 
 
1. Police (26% - 278 instances) 
2. Community (22% - 230 instances) 
3. Political (18% - 187 instances) 
4. Legal (11% - 119 instances) 
5. Terrorist (8% - 88 instances) 
6. Academic (7% - 73 instances) 
7. Media (5% - 49 instances) 
8. Victim (3% - 37 instances) 
Figure 1: Visual Representation of Speaker Division 
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The chart above displays whose testimony journalists cite most often, and whose stories 
articles are built around. Certain information is promoted as most valuable and certain 
perspectives as most important. As a result, these speakers have a great deal of 
opportunity to frame and reframe the issue on their terms, fostering their own 
understandings, opinions, values, beliefs, and agendas, which then become popular 
frames promoted within the Canadian news media. 
 
 
76 
 
Even amongst the privileged voices, all are not equal. I was unsurprised to 
observe the emergence of police, political, and legal speakers as some of the loudest of 
these voices. As a matter of course, these speakers make statements intended to be quoted 
and published by the media. Moreover, they are, in practice, the people who investigate 
and arrest terrorists (police), and the people who are responsible for establishing justice 
and protecting Canadians from terror threats (all three). Modern terrorism is often 
approached as a criminal issue, and police and politicians are the intuitive, established 
authorities for matters related to crime (and also policy, immigration, international 
relations and other issues intimately connected to terrorism). Legal speakers may be 
viewed as experts or insiders concerning the progress of terrorism-related trials, or when 
discussing counter-terrorism laws. At this point, it appears to be convention for 
journalists to turn to these sources when writing about domestic terrorism. 
I did not expect community speakers to feature so prominently in the analysis. 
Despite the fact that these sources almost never have anything especially insightful to say 
about terrorism writ large, or even the specific terror plot in question, they are by a large 
margin the second most common type of speaker found in the news article database, 
eclipsing even political speakers. One explanation for this may be that the articles focus 
on Canadian-connected and domestic terrorism, making average Canadians’ viewpoints 
more relevant to report. More likely is the fact that they are easier to access than most of 
the other speakers. A great deal of theorizing on journalistic rationale vis a vis 
community speakers is provided later, in the unpacking and discussion of various frames. 
Whatever the reason, the popularity of community speakers has made crucial impacts on 
the dominant frames in this study. 
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The remaining speakers, terrorist, academic, media, and victim (in order of 
prevalence) each make up less than 10% of the speaker total, and did not appear to 
feature prominently as frame creators. I was somewhat amused to see terrorist speakers 
(8.3%) as more commonplace than academic speakers (6.9%); I theorize that this is likely 
the case because of the domestic terror emphasis of my research. It is possible that the 
same might apply to international terrorism, if journalists consistently dedicate article 
space to the videos, social media comments, and other propaganda and threats emanating 
from groups such as ISIS/ISIL or Boko Haram. Within the confines of my database, I 
assume the unexpectedly high number of terrorist speakers can be attributed to a) terror 
suspects’ statements at trials, b) pre-existing manifestos or communications, and c) 
interviews with people not yet arrested or accused of terrorism, but who are definitively 
presented in the articles as having radical ideologies or belonging to extremist groups. 
Academic speakers seem unfortunately underrepresented (though this is, perhaps, 
a biased perspective). The media did show a respectful affinity for ‘terrorism experts’: 
however, the majority of these were police/security speakers rather than academic. 
Journalistic focus is tuned more towards the action than the theory, which may explain 
the general lack of enthusiasm for interviewing academic researchers about domestic 
terrorism. 
The media speakers code refers to instances of news sources quoting other news 
sources, e.g., the National Post using information from CBC to fill out a story. As 
discussed earlier, news is often repetitive, which is the main significance media speakers 
have in the process of frame creation. Media quoting media may also serve to legitimize 
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the news sources quoted, as a type of peer recognition, and furthermore, a contribution to 
the quoted news source’s visibility. 
Finally, victim speakers did not play an important role in frame creation, except 
by proxy as a source for personal stories and emotional reactions. The framing of 
domestic terrorism as an emotional issue certainly emerged as a significant heuristic. 
Victim speakers contributed far less towards this emotional framing than community 
speakers, probably because of their fewer numbers. In 2013, most terrorist offences did 
not result in death, injury, or damage to persons or property. Nonetheless, victim speakers 
were typically able to give some of the more impactful statements, and surely influenced 
the potency of the frame. 
5.2 Frames 
In the following section, I delineate and analyze the actual frames built upon my 
91 inductive codes, including the previously explained framing devices. The frames 
summarize important and/or popular viewpoints, associations, heuristics, and other ways 
of communicating about and understanding domestic terrorism employed by the 
Canadian news media. This list may not be exhaustive, but I am confident that I have 
covered the dominant frames within my database, and discussed them from as many 
relevant angles as possible. 
Where the comparison of more than two somewhat contrary component codes 
makes up an element of the frame, I have provided simple visual diagrams (such as 
Figure 1 above). In other cases, only one code (or two that were not contrasting with each 
other) stood as supporting the frame. In these latter cases, and in cases where two fairly 
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straightforward codes evidenced the frame (such as law enforcement successes vs. law 
enforcement failures), I did not judge it necessary to add visual diagrams. 
5.2.1 Secrecy Regarding Terrorism is Appropriate/Acceptable  
Obscurity of truth, details, or motivations in the statements provided by police, 
intelligence, or military spokespeople, judges and lawyers, and other authorities came up 
quite frequently in the articles. Generally, there is little satisfactory or definitive 
information available to journalists writing about terrorist events. These obscurities made 
one of the first emergent themes, and it ended up as one of the thickest, with 217 
incidents coded. Articles described the terrorist situation as being shrouded in mystery, 
with reporters receiving only (or close to) the vaguest answers from official sources, and 
finding themselves blocked from further investigation. I only coded instances where 
specific mention was made of the lack of detail available – as in the following examples. 
When asked whether the plot had a religious motive or was instead driven by 
something else, Assistant Commissioner James Malizia sidestepped the question... 
the force declined to comment on the specifics of its investigation, such as 
whether officers had infiltrated the plot (‘B.C. Mounties say duo planned to blow 
up legislature’, 2013).  
 
Neither Kenney, Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird, Public Safety Minister Vic 
Toews and the RCMP would comment directly on the report (‘Early interventions 
help stave radical formation: gov’t’, 2013). 
I did not find any articles where everything was considered to be known about a terrorist 
event or issue. Certain articles took a ‘what we know now’ or ‘the facts to date’ approach, 
but even these posed unanswered questions or recognized gaps in media understanding. 
 Sometimes this secrecy or confusion came from family members or former 
friends of the radicalized individual, who are trying to come to terms with what 
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happened. Journalists frequently seek these people out, likely because they are more 
accessible than those working for CSIS or the RCMP. In some cases, family members 
express their own confusion or disbelief, which the journalist then reports, further adding 
to the presentation of terrorism as a mysterious threat. 
Why did the 29-year-old, who grew up in a nonreligious family in a sleepy 
seaside town on England’s south coast, turn to such an extreme form of Islam? 
Leech, who made a film about Dart called My Brother the Islamist, has spent 
years thinking about it and still isn’t sure (Quinn, 2013). 
“And that’s quite — I don’t know what the word is — it’s massive. It’s really 
hard to explain” (Quinn, 2013). 
 
Other instances had former friends, co-workers, or family members giving limited 
statements or flatly refusing to talk to the media, obstructing journalists’ quests for more 
information. 
Ubada Enderi said he didn’t want to talk about his brother because he was worried 
about his words being taken “out of context” (Brewster, Levitz, & Jones, 2013). 
Fellow students, neighbours and others who know the family in London were 
tracked down over the last few days, and shed some light on Enderi — but few 
wanted to speak publicly (Brewster, Levitz, & Jones, 2013). 
 
Martineau said she was surprised at his arrest. Asked for further details about him, 
she said, "You probably know more than I do" (Quan & Kennedy, 2013). 
 
But Shanti Thaman said she was stunned to learn they had been charged in a 
terror plot. 
“It is shocking. We never suspected this,” Ms. Thaman told the Sun, as police 
searched the house Tuesday afternoon (Hutchinson, 2013). 
 
The crux of this frame’s sociological significance is that it normalizes official secrecy 
and public obliviousness when it comes to terrorism cases. While there are plenty of good 
reasons why leaking too much information could compromise the case, ongoing 
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investigations, or even national security itself, the degree of obscurity shrouding almost 
every aspect of terrorism arrests and trials poses another type of danger – Canadians do 
not know what our own security forces, government, or judicial authorities are doing. The 
number of times that an absence of concrete knowledge was mentioned across different 
articles, regarding different cases, makes it appear normal and acceptable when the facts 
of these cases are hidden from the public. Considering the special and unusual measures 
now legal for dealing with terrorism, accepting silence and secrecy about terrorism cases 
potentiates the risk of abuse and unjust treatment many fear is possible (or already 
happening). 
I considered that changing journalistic norms and practices may play a key role 
here. Some established journalistic agencies claim that investigative reporting, of the sort 
where journalists were expected to do their own research and hunt down leads, has 
crumbled in the past couple of decades, replaced by an occupational culture where 
journalists are taught to gather information from authorities/experts (such as police) and 
report it verbatim (Walton, 2010; Coronel, 2013). The prevalence of police and political 
speakers provides some support for this viewpoint. However, I often observed journalists 
pursuing other avenues or sources, a major example being the widespread reliance on 
community speakers.  
The blame cannot be laid entirely at the feet of journalists. Painting a vivid picture 
of ‘who, what, when, where, and why’ is not possible when police and intelligence 
officers withhold their findings, as demonstrated in the following excerpts. 
How they journeyed from a Southwestern Ontario city to the front lines of an 
attack that shook the world has not been revealed (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013). 
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… security officials won't officially comment on the identities (Freeze, Ha, & 
Hui, 2013). 
 
… a former assistant director of intelligence [said] he could not comment on 
specific cases (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013). 
 
Investigative reporting ranges from impractical to illegal when dealing with matters of 
national security. Journalists covering terrorism are limited to getting information from 
authorities, who are often reluctant to share that information. More often than not, it 
appears that authorities give out only as much information as is necessary to convey their 
successful and legal/ethical handling of the potential threat. Only the barest details may 
be included, such as, that they are “[retracing] past investigations” (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 
2013).  
Though they will not reveal facts, police and security workers are frequently freer 
with sharing their emotional experiences and judgments. For instance, 
… he could not comment on specific cases, but his work involved hard choices. ‘I 
sucked my breath back many times, to go 'Okay. Drop them. Move to these 
people,’’ he said (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013). 
 
“Canadian Security Intelligence Service – an agency constantly pressed to make 
hard decisions about whom to keep tabs on, and when to cease surveillance” 
(Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013). 
 
Publication bans, according to terrorism researcher Lorne Dawson (2014), are 
commonplace in Canadian terror investigations and trials. Though well-intentioned and 
arguably necessary, these bans serve to further limit how much journalists can publicize 
these events (meeting, November 11th, 2014). It is usual to have a flurry of media activity 
around the outset of a terrorism case, reporting on arrests and charges, and seeking 
statements from experts and authorities. However, once the trial begins in earnest, 
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publication bans may be enacted with the goal that the trial not be compromised. The 
result is that a lot of the reporting on any given case takes place before the trial, where the 
bulk of what will be revealed in the criminal case, at least until its conclusion, is 
disclosed. The rest of the information and/or proceedings might not be made public for 
years, if ever; therefore, the initial frames journalists must develop and work with to 
conceptualize a terrorism case are put together in a deeply fact-uncertain context. 
5.2.2 Relevance of the Terror Suspect’s Personal History and Character 
Many articles try to explain who the terrorists are and/or why they became violent 
radicals. One way to frame this is to focus on suspects’ personal lives, using past and 
present instances of deviance to construct the unbroken narrative of a consistently 
criminal, ignorant, or mentally ill state or lifestyle.20 Of course, negative evaluations 
ruled the data, as illustrated in the figure below. 
Figure 2: Negative vs. Positive or Neutral Evaluations of the Terror Suspect’s 
Character 
                                                          
20 Instances of deviance directly connected to the alleged terrorist act or plot are exempt. 
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Suspects were portrayed as criminal, immoral, or disreputable in 31% of character 
assessments (482 instances total); immature, ignorant, or ridiculous in 24%; and, as 
displaying disgusting, irrational, or abnormal behaviour or psychology in 16%. See the 
criminal behavior emphasized in the following quote: 
But before he could be evicted, police arrested him on outstanding warrants from 
Quebec. He was charged with pushing a landlady down a flight of stairs in 
Montreal in 2007. An arrest warrant was issued in 2010 when he failed to show 
up for his trial (‘Owner upset by mess in reclaimed rental ‘embassy’’, 2013). 
 
Adopters of Freemen-on-the-Land ideology are arguably portrayed as immature, 
ignorant, and ridiculous in statements from legal professionals and societies. 
“What we've seen over the last year is an increasing level of frustration, an 
increasing level of desperation. People just don't like the idea that someone isn't 
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going to help them with their fantasy,” Usher said, noting the society [of Notaries 
Public of B.C.] discourages its members from signing the “nonsensical” legal 
documents (Moore, 2013). 
 
“It appeals to the angry male whose life isn't working out very well,” Usher said. 
“You get this spiral of legal mess that the only person that's benefited is the 
person who's taken their money for the seminar teaching them how to do all this” 
(Moore, 2013). 
Likewise, the VIA rail plotters’ disregard for the authority of the Canadian Criminal 
Code (which made headlines), may be seen as ridiculous, as well as possibly irrational.  
“This Criminal Code is not holy book,” Chiheb Esseghaier, 30, told the court as 
he stood in the prisoners’ box at Old City Hall, wearing the same blue and black 
jacket he was arrested in. He also had glasses and a dark beard (Young, 2013).  
 
The Code could not be relied on, Jaser continued, saying: “Only the creator is 
perfect” (Young, 2013). 
 
Other terror suspects are noted for their bizarre, abnormal, or sordid statements, behavior, 
or psychology. Social isolation, drug use, and living conditions emerged frequently as 
support for this framing. Counter-terrorism expert Ray Boisvert says of the warning signs 
of radicalism, 
“… somebody [during radicalization] starts to withdraw, shifting their 
friendships, shifting away from typical activities, becoming intolerant, dogmatic 
in their political religious views…” (MacCharles, 2013). 
 
Similarly, the following account of a reclaimed Freemen-on-the-Land ‘embassy’ points 
out that, 
 
Windows were covered with towels, clothing was heaped on floors and dirty 
dishes were piled in the kitchen that smelled like rotten food (‘Owner upset by 
mess in reclaimed rental ‘embassy’’, 2013). 
 
John Nuttall and Amanda Korody were perhaps the 2013 terror suspects most commonly 
characterized as insane, psychotic, and/or addicted. 
But they clearly had few resources at their own disposal, and lived in what some 
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reporters have observed to be a filthy apartment in Surrey, filled with litter and 
empty bottles of methadone, a prescription heroin replacement (Hutchinson, 
2013). 
 
 By comparison, neutral, sometimes normalizing statements presenting the terror 
suspect as integrated into society made up about 20% of character-evaluative 
statements.21 Statements describing the terror suspect as a typical or normal person 
happened just 9% of the time. Openly positive evaluations of suspects’ (former) character 
took place to a far lesser degree, and were only invoked to reinforce the idea that they had 
fallen from grace – i.e., underlining their deviance. Says an ex-classmate of one of the 
young men from London who became foreign fighters, 
“In my memory, he's got a smile and was kind of a happy-go-lucky person,” said 
former classmate Michael Melito, 25, who was shocked to hear the news. “I don't 
know how he's changed or who he met since high school...” (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 
2013). 
 
 
It is by making news out of a terror suspect’s personality, in addition to focusing 
on the associated emotional reactions, that heavy reliance on community speakers 
changes what might be more suitably understood as a political, socioeconomic, or crime 
story into a human interest piece. For example, the news coverage of the former London, 
Ontario high schoolers involved in a deadly attack on an Algerian gas plant tells us more 
about the young men themselves than about the actions which led them into a 
                                                          
21 Being integrated into society is not inherently positive; all it suggests is that the terror suspect managed 
to slip under society’s radar. I counted it to assess this frame because being integrated into society 
requires having enough stability to lead some degree of a ‘normal’ life, or at least to have some skill in 
mimicking one. 
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newsworthy situation in the first place. These excerpts from the Globe and Mail illustrate 
the human interest framing in action. 
During high school, Ali Medlej was considered a "happy-go-lucky" football 
player. Xristos Katsiroubas, his classmate, was a quiet student from a Greek 
Orthodox family (Freeze, Ha, & Hui, 2013). 
 
Mr. Medlej and Mr. Katsiroubas had been friends at the London South Collegiate 
Institute in London, Ont., a mid-sized city two hours west of Toronto (Freeze, Ha, 
& Hui, 2013). 
 
The statements above clearly center on the personal life and characteristics of the suspect. 
Personality traits like ‘happy-go-lucky’ or ‘quiet’ have little to do with anyone’s terrorist 
career, yet these are traits repeatedly highlighted in the article.  
There are multiple explanations that may account for this framing. In this case, it 
is likely that journalists simply lack access to the information that would help them 
construct the story wholly as a crime narrative. More pervasively, the relative ease of 
getting personal information about a terror suspect, compared to the difficulty of 
accessing legal, political, or criminal information about them, may help foster the trend of 
framing terrorism as an emotionally charged human interest story. It is, plainly, much 
easier to access and coax quotes out of people like former neighbours, colleagues, 
classmates, and family members, who were not involved in the terrorist act and can 
contribute little or no information about it, than it is to access the accused, co-
conspirators, or military/police/intelligence officials. 
Another explanation for this frame’s popularity may be that it successfully sells 
papers. Van Gorp notes that frames “contribute to the emotional appeal of the news” 
(2010, pp. 87). Canadian journalists seem to be aware of the potential value of playing to 
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their audience’s emotions when discussing domestic terror. Entman points to “the 
production norms encouraged by market competition” (2010, p. 339) as influential in the 
creation and adoption of certain frames over others. Journalists and CEOs alike want their 
articles to be popular and profitable. If media producers believe that personal histories, 
character studies, emotional reactions, and/or tales about the terror suspect from former 
community members are what the public wants, there will be pressure on journalists to 
give them just that. “Qualities [such as] simplification and fragmentation” (Entman, 
2010, p. 340) are known to result from production norms which enculturate journalists to 
prize readership and mass appeal over uncompromising dedication to the facts. Entman 
suggests that how well a frame informs the readers, or how accurately it conveys the 
events discussed, may be secondary compared to how well a frame can sell papers. 
Theoretically, this could create a feedback loop, wherein readers come to expect a certain 
approach from the news media, and the news media delivers what they know is expected 
of them. As Entman explains, “perceived public opinion can and does feed back to 
influence the future framing behavior of elites and journalists” (2010, p. 333). It is 
therefore possible that this frame, and indeed any weak but popular frame, can be shifted 
by public preferences or demands for more rigorous reporting. 
Finally, the media emphasis on the social and personal lives of terror suspects 
might have turned out to be as strong as it was because my database of articles were 
selected for their specific emphasis on domestic terrorism. Stories of the jihadist next 
door are more compelling when it is easier to imagine the jihadist living next door to you 
in your Canadian suburb – a concern that is not nearly as applicable when discussing 
threats from foreign radicals.  
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One message implicit (and sometimes explicit) in the proliferation of anecdotes 
and statements from former neighbours, classmates, and co-workers, as well as warnings 
from police and security officials, is that it’s possible that average Canadians know, live 
with, or work with violent extremists. The repeated reports of those interviewed as 
shocked and surprised to hear about the terrorism charges was powerful rhetorically and 
significant as a framing element. A common theme was that the terror suspect might have 
been weird, or even hostile at times, but no one thought s/he could carry out such an act – 
therefore, they were hiding in plain sight, under the community’s nose the whole time. 
5.2.2.1 Sub-Frame: The Radical Next Door 
When the terror suspect’s past and the emotional reactions of the community are 
evaluated, two significant frames emerge. The first is the radical next door, elements of 
which we have already touched on. This frame is executed when the article presents 
terror suspects as being, at least at one time, more or less normal people. Examples can 
be found in the media coverage of the London, Ontario boys accused of attacking an 
Algerian gas plant, the underage radicals of the Toronto 18, the suburban-punkette-
turned-jihadi Amanda Korody, and even in the case of the two men charged with plotting 
to derail a VIA train as an act of terror.22 A CBC article on the last-listed incident 
illustrates the narrative of a promising, beloved child changing into a potential terrorist, 
which can be a component of this frame. 
… [Chiheb Esseghaier’s] father did admit that in the last few years his son had 
changed and that the changes did not please him (‘Via terror plot suspect a 'very 
good boy,' mom says’, 2013). 
                                                          
22 These men were not Canadian citizens, but they did live in metropolitan Canadian cities and worked 
respectable jobs while here. 
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The framing is even more explicit in the following excerpt from a Maclean’s article titled 
‘Why terrorism can grow in any soil – including our own’. 
Both young men, aged 24 and 22, respectively, were friends at London South 
Collegiate Institute. And like their hometown, their upbringing seems, from the 
outside, utterly average. A third friend... was similarly recognizable as a typical 
teen. Today, Medlej and Katsiroubas are dead and Yoon is in a Mauritanian jail 
serving a two-year sentence for ties to a radical terror group (‘Why terrorism can 
grow in any soil – including our own’, 2013).  
Still more explicitly illustrating this frame is a National Post article about the danger 
posed by domestic radicalization and terrorism. 
One [of the Toronto 18] worked at a Canadian Tire gas bar. They went for coffee 
at Tim Hortons (Blatchford, 2013). 
 
The central message implicit in this frame is that terrorists may be hidden among 
everyday Canadians: in our workplaces, our high schools, even our gas stations. The idea 
that these ubiquitous Canadian social institutions could be populated by budding radicals 
is an unsettling one, further exacerbated by the articles’ insistence that these people were 
once or are in some ways ‘normal’ – meaning, essentially, that it is impossible to tell who 
might be a terrorist until it’s too late.  
While the radical next door frame sends messages of fear and paranoia, like all 
emotional framing, it may simultaneously help sell papers. The uncertainty fostered by 
this frame could be a hook for people wishing to understand more about how domestic 
terrorism happens – though it seems likely they will end up as uncertain as when they 
started reading.23  
                                                          
23 Nonetheless, this uncertainty may be the most realistic attitude to have. Domestic terrorists share little 
to no common traits, other than radical ideology of some sort; there is no formula for determining who is 
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5.2.2.2 Sub-Frame: The Time Bomb 
The second common personal characterization is the time bomb. While the radical 
next door is presented as an average person who lost their way, the time bomb was lost 
long before they turned to radicalism. This frame relies most heavily on the negative 
personal characterizations defined and explained at the beginning of the discussion of the 
overarching frame. 
“He was a combustible human being with little sense of morals or repercussions,” 
Victoria artist Jesse Ladret, who once lived in the same apartment complex as Mr. 
Nuttall and knew him through friends, told the Post by email on Wednesday 
(Hopper, 2013). 
 
John Nuttall, referred to in the above quote, is an easy example of the time bomb terrorist 
trope. Beset by mental illness, poverty, and substance abuse, the article paints a clear 
picture of Nuttall as a thoroughly unwholesome person. 
… homeless… racked up a record of violent offences… dabbled in neo-Nazism… 
a particularly heavy alcohol and drug user even by punk rock standards (Hopper, 
2013). 
 
 
A National Post article frames one of the young men from London, Ontario who 
committed terrorism in Algeria as a time bomb. The article focuses almost entirely 
around his high school days, which his classmates say were rife with misbehavior, 
disregard for Canadian values, and violence. 
He did not have a reputation as a good student. Classmates recalled him setting 
off cherry bombs in the schoolyard and stealing. “He always sat at the back of the 
classroom, showing up to 20 minutes to 30 minutes late every day — never cared 
about school” (Keidan & Bell, 2013). 
 
Mujahid Enderi refused to sing O Canada at school in London, Ont. He said his 
                                                          
going to becomes a terrorist (Dawson, Nov 11th 2014, meeting). 
 
 
92 
 
Muslim faith forbid it. When the time came for the class to stand beside their 
desks for the national anthem, he left or made sure to arrive late. The Libyan-
Canadian’s zeal eventually turned violent (Keidan & Bell, 2013).  
As illustrated above, this frame fosters the idea of terrorists as disgruntled, aggressive 
people who were always, in some sense, degenerates – or at least outsiders. That they 
were drawn to radical ideologies and terrorism is not a surprise, but rather, a natural 
extension of their pre-existing violent personalities.24 
5.2.3 Charismatic Figures and Recruitment: Stronger Inroads than Self-
Radicalization 
The articles in my database showed that the prevailing idea about how (note: not 
why) people get involved in terrorist activities or extremist groups is via recruitment 
and/or exploitation by powerful, established radicals (124 instances total). The following 
figure breaks down the component codes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 Some journalists may argue that in this case, they are just stating the facts about the suspect’s history– 
equal in nature to explaining that the suspects planned to plant bombs or use poison gas. While there is 
no reason to disbelieve or challenge the fact that many terror suspects had previous criminal records or 
mental health problems, it is the repeated emphasis on the suspect as degenerate that makes this a 
distinct and salient frame. 
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Figure 3: External Influences vs. Self-Radicalization 
 
Self-radicalization, a situation in which the would-be terrorists seek out and 
pursue extremist groups or ideologies on their own, is referenced only 21% of the time. 
The remaining 79% of instances explain terrorist radicalization using more external 
factors. These consist of radicalization through recruitment (51%), where new members 
are acquired through specific, targeted recruitment techniques, but not necessarily a 
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special individual contact; the other 28% present a charismatic figure (a highly charming 
and captivating person who uses their social skills and/or mystique to win over converts) 
as an important, sometimes essential, enabler of the radicalization process. 
Canada Day plotters John Nuttall and Amanda Korody are amongst the few 
domestic terror suspects consistently labelled as self-radicalized. The following excerpts 
tell the story of Nuttall as a man disconnected from community, “a virtual unknown” and 
a self-made fanatic. 
But while he seems to have remained a virtual unknown to Muslims within his 
Surrey neighbourhood, Mr. Nuttall's friends and family recounted seeing the 39-
year-old's quick descent into religious fanaticism; the apparent product of what 
the RCMP called his “self-radicalization” (‘'I will die a martyr': B.C. terror 
suspect's brother was 'weirded out' by his sudden conversion to radical Islam’, 
2013). 
“He was a complete Muslim all of the sudden, in no time. I didn't know my 
brother anymore, he was a completely different person,” said Mr. Nuttall's brother 
in a Wednesday interview with CTV (‘'I will die a martyr': B.C. terror suspect's 
brother was 'weirded out' by his sudden conversion to radical Islam’, 2013). 
 
Another article explains that, 
According to police, they are Canadian-born, “self-radicalized” individuals who 
were “inspired by al-Qaeda ideology” but acting of their own accord. They had 
“educated themselves” on making improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, the 
kind that are used by radicals to randomly kill and cause harm (Hutchinson, 
2013). 
 
 
In these statements, we are left with the impression of Nuttall and Korody as self-made 
terrorists, who, while inspired by “al-Qaeda ideology”, had little to no connection to a 
real group of radical Islamic terrorists. They converted without the help of a Muslim 
community, and subsequently taught themselves how to commit acts of widespread, 
deadly violence, ostensibly for ideological purposes. 
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Conversely, the former landlady of Nuttall and Korody offers a very different, 
very straightforward statement, promoting her belief that the two were being radicalized 
by external forces.  
“I don't know why they would be plotting something. Someone was brainwashing 
them” (Hopper, 2013). 
 
The charismatic figure comes up as a particular “radicalizing influence” (Quinn, 
2013). For example, 
… individuals who become radicalized tend to follow a very similar pattern after 
being exposed to someone who is an “influencer” who condones or encourages 
their extremist interpretation or path of action (MacCharles, 2013). 
 
The above theme is repeated in other articles and other statements, such as these 
assessments of the likely vector of two Londoners’ journey towards terrorism. 
The path Xristos Katsiroubas and Ali Medlej took likely began with a typical 
teenage need to make a difference and a sense of invincibility, then passed 
through the Internet before intense indoctrination in a group setting run by a 
“radicalizer” (Richmond, 2013). 
“It's somebody close to them. I guarantee it, it's somebody very close,” said Ray 
Boisvert, former assistant director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
(CSIS) (Richmond, 2013). 
 
Ideas of radicalization as influence, e.g., the possibility that one person can radicalize 
another, is accepted by the legal system as well.  
Prosecutors allege Abassi had “radicalized” Esseghaier, a Montreal resident who 
is one of two men charged with plotting to attack a Via Rail train (‘Canada quick 
to downplay ties to U.S. terror suspect’, 2013). 
 
 
When the same idea is propagated by multiple sources, particularly by such 
authoritative or expert individuals as members of the RCMP, Crown prosecutors, and the 
former assistant director of CSIS, it stands to gain a more significant kind of legitimacy. 
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The charismatic figure and recruitment frame enjoys widespread acceptance, and thus 
may be one of the more meaningful frames isolated in this analysis. 
5.2.4 (Conditional) Sympathy for the Moderate Muslim Community  
Generally speaking, the articles I reviewed presented local, non-radical Canadian 
Muslim communities in a positive light. Many community speakers were from such 
communities, incorporating the perspectives of Muslims who are peacefully integrated 
into Canadian society. When the Canadian Muslim community was mentioned, articles 
featured at least one speaker from a Canadian Muslim community, often an imam or 
another community leader. Their statements commonly took the form of distancing 
themselves and their fellows from whatever terrorist incident the article discusses. To 
examine one statement offered in the wake of the attempted B.C. legislature bombing, 
Several leading members of B.C.'s Muslim community were shocked at the 
alleged homegrown plot. "These names don't ring a bell at all. They're not even 
Muslim names," said Adam Buksh, president of Surrey Jamiyah Mosque. Buksh 
said members of his mosque and the B.C. Muslim Association do not condone 
radicalism (Moore & Keller, 2013). 
 
A similar public disavowal came in response to news that four young, Canadian Muslim 
men had attacked an Algerian gas plant (two of four died in the attack). As one Muslim 
community leader explained, 
“There is a trend in some radical groups that are non-violent to disavow the idea 
of loyalty [to Canada],” he said. “These people generally find themselves isolated 
because it is not something that resonates with the rest of the congregation” 
(O’Brien & Maloney, 2013). 
 
Other printed statements emphasize the mainstream Muslim community’s unawareness 
of any terrorist activity in their midst. 
"That's what we keep thinking about," said one London Muslim Mosque member. 
"If they (terrorist teachers) are here, it's a very curious thing. Where are they 
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from? Does anybody know them? Who talked to them?" asked the man, who 
didn't want to be named (Richmond, 2013). 
Moreover, several articles credit local Muslim communities with promptly tipping off 
police whenever they do became aware of suspicious activity. 
The RCMP did confirm an imam gave them information that led to the arrests, 
although “not too many details were shared. They did say a prominent community 
leader has come forward” (Young, 2013). 
 
Within a religious community, imams have kept an eye out for radicalization, 
Badat said (Young, 2013). 
“We would not hesitate at all in informing the agencies to do their part. As 
Canadians, we share the concerns. We are equally affected by any terrorism 
threats” (Young, 2013). 
 
In addition to giving members and representatives of the Muslim community a 
platform to share their side, journalists included quotes that both acknowledged and 
condemned the backlash against moderate Muslims which has historically occurred in the 
wake of terror attacks. For instance, 
“And the mood there was what will be the backlash, how are we going to handle 
the media and the press reports from looking like they are stereotypically 
demonizing Muslims, when it was a tip from our leadership that prompted the 
arrest” (Levitz, 2013). 
Articles stressed friendship and cooperation between Muslim communities, their leaders, 
the larger communities to which they belong, and Canada’s law enforcement agencies. 
One such Muslim community leader affirms these bonds of friendship and solidarity, 
saying,  
“It says enough for guys like me to go back to people and say no, no that's not 
how it is. You might think it's this way, you might try to come up with a 
conspiracy but I know some real stand-up guys inside the RCMP who took the 
time to take our community aside and say ‘hey look, you guys are part of the 
greater community, there might be things said about you guys but know that's not 
what we believe’” (Levitz, 2013). 
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Muslim speakers were consistently sure to either condemn religious radicals and 
violence and/or assert their commitment to Canadian laws and values, including their role 
in drawing police attention to possible terrorist plots. This is evidence of the Muslim 
community attempting to frame itself as peaceful, law-abiding, and anti-terrorist. Benford 
and Snow (2000) explain how it can be crucial for social movements to use the media to 
get their own preferred frames across; Muslim communities across Canada seem to 
realize this, frequently speaking up to disavow and distance themselves from Islamic 
terrorists. Journalists support this framing by including Muslim community speakers, 
reporting positive evaluations of Muslim communities from the RCMP, and condemning 
the very real, unjustified attacks moderate Muslims have suffered in the past. While the 
news media certainly do draw connections (some which appear all but explicitly causal), 
between Islamic beliefs and terrorism, I found the dominant framing of Canadian Muslim 
communities to be sympathetic, accepting, overtly non-accusatory, and generally 
positive.25 
5.2.5 Terrorism as a Religious (Islamic) Issue 
Existing simultaneously with the sympathetic framing of moderate Canadian 
Muslim communities is the framing of terrorism as an Islamic phenomenon. Most articles 
offered some level of explanation or speculation about the motives driving terrorists, or 
the reasons for their actions. I located ten identifiable categories of heuristics and/or 
                                                          
25 These are not mutually exclusive frames: an article may feature defense of the moderate Muslim 
communities, while only a few lines later characterizing terror suspects most significantly as radical 
Islamists, or suggesting conversion to Islam as a precursor to terrorism. 
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perspectives causally explaining or defining terrorism.26 None of these causes were coded 
as mutually exclusive: an article could promote multiple ways of understanding terrorism 
(e.g. discussing it primarily as a religiously-motivated act, but also acknowledging the 
role played by personal dissatisfaction). Sometimes the information came from quotes, 
and at other times, from journalistic inference. The dominant framing regarding causes or 
underlying factors appeared via journalists attending or disattending to certain facts – i.e., 
prioritizing or disregarding specific traits or aspects of the person(s) or event(s), selected 
from any number of possible angles. Codes cataloguing attribution of terrorists’ motives 
or reasons, from most to least prevalent and including raw frequencies, are: 
1. Islamic Conversion or Beliefs as a Factor (32%, 132 instances) 
2. Race or National/Ethnic Origin as Relevant (16%, 65 instances) 
3. Political Dissidence (12%, 49 instances) 
4. Terrorists (Personally) Dissatisfied (10%, 42 instances) 
5. Terrorists Socially Motivated (10%, 41 instances) 
6. Complex View of Terrorism (7%, 31 instances) 
7. Terrorism Act of Revenge, War, or Defense (6%, 24 instances) 
8. Anti-Western Goals or Motives (4%, 18 instances) 
9. Eco-Terrorism, (3%, 12 instances) 
10. Economic Causes of Terrorism (0.7%, 3 instances) 
 
                                                          
26 I am referring to causality in a very rough, basic way; I did not hold the news articles up to scientific 
principles establishing causal relationships. For the purposes of coding, a statement or quote attributing 
terrorism (at least partially) to a specific quality or phenomenon counted. 
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I have also created a chart to visually display the frame components. 
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Figure 4: Visual Representation of Motives/Conditions Driving/Underlying 
Terrorism in the Canadian Media 
 
 
As illustrated above, religious (specifically Islamic) extremism was 
overwhelmingly reported as the key factor inspiring terrorism. When articles stated or 
hinted at motives, explanations, or causes for terrorism, Islamic beliefs or conversion to 
Islam made up 32% of 417 coded instances. If a terrorist/suspect was Muslim, their faith 
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was unfailingly brought up in conjunction with their alleged plots or actions, if not 
directly linked to their radicalization and subsequent involvement in terrorism.  
Scholars understand involvement in terrorism as a complex phenomenon with a 
variety of possible pushes, pulls, and other underlying factors which may affect a person 
on their path to radicalism. Certain sources and articles expressed a complex view of 
terrorism, speaking to the multiplicity of justifications, goals, conditions, circumstances, 
and other influential factors which have shaped the diverse array of terrorist incidents 
seen in the past decade and a half. Roughly 7% of instances reflected this complex view 
of terrorism.  
Despite the legitimacy of a complex view, this way of understanding the problem 
is not reflected in the Canadian media, which frames terrorism predominantly as a 
religious issue, and terrorists as Muslim fanatics. Religion is certainly important to 
consider, especially when the terrorists in question so blatantly invoke it as a justification 
for their acts. However, the popular framing of religion as the biggest, most powerful root 
cause of terrorism often served to overshadow and diminish other, less simplistic aspects 
of radicalization and terrorism. For example, journalists mentioned economic causes of 
terrorism as significant less than 1% of the time. Ecological, conservationist, or animal 
rights centered beliefs were second least, at almost 3%, closely followed by purely anti-
Western goals or motives (i.e., the destruction of the West as primary or sole aim), which 
comprised a shallow 4%. Revenge, war, or defense were only acknowledged as motives 
in roughly 6% of coded instances, even though these are, in some form or another, 
foundational elements of nearly every terrorist credo throughout history.  
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Sociological theory holds that the beliefs, expectations, and morals of one’s 
primary social group, or those of a desired community, provide one with values 
governing thought and behavior, informing notions of what is acceptable or unacceptable, 
ideal or discouraged, and necessary or non-compulsory (Mead, 1932; Cooley, 1962). In 
most cases I examined, a community, be it an informal group of friends (such as the 
London boys, high school friends) or an established extremist cell (like the U.S. 
Freemen-on-the-Land or the Animal Liberation Front), was instrumental in enabling the 
terrorist act. An extension of this may be active in the apparent effectiveness of 
recruitment strategies and charismatic figures. Despite the variety of theory, anecdotal 
evidence, and even concurrent framing pointing to the centrality of social motivations, 
just 10% of the instances referenced social motivations or group bonds as an important 
element contributing to radicalization.  
Personal dissatisfaction made up another 10%, rather minimal considering that 
many experts and scholars routinely cite this as a reason for rejecting one’s own culture 
and adopting contrary, radical ideologies. In cases where the terrorist/suspect was not in 
direct contact with an extremist group, dissatisfaction with themselves and a sense of 
alienation from mainstream cultural values can lead them to contact such groups, or to 
plan acts of terror on their own. Many Canadians who become radicalized are teens or 
young adults; the search for identity, belonging, and meaning – a natural part of this 
phase of life – can leave young people particularly susceptible to radicalist rhetoric 
promising brotherhood and the chance to punish evildoers, right injustices, and protect 
the weak. Historically, bored young men have long been drawn to the adventure, 
excitement, and purpose of war (Miller, 2013).  
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Political dissidence fueled 12% of causal messages, largely bolstered by the 
attention radical libertarian groups such as the Sovereign Citizen Movement and 
Freemen-on-the-Land garnered in 2013. Arguably, all terrorism has a political agenda, 
conflicting with the mainstream or hegemonic political agenda; therefore, this element, 
too, deserves more recognition than I observed.27 Finally, race or ethnicity was 
mentioned as a causal or underlying factor about 16% of the time; I will expand upon this 
below. 
Today’s high-profile terrorist threat comes from Islamic groups, committed to 
religious rhetoric preaching the destruction of unbelievers and/or driving them out of 
Islamic lands. Certainly, religion is a core element of their propaganda – this includes 
their self-attributed rationale for acts of violence and destruction. However, to understand 
modern terrorism simply through the lens of religion, as the most prominent frame in 
Canadian news media does, presents an incomplete picture of a complex phenomenon.  
5.2.6 Salience of Race/Ethnicity/National Origin 
As indicated above, about 16% of the causal or explanatory instances made note 
of the ethnic backgrounds of terror suspects in a prominent way. This includes national 
heritage, the immigration status of suspects and their parents, and other aspects of their 
racial/ethnic background(s). In cases where the accused were not Canadian citizens, their 
national origin (e.g., Raed Jaser coming from Palestine) was brought up as a matter of 
                                                          
27 In the interest of transparency, I have considered the possibility that political messages and political 
causalities are so intrinsically linked to discussion of terrorist incidents that I have passed over some of the 
more subtle examples, and if so, my count may be low on this code. However, my most liberal error 
estimates do not put political dissidence at higher than 17% of the instances, an interesting difference but 
still not one which would invalidate or even challenge the religious framing I have proposed as dominant. 
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course – I did not observe exceptions to this rule. Canadian-born suspects of Middle 
Eastern descent were treated similarly. News articles making note of the 
racial/ethnic/national background of suspects is not unique or interesting on its own. 
However, comparing the ways in which the ethnicity of Middle Eastern individuals was 
discussed with the treatment of and slant on non-Middle Eastern terror suspects yields 
interesting results. 
The fact that any suspect had Middle Eastern heritage was never contextualized as 
anything other than normal and uneventful. For example, this bit of information from a 
Toronto Star article: 
Enderi, whose family came to Canada from Libya, went to high school with the 
other three boys and lived close to Medlej and Katsiroubas (Livingstone, 
MacCharles, & Shepard, 2013). 
 
 
This statement prominently characterizes the subject as a Libyan immigrant, a fact which 
does not come up again in the rest of the article. Its casual nature is typical of statements 
about Middle Eastern ethnicity. Seemingly, Middle Eastern (and, of course, Muslim) is 
how we expect our terrorists to be.  
I base this claim on the fact that when terror suspects were White, Asian, 
Mediterranean (or otherwise not Middle Eastern), their heritage was regularly mentioned 
as exceptional in some way. No article explicitly said that Middle Eastern people or 
Canadians of Middle Eastern descent were more likely to be terrorists, but articles 
expressed more shock and confusion when the terror suspects were of a different ethnic 
origin. Examine the phrasing of the two sentences in the following excerpt. 
A Cree who wears a traditional coonskin cap he made himself, Dawood is a 
member of the James Smith First Nation in Saskatchewan. He is also a strident 
advocate of armed jihad (Bell, 2013). 
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First, we learn Dawood is a Cree and a member of a Saskatchewan First Nation. This 
information is juxtaposed with the next bit of information – that he is an advocate of 
armed jihad. Moreover, 
Even the Muslim leader who converted Dawood said he disagreed with his views 
on violence (Bell, 2013). 
 
The framing here is subtle, but significant. It is bizarre that a Cree man is involved in 
jihadi ideology, and similarly surprising that the Muslim leader who converted him is the 
more moderate of the two. 
One excerpt, drawn from a Maclean’s article, discussing the conversion and 
eventual radicalism of non-Muslim, non-Middle Eastern young men, notes their ethnicity 
and religion – as do many articles about them. 
Katsiroubas, raised in a Greek Orthodox family, was quieter but enjoyed road 
hockey and video games. A third friend, Aaron Yoon of Korean-Catholic descent 
(‘Why terrorism can grow in any soil – including our own’, 2013). 
The article title, ‘Why terrorism can grow in any soil’ further implies that something new 
and strange is taking place: terrorism is springing up in previously unexpected places and 
people. 
Using race/ethnicity as a framing device is nothing new; established racial 
stereotypes can be one of the “culturally shared notions with symbolic significance” (Van 
Gorp, 2010, p. 85) that are known to work very well in creating and maintaining a 
hegemonic frame. It is worth noting that several articles, overtly at least, did not invoke 
ethnicity to pigeonhole or condemn, but to emphasize how different from certain 
established cultural notions the reality really was – that so many of the young, Canadian 
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domestic terrorists/suspects that made the news in 2013 were not from the stereotypical 
ethnic background, i.e., Middle Eastern. As one article stated, 
The notion that three middle-class kids from diverse religious backgrounds 
attending high school in an average Canadian city could become radicalized to 
this extent raises big, uncomfortable questions for all Canadians (‘Why terrorism 
can grow in any soil – including our own’, 2013). 
 
Similar to the radical next door frame, the salience of ethnicity frame was used in 
2013 to change the boundaries delimiting notions about who could be a terrorist. As the 
older idea of the terrorist as foreign, Islamic/Middle Eastern, and wholly alien in 
motivation and mindset is still alive and well (the reigning default image, even), I view 
the new challenges to this image as more of an expansion than a re-interpretation. 
Granted, it is possible that this more expansive reframing could be interpreted as 
promoting the idea that race/ethnicity is not a determining or causal factor in 
radicalization, if one only takes a sample of overt messages into account. Examining the 
bigger picture, however, shows us that the media’s apparent surprise when terror suspects 
turn out to be non-Muslim or non-Middle Eastern (and the lack of surprise when they 
are), speaks to a frame still anchored in and validating a particular, ethnically-connected 
image of the terrorist.  
5.2.7 Betrayal of Canada 
Some of the more sensationalist or emotive articles framed domestic terrorism as 
a betrayal of Canada, a perverse and heinous act. For instance, 
Yet, perversely, when Raed Jaser turned increasingly intolerant, as he is accused 
of doing in his alleged involvement with a plot to derail a VIA Rail train, he 
turned his focus not on the culture and countries that drove his family away, but 
on the one that offered them safe harbour (McParland, 2013). 
 
 
108 
 
 
Another article tells us that he is, 
… accused of plotting to terrorize the Canadians who gave his family a second 
chance (Humphreys & Bell, 2013). 
In the above texts, Jaser’s status as a former refugee is invoked as an aggravating factor.  
Canadian-born terror suspects are also discussed within the frame of betrayal, but 
differently. The following statement illustrates the more subtle denunciation: 
We don't know why. Maybe they had planned to spend the rest of their day - 
Canada Day, for the rest of us - celebrating the carnage, mocking the people 
whose lives they might have taken, and those who would have been maimed. That 
was their intention all along, police allege. To kill and destroy (Hutchinson, 
2013). 
 
In this article, Nuttall and Korody’s purported anti-Canadian sentiment is clear, but their 
(forfeited) Canadian-ness is only addressed obliquely. Contrary to my expectations, 
Canadian-born terror suspects received a (relatively) greater degree of acceptance. In 
fact, in a different National Post article devoted to Korody, who had an affluent Ontario 
upbringing, the author minimizes the angle of her turning against the culture and society 
which had, presumably, provided her with a comfortable early life – instead, the focus is 
on her post-adolescent mental health issues and troubled personal life. 
Josh Korody, her cousin, told the National Post that growing up, Ms. Korody was 
the “cool” older cousin, intelligent and creative but lacking in focus. “She was 
very unstructured,” said Mr. Korody, who runs a music recording studio in 
Toronto. “I know she definitely didn't have a normal life” (‘Canada Day terror 
suspect had a privileged yet troubled upbringing and disappeared a decade ago, 
family says’, 2013). 
Her cousin’s free-spirit characterization is followed directly by details of the charges 
Korody faces. 
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Ms. Korody was arrested Monday for her involvement in an alleged plot to 
detonate explosive devices on the steps of the B.C. legislature on Canada Day 
(‘Canada Day terror suspect had a privileged yet troubled upbringing and 
disappeared a decade ago, family says’, 2013). 
The accusations against Korody are serious and terrible, comparable to those against 
Jaser. However, the aforementioned article is mostly comprised of community speakers’ 
accounts of Korody’s distance from her family, indiscriminate attention-seeking 
behavior, and other aspects of her pre-jihadi life which are decidedly more tragic than 
condemning.28 
One impression I was left with was that when people immigrate to Canada, and 
later take up radical ideologies, their betrayal is discussed with anger; when Canadian-
born citizens do the same, it is viewed with confusion, disappointment, and sadness. I 
found just 14 instances of the supporting code, so I am hesitant to present any of my 
findings or impressions as conclusive, or even strong. This code did, however, offer some 
thought-provoking instances illustrating potential differences in the framing of domestic 
terror suspects. 
5.2.8 Redefining Canadian Values 
Some journalists frame domestic terrorism as something which either is forcing 
us, or should force us, to reevaluate and redefine traditional Canadian values. Most often, 
these values are somehow those relating to national security. A National Post article asks, 
And what does the democracy that values individual liberties, not to mention the 
vision of itself as a welcoming cultural mosaic, do about that [returning foreign 
                                                          
28 Unlike her partner, John Nuttall, Amanda Korody clearly falls under the Radical Next Door sub-frame. 
Though she was historically a troubled person, she is often portrayed as adrift in the world and susceptible 
to bad influences, not a violent or bad person herself. 
 
 
110 
 
fighters]? (Blatchford, 2013). 
 
This frame is associated with the controversies surrounding many of the new and 
expanded counter-terrorism measures the Canadian government continues to implement. 
In contrast to watchdog-oriented frames decrying potential or real abuses of power, we 
are asked to consider that our established civil rights and liberties might be making 
Canada vulnerable to attacks from unscrupulous extremists. 
5.2.9 Reinforcing Canadian Values 
Politicians invoke this frame when they say that our democracy/free society will 
not crumble in the face of terrorist threats or attacks, and also when they express 
commitment to Canadian values. Political figures from Safety Minister Vic Toews to 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper have reached out to the media, making statements that 
helped frame domestic terror plots or attacks as something that will make Canadians 
stronger and ever more devoted to our established beliefs, values, and institutions. This 
defiant framing is illustrated clearly in Christy Clark’s response to the attempted Canada 
Day bombing in British Columbia. 
B.C. Premier Christy Clark said she was profoundly shocked by news of the 
arrests. “But let me say this to those who resort to terror: You will not succeed,” 
Clark told reporters at the legislature in Victoria. “You will not succeed in 
damaging our democratic institutions. Just as importantly, you will not succeed in 
tearing down the values that make this country strong” (Home-cooked terror; 
RCMP arrest two in Canada Day plot to blow up B.C. legislature, 2013). 
 
 
 
111 
 
5.2.10 Terrorism is Under Control 
While there were only 7 total instances of citizens commenting on their level of 
faith in Canada’s police and security services, 5 out of these (roughly 71%) were positive. 
When citizens’ thoughts on this matter were published, the good outweighed the bad 
(only 2 messages, about 29%, were negative or critical). Similarly, only 4 coded 
instances showed citizen evaluation of the government. The low numbers show that it is 
rare for journalists to include citizens’ views on the effectiveness of our police, our 
security services, or our government against terrorism. 
Perhaps tellingly, most of the information on the success of anti-terrorism 
procedures comes from police and security personnel themselves. Of the identified 
speakers quoted in the news articles, a whopping 278 instances (26%) were coded under 
Police Speaker. For ease of analysis, I included national defense, intelligence, and 
security operatives in this category. Examples of typical police speaker statements 
include the following. 
The RCMP said it has been following the suspects' activities for months and said 
investigators ensured the alleged bombs were harmless (Moore & Keller, 2013). 
And, 
What Mounties did say was that the tip was subsequently passed on to the 
RCMP's Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSERT) in B.C., 
who used a “variety of complex investigative and covert techniques” throughout 
the month's long probe (Oliver, 2013). 
“We detected the threat early and disrupted it,” said RCMP Assistant 
Commissioner James Malizia. “I want to reassure our citizens that at all times 
during the investigation, our primary focus was the safety and protection of the 
public” (Oliver, 2013). 
Or, 
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“The spectre of these young people returning to Canada with combat experience 
and thoroughly radicalized views is a serious national security concern,” Michel 
Coulombe, the deputy director of operations for the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service agency told MPs studying the bill last year (Levitz, 2013a). 
 
Understandably, police speakers were typically not interested in sharing information 
about failed attempts to capture terrorists or prevent terrorism. Their comments were 
usually vague, yet positive, and frequently given to the press following a high-profile 
arrest or thwarted plot. Naturally, these speakers wish to paint themselves and the 
organizations they represent in the best possible light, lest they invite further criticism, 
cutbacks, or scandal. The dominance of police speakers effects the framing of domestic 
terrorism by presenting the issue in a manner positive towards themselves, which I sum 
up as: ‘yes, terrorism is a threat and terrorists pose a danger, but we have neutralized 
them and will continue to do so’. The implicit (and sometimes explicit) message is that 
terrorism is under control – the authorities, who citizens are safe trusting, have it covered.  
For the most part, they are right. There were minimal successful terrorist attacks 
on Canadian soil in 2013, compared to several successful arrests and charges against 
suspected terrorists. However, there were still some successful attacks (e.g. the Glebe 
fireboming), as well as a number of fairly high-profile instances of radicalized young 
Canadians leaving the country and committing violent acts of terror overseas (e.g. the 
group from London). These events were occasionally discussed critically by journalists in 
terms of CSIS’ neglecting to perform adequate surveillance, or the RCMP’s failure to 
apprehend the culprit, but these messages are rare. Just 7 instances of overt criticism, less 
than 5%, were found in the articles, compared to 135 instances of reporting law 
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enforcement success (a remarkable 95% of the statements regarding law enforcement 
success/failure). 
My data only applies to 2013, but interesting changes to this frame may have 
occurred because of the deadly 2014 attacks in Quebec and Ottawa. This question could 
make for a rewarding future research project.  
5.2.11 Problems with the Government 
 As mentioned above, the articles offered few examples of the Canadian 
government being evaluated. Citizen (non-journalist, non-politician, or non-federal 
employee) quotes regarding confidence in the government numbered 4 in total; all other 
evaluations of politicians only occurred 11 times. In both cases, the majority of the 
evaluations were negative. A significant majority of citizens (75%) expressed a lack of 
confidence in the government’s ability to successfully stop terrorism, while just 25% 
believed the government was doing enough to protect Canadians from terror attacks. 
Amongst the others, 73% of the evaluations were critical. The effectiveness of the 
government’s anti-terrorism measures was questioned, as well as the sincerity of their 
commitment to understanding and neutralizing terrorism (versus merely trying to appear 
as though they are doing something). Conversely, 27% of the evaluations were positive, 
praising political leaders for appropriate and successful action against the terrorist threat. 
5.2.12 Problems with the Legal System 
 I found more examples of critical attitudes towards the government when 
examining perspectives about law and legal responses. This topic yielded 147 instances, 
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making it fuller and stronger than the aforementioned evaluations of the government 
itself.29 Five main categories emerged, with 65% of the perspectives offering negative 
opinions about recent laws or governmental actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Positive and Negative Attitudes Towards the Law and/or Legal 
Responses to Terrorism  
                                                          
29 Discussions of law/legal responses delve into a specific aspect of governance, and the laws themselves, 
whereas the previous codes dealt with opinions on the government more generally. 
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The most frequent objection was that modern Canadian anti-terrorism laws and 
legal responses are overly harsh, problematic, or controversial (39%). Following that was 
the complaint that terrorism was being used for political profit or advancement by 
individuals or parties (16%). Finally, claims that the Conservative party was suppressing 
dissent or opposition to their counter-terrorism measures (notably, by accusing critics of 
being soft on terrorism, which many considered a low blow) made up roughly 10% of 
perspectives. It is worth noting the positive perspectives: about 22% of articles presented 
new laws or legal responses against terrorism as supported or recommended. Also, some 
speakers and journalists (13%) expressed trust in our legal system’s ‘safety nets’, 
claiming that even though the government’s new counter-terrorism measures had 
incredible powers and scope, said measures would not be abused and the average 
Canadian need not fear them. 
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 Despite the positive minority, the fact that most instances express discontent or 
paint our politicians in an unflattering light makes for an interesting frame. While news 
media rarely engage in criticism of police and intelligence/security forces, criticism of the 
government is readily accepted. There may be many intangible reasons contributing to 
this fact: perhaps the former are more venerated than the latter, seen as defenders and 
heroes rather than cronies and crooks. One plausible (and tangible) reason is that 
politicians are willing to criticize other politicians far more than police, intelligence, or 
military personnel – political speakers were the third most common type of speaker 
(18%), and they often had negative things to say about one another. Anyone who has 
watched an attack ad during election season knows that inter-party infighting can be 
brutal, and on the high-profile topic of terrorism, the media provided an ample platform 
for competitive rhetoric between parties.  
 One prominent example is Stephen Harper’s dismissal of Liberal leader Justin 
Trudeau’s suggestion that we ought to examine the root causes of involvement in 
terrorism. 
“I think, though, this is not a time to commit sociology, if I can use an 
expression,” Harper said. “These things are serious threats, global terrorist 
attacks, people who have agendas of violence that are deep and abiding threats to 
all the values our society stands for” (Fitzpatrick, 2013). 
 
Harper’s clear adherence to a punitive rather than investigative framework for dealing 
with terrorism not only countered Trudeau’s approach on a fundamental level, but cast 
the implication that Trudeau was ignorant of the true threat of terrorism. Accusations of 
being ‘soft on terrorism’ are a political weapon frequently wielded by the Conservative 
party against other politicians. 
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Political mud-slinging is hardly a one-sided practice, however. Members of the NDP 
have vocally criticized Conservative responses to terrorism, declaring, for instance: 
“A responsible Canadian government would not have kept hitting the snooze 
button until tragedy struck somewhere else in the world,” said New Democrat MP 
Dany Morin during the debate (‘Government says new terror laws necessary’, 
2013). 
Police and security forces are not pitted against each other in such a way 
(notwithstanding the potential for battles over jurisdiction or responsibility for failures). 
At least, this is not their public presentation. More often than not, if one such speaker 
mentioned another individual or agency, it was with a supportive, co-operative tone. 
Local police, the RCMP, and CSIS reinforce the idea of combined efforts to keep 
Canadians safe, whereas politicians wish to emphasize their own party’s superiority in 
combating terrorism and protecting Canadians, which may include demonizing or 
belittling other parties’ capabilities.  
Finally, it is politicians who make the laws which police and security forces are 
subject to. Thereby, the government is positioned as the ultimate authority, and 
potentially held to a higher standard of responsibility in the minds of journalists and other 
speakers. Regardless of cause, the government and its laws seems to be framed as a 
noticeably acceptable target for criticism and negative evaluation. 
5.2.13 Terrorism (Especially Domestic) is a Serious, Escalating, and 
Deadly Threat 
 Many elements of the news articles created and reinforced the idea that domestic 
terrorism is serious, escalating, and deadly – a bloody, insensible practice, and, by 
explicit statement or implication, something Canadians ought to be concerned about. To 
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assess messages of a serious/escalating threat, I coded each instance where alleged 
terrorist individuals or groups were noted for their growing impact on or danger to 
society (200 instances). I also coded instances of escalating legal, police, and/or 
intelligence attention to individuals, groups, or phenomena labeled as terrorist. These 
instances came up early on in the coding process, and formed one of my first codes. Later 
on, I came across articles that downplayed domestic terrorism as not a very serious threat, 
generally portraying it as a low risk relative to other dangers (28 instances), but their 
influence on this frame is negligible. Below is a visual comparison of the two codes. 
Figure 6.1: Domestic Terror as Serious vs. Not Serious or Less Serious 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
 A weighty 88% of instances clearly represented domestic terrorism as a 
dangerous and rising threat to Canadians. This was accomplished mostly through quotes 
from experts, authorities, and officials, predominantly police and political speakers. One 
National Post article explains, 
Security officials have been raising concerns for several years about radicalized 
youths joining the Islamist extremist cause, arguing they pose a danger both 
abroad and once they return to Canada with training (Keidan & Bell, 2013). 
 
Another method of reinforcing the seriousness of domestic terrorism was 
journalistic implication via comparison. Many articles about the Canadian Freemen-on-
the-Land movement ended up in my database because in each one (of multiple, unique 
articles, not just reprints or copies), the author mentioned that in the United States, the 
FBI considers the American Freemen-on-the-Land a domestic terrorist group. The oft-
repeated line: 
The FBI considers the movement a domestic terror threat in the U.S. but a 
Freemen-on-the-Land spokesman told The Canadian Press earlier this month that 
violence is not advocated and has no place in the movement (Graveland, 2013). 
 
Without explicitly stating so, making these connections sends the message that the 
Canadian Freemen are equally dangerous and radical; thus, they are framed as potential 
terrorists. Journalists seem insistent on reiterating this idea, despite the fact that the 
American Freemen have shot at least one police officer, whereas the Canadian Freemen 
are better known as a nuisance than a threat to society at large, committing crimes such as 
squatting and driving without a license. 
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I found five more elements that contribute to the frame of domestic terrorism as a 
serious, escalating, and deadly threat. For example, articles may prominently feature a 
gamut of emotional responses to a terrorist event, from an assortment of sources. 
Journalists pad these articles with quotes emphasizing the shock, horror, and fear 
experienced in reaction to the event. Another tactic appealing to readers’ pathos is 
positing disturbing, emotionally-charged hypothetical scenarios. The following excerpt is 
a near-perfect example. 
As I walked around there at the height of rush hour Monday night – GO 
commuter trains also run out of Union and the subway does a turn there, so it's 
busy – I looked upon the crowd. Who would have been "the face of Canada's 
terror bombing," as eight-year-old Martin Richard has been called Boston's, had it 
proceeded along lickety-split? 
Could it have been the teenager with the small clutch of flowers? The young man 
who made animals-in-the-jungle noises to amuse his girl as they said goodbye? 
The older couple, he sweating and breathless, she organized and clearly in charge 
but quietly frantic, who went off to find out where they should go next? 
While she was gone, the old fellow's phone beeped that he had received a text: 
The sight of him fumbling, with arthritic hands, to retrieve the tiny phone, first 
out of a pocket and then out of its fancy leather pouch, and then punching the 
keyboard, inexplicably broke my heart. 
Toronto's train station; Canada's trusting passengers: May they stay strong, as Mr. 
Ortiz said (Blatchford, 2013a). 
 
Even if the people quoted were never in danger from the plot or attack, or the 
scenario never actually happened, the emotional content can still reinforce the dangers of 
domestic terrorism. As previously explained in the discussion of speaker types and the 
frame relevance of the terror suspect’s personal history and character, articles framing 
an issue this way have the benefit of being more widely relatable, making the content 
more of a human interest story than a crime or politically-oriented narrative. Furthermore, 
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a fear angle may serve to raise interest in the topic (and help sell future news stories). I 
coded 134 instances of emotional responses to terrorism. 
The third component of this frame is the level of detail and description given to 
terrorists’ weapons. I coded 218 instances where the exact type of weapon used (or 
planned to be used) in a terrorist attack was identified and described in some degree of 
detail. This detail ranged from the bare minimum (e.g. ‘a bomb’) to fairly extensive, for 
example, 
Nuttall and Korody are alleged to have made three explosive devices out of 
pressure cookers, similar in make to the type of bombs used in the recent Boston 
Marathon bombings that killed three people and injured more than 260, and 
placed them or arranged to have them placed around the legislative buildings in 
Victoria (Oliver, 2013). 
 
Most descriptions were moderately to highly graphic in their level of detail. The more 
explained about the weapon, the gorier and more unsettling the description becomes. The 
excerpt above tells us that the terror suspects created three bombs, akin to the bombs that 
killed three and injured a great many more in a previous terror attack, and were allegedly 
prepared to plant them around an important government building, on a day when a high 
concentration of people would be gathered there to celebrate. Describing the bombs 
invites people to imagine what might have happened, had they not been apprehended by 
the RCMP. For example, 
“Had this plot been carried out, it would have resulted in innocent people being 
killed or seriously injured,” said RCMP assistant commissioner James Malizia 
(DiManno, 2013). 
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Some examples, like a fertilizer bomb, are frightening because the ingredients are 
reasonably commonplace. The potential for death and destruction, combined with the fact 
that domestic terrorists are fully able to build these contraptions at home, from scratch, 
makes detailed description of weapons a supporting element in the news media’s framing 
of domestic terrorism as a serious and deadly threat.30 
In fact, several articles made a point to mention the potential damage or violence 
to people resulting from a terrorist attack, independently of the discussion of weapons. I 
analyzed instances of media focus on terrorist plots or intentions that had as a goal 
causing death, injury, or trauma to humans, but which failed; these made up the forth 
component of this frame. Having differentiated these instances from attacks that 
succeeded in killing at least one person (the fifth component), I then compared the two.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 In cases where the death toll would not come from weapons per se, but from seizing control of 
something dangerous and intentionally using it to hurt people, I looked for detailed description of what 
the terror suspects planned to do, how they planned to do it, and the degree of projected carnage, had 
the attack been successful. 
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Figure 6.2: Deadly Attacks vs. Failed or Foiled Plots (Planned/Potential Damage 
or Violence to People)  
 
 
There were slightly more failed attacks (61%) than successful ones (about 40%), but not 
by very much. I counted references to Canadian plots or deaths, at home and abroad, and 
plots or attacks committed in other countries by Canadian-connected terrorists.  
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Occasionally, if a foreign incident was a) domestic terrorism, b) deadly, and c) 
mentioned in close connection with a Canadian plot or attack, or brought up to 
demonstrate Canada’s vulnerability, I included it. I discovered that the Boston Marathon 
bombings were a journalistic favourite in this regard. Often in the Canadian news media, 
the shock, horror, destruction, and brutality of this event became a wake-up call of sorts; 
many Canadian-content domestic terrorism articles use it as a point of comparison and as 
a cautionary example. There were 130 instances of articles linking Canadian to non-
Canadian domestic terror, or vice versa. 
Finally, another aspect of media’s framing of terrorism as a serious and deadly 
threat to Canada is the image of the competent and fearsome terrorist. While the 
overwhelming majority of terrorist characterizations peg them as criminal and immoral, 
ignorant and ridiculous, disgusting, irrational, and abnormal (92%), or some other form 
of psychosocial failure, roughly 9% of the time, this rhetoric is supplanted by one 
presenting the domestic terrorist as clever, successful in his plans, and an adept 
manipulator of the Western system.  
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Figure 6.3: Terrorists as Maladjusted, Mentally Ill, and/or Incompetent vs. 
Messages of Competency 
 
 
Messages of competency are found in a National Post article referring to the Toronto 18: 
“They picked Christmas for the date of their training camp because they were 
Canadian kids who knew the country shuts down at that time of year” (Blatchford, 
2013). 
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Somewhat incongruently, even when the terrorists are described in the 
negative/incompetent terms mentioned above, they are still presented as a threat to people 
and/or their property. Yet, as discussed earlier, opposing frames may exist 
simultaneously, and frame elements may become composites of more than one frame, 
gaining different meaning when switching context. When considering the apparent 
dichotomy at hand, recall the socially isolated, drug-addicted pair who attempted to blow 
up the B.C. legislature; or, the Freemen-on-the-Land who took over an elderly woman’s 
rental home, declared it an embassy, and caused major damage to the property (and 
psychological stress to the owner). She says of her experience, 
“I'm at wits' end and somebody says to me: 'Oh they're just a bunch of kooks,'” 
said Caverhill. “I say: 'No, they're not. They're not kooks - they're crazy, yes, 
they're dangerous, yes'” (‘Calgary home declared ‘embassy’ by Freeman Property 
located in Calgary’s upscale Parkdale neighbourhood, 2013). 
 
Though the Freemen-on-the-Land are known for being ignorant, irrational, and ridiculous 
(their interactions with the justice system have showcased these propensities time and 
again), victim speaker Rebekah Caverhill warns that their odd behavior does not make 
them benign or inconsequential. 
Terrorism as a serious, escalating, and deadly threat turned out to be one of the 
most well-developed and best-supported frames in my analysis. The ideas in this frame 
are clear. Terrorists exist; some of them exist and operate inside Canada (possibly even 
inside the readers’ own communities); they are dangerous; and they have the potential to 
be competent. These are people who have turned their backs on Canadian society, people 
who are intentionally, actively constructing plots and building weapons with the power to 
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kill or maim, and furthermore, they have no moral compunction against using these 
weapons to kill ordinary people. In fact, they have done so (or tried to) many times 
before. A powerful question implicit in this frame is, could a successful terror attack 
happen in Canada? The also-implicit answer tells us that yes, it could. 
 I have only touched upon the basic components of the frame here; there is so 
much potential for further analysis and deeper discussion that I am convinced it would be 
possible to write another paper simply on how the media creates, conveys, and reinforces 
this particular idea of terrorism – possibly, without even having to expand the database. It 
is certainly among the most significant media frames for understanding terrorism in the 
Canadian context. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
This research revealed some interesting findings on the framing of domestic 
terrorism in the Canadian news media. Starting with the broad research question, ‘how 
were domestic and Canadian-connected terrorists and terrorist events portrayed (i.e. 
framed) by the Canadian news media in the year 2013?’ 
One finding showed that the media presentation of domestic terrorism and the 
academic discussion of the phenomenon were disparate. While academic sources tend to 
favour a more complex interpretation of events, individuals, and organizations, the media 
tend to gravitate towards simple focal themes which are implicitly or explicitly put forth 
as explanations or important facets of the topic. Race, religion, psychological states, and 
other essentialist factors were reported as connected with terrorism by default. Academic 
findings, on the other hand, explain that the influence of any of the above should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, not a priori. 
Among the most popular frames were salience of race/ethnicity and Islamic 
conversion/beliefs as a factor. Secrecy regarding terrorism is appropriate/acceptable, 
relevance of the terror suspect’s personal history and character, and terrorism 
(especially domestic) is a serious, escalating, and deadly threat also emerged as notable 
frames. While a focus on race and religion was typical in the articles, journalists nearly 
always made efforts not to be overtly racist, as demonstrated in the frame (conditional) 
sympathy for the moderate Muslim community. 
Some findings were less frequent, but still interesting and worth discussing. For 
instance, a combination of frames and framing devices hinted at differences and divisions 
characteristic of certain organizations and made visible by the news media. The analysis 
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of speaker variables, when assessed with the rest of the content, illustrates some 
examples. Political speakers were commonplace, yet criticism of political bodies and 
individual politicians was relatively rampant. Contrasting this with the nearly always 
uniform statements and stories offered to the press by the even more popular 
police/security speakers, one may draw certain conclusions about the nature of the 
political game versus the operations of agencies such as the RCMP, CSIS, and local 
police forces. The latter tended to show more solidarity in terms of the information, 
statements, and objectives both offered to and withheld from the press, showing a unified 
– if inscrutable – front, whereas the former helped present an image of discontent and 
controversy with respect to the political scene. 
Another interesting detail was the expansion of what is presented in the media as 
terrorism. Found amongst the expected reports about bombings, hijackings, and plots 
were articles extending the label of domestic terrorism to crimes such as a gang-related 
shooting and a case of squatting. This development is especially potent because of the 
special counter-measures widely accepted as justifiable (even necessary) in terrorism 
cases. Treating more and more types of crime as terrorism may lead to changes in how 
crimes and criminals are dealt with in the Canadian legal system. 
The framing devices used most often and to strongest effect were repetition of 
data, repetition of quotes, and privileging or prioritizing of certain voices over others 
(such as in the speaker variable discussed above). 
This thesis provides some much-needed answers on terrorism framing specific to 
the Canadian context. However, it is only the beginning for framing research in this 
milieu. Future research building on or incorporating the data from this thesis could 
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include exploring certain frames more thoroughly. Frames like the popular ones 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, along with others such as privileging or 
prioritizing of certain voices, charismatic figures and recruitment: stronger inroads than 
self-radicalization, frames related to Canadian values, and those evaluating the 
government, legal system, and security forces merit more attention based on what they 
could explain about Canadian law and society (as well as media framing in general). 
Another option for building upon this research is to repeat the same study, using 
the same methodology and practices, but using articles from different years. Trends 
present in the 2013 news articles may be tracked across time. In this way, scholars may 
observe and analyze which frames persist in popularity and which fall out of favour in the 
Canadian news media. Not only would this be a good judge of the study’s replicability, 
but if successful, would offer conclusions valuable to academics ranging from 
sociologists to communications scholars to political scientists. 
Taking a more holistic approach, a research design incorporating data from focus 
groups or survey results could serve to see how well the general public absorbs media 
framing. Studies focusing simply on the mediated aspects of framing – what is said in the 
texts in question – can only go so far. When combined with data from public opinion 
research, however, framing studies can go a long way towards explaining the impact of 
frames on society. This thesis discusses many possible, theoretical effects of the media 
frames I discovered on public belief, opinion, and action. However, none of these can be 
correlated with the popularity of specific frames without complimentary research actually 
investigating public opinion firsthand. I suggest focus groups because they are known to 
be effective at probing the qualitative elements of human belief and opinion, and because 
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they may be used to gather data from a wider, larger sample than is practical for one-on-
one interviews. Survey data would be my second choice, as it could address relevant 
questions (such as what news sources participants accessed and their agreement with 
selected frames), but with less depth (albeit with a larger sample size) than qualitative 
methods. 
Furthermore, this thesis may be valuable for its contributions to the study of war 
framing in general, as discussed in Reese (2010) and Gavriely-Nuri and Balas (2010). 
Reese (2010), D’Angelo and Kuypers (2010), and Entman (1993) wish to develop a more 
unified theory and practice of framing research. If compared to other news framing 
studies, especially those covering issues like terrorism, security, or war, this thesis may 
help establish methodological and contextual commonalities that could guide future 
research. Not only might this development help scholars better understand the framing in 
legitimized sources of news media, but also the ways terrorist groups use the media to 
spread their messages of fear and/or propaganda.  
There are important gaps in the academic knowledge base on this topic, especially 
from a Canadian perspective. As explained in the literature review, at the outset of this 
research project I could not find any Canadian studies about the framing of domestic 
terrorism, or even any less-specific frame analyses of (generalized) terrorism in the 
Canadian news media. This is a rather important knowledge gap, given that terrorism is a 
highly popular topic in the news. My thesis is among the first academic research to 
explore this particular aspect of Canada’s response to terrorism. The articles in my 
database cover a variety of domestic terrorism incidents, from Islamic fundamentalist 
terrorism to eco-terrorism to cases that illustrate new applications of the term (such as 
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calling a gang shooting “domestic terrorism”). Hence, my analysis, and the resulting 
frames, draws from a diverse assortment of what the Canadian news media called 
terrorism in 2013. Awareness of the frames revealed in this thesis provides a jump-off 
point for comparisons with the data from other framing research (on terrorism 
specifically or news media more generally), with public opinion research, or as support 
for non-framing-centric studies about Canadian media, culture, government, and/or 
response to terrorism. 
The overarching conclusion garnered from the findings – evident when addressing 
the body of frames as a whole – is that the Canadian media is obsessed with terrorism, 
but, for the most part, falls short of informing and educating their audience to any 
significant degree. Journalists showed a tendency to sensationalize, e.g. relying on 
emotional appeals and discussing terror suspects’ personal lives, instead of filling their 
articles with empirical facts and expert theories about the terrorist incidents they discuss. 
Focus on religion and race undermined discourse on the more universal, more underlying 
causes/explanations of terrorist radicalization, and additionally may support certain racist 
or extremist perspectives. While most journalists shied away from explicit 
fearmongering, several authors (such as the National Post’s Christie Blatchford) asked 
the audience to imagine dangerous, deadly acts of terrorism as they could happen on 
Canadian soil, leading news readers into emotionally charged hypothetical scenarios. The 
cultural, emotional, psychological, and physical damage domestic terrorism stands to 
cause was stressed even in articles reinforcing the competence of Canadian security 
services in preventing attacks. Speculation on ‘what may have happened’, including 
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graphic details about the alleged terrorists’ weapons and how they planned to use them, 
helped bolster this presentation of domestic terrorism as a serious and severe threat. 
When relevant ‘hard facts’ about the terror incident were included, they were 
bare-bones, and almost exclusively came from two main sources: police speakers and 
political speakers. But the former are purposefully guarded as a part of their institutional 
culture, and the latter are more interested in using rhetoric to make themselves seem 
appealing to the public (or insulting their political rivals). Statements from both types of 
speaker are most often collected the same way: via public press conferences staged by the 
government or security services, the representatives of which thereby have total control 
over what information is disseminated, and what is kept secret. Two remedies to the 
problems of poor quality and quantity of information and undue, irrelevant 
emotionalizing and/or sensationalizing are: a) a return to investigative reporting, wherein 
journalists sought out leads and facts on their own, rather than relying solely on the 
information selectively fed to them by authorities, and b) a greater reliance on academic 
speakers (ideally, to the minimization of community speakers).  
Overall, I am pleased with how this thesis turned out. Despite certain setbacks and 
limitations, the end result yielded some valuable and interesting findings. This study 
offers great opportunity for other scholars to integrate its data into their own papers, and 
furthermore, to build upon it, testing the reliability and validity of my methods and 
conclusions. As a contribution to Canadian media studies, terrorism studies, and framing 
studies, I believe this thesis stands on its own as an important (and perhaps 
groundbreaking) work. The highest honour I could hope for, as an academic, is the 
chance to contribute something of meaning to the body of Canadian sociological 
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scholarship. If this thesis can do this in even one small way, my efforts have been 
worthwhile.  
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Appendix A: List of Codes, Definitions, and Frequencies 
The following is a report created by MAXQDA, detailing all codes and subcodes, 
definitions, notes and examples (from code memos), and frequencies. 
Sentiment re: Academic Research or Knowledge [0] Organizing code. 
Pro-Academic/Pro-Knowledge Sentiment [36]  
Article includes statements supporting the deeper investigation of domestic terrorism and 
the need for ongoing research.  
Simply the mention of an academic/think tank study or it's data does not count. 
E.G. "“If people do not stand up to discuss this, we will not be able to shine the 
spotlight,” said Salim Mansur, an associate professor of political science at the university 
in London, Ont., “We have to ask difficult questions.”"- Ottawa Sun - Need more 
dialogue to shine light on homegrown terror 
Anti-Academic/Anti-Knowledge Sentiment [10]  
Article relates anti-academic or anti-knowledge sentiment towards terrorism. Attempts at 
scientific investigation and holistic understanding of terrorism are portrayed by the 
speaker as the wrong response: often accompanying this kind of statement is the assertion 
that the only right view of terrorism is strictly as a criminal act, and the right response is 
punitive. Moreover, it is implied that the two approaches are mutually exclusive, and that 
anyone who wants to understand terrorism is either deluded, soft on terrorists, a 
sympathizer, and/or making excuses for their criminal behavior.  
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E.G., Harper's famous anti-sociology quote: 
"Stephen Harper says now is not the time to "commit sociology" in response to the arrests 
of two men accused of conspiring to attack a Via Rail train."- Winnipeg Free Press, 
Terror incidents should spark anti-crime 
Now is not the time to understand terrorism using sociology - why might that be? 
 
Citizens' Faith in the Government [0] Organizing code. 
Confidence in the Govt [1]  
Canadians confident that the govt can and will do what is needed to successfully stop 
terrorism. Expressed explicitly as citizen's opinion, different from just praise for govt or 
messages of govt success. Citizen commentator/opinion, not official. 
Lack of Confidence in the Govt [3]  
Canadians not convinced the govt can protect the country from domestic terrorism. 
Expressed explicitly as citizen's opinion, different from just criticism for govt or 
messages of govt failures/shortcomings. Citizen commentator/opinion, not official. 
 
Citizens' Faith in Police/Intelligence Agencies [0] Organizing code. 
Confidence in Police/Intelligence [5]  
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Article mentions Canadian confidence and/or trust that police and intelligence agencies 
are doing their best and will be successful at preventing domestic terrorism. Expressed 
explicitly as citizen's opinion, different from just messages of police success. 
Lack of Confidence in Police/Intelligence [2]  
Article mentions Canadians' doubt, concern, insecurity, fear etc. regarding police or 
intelligence agencies' ability to stop domestic terrorism. Expressed explicitly as citizen's 
opinion, different from just messages of police failures. 
 
Metaphor/Simile [0] Metaphor used to describe terrorism. Organizing code. 
Terrorism as Natural Force [3]  
i.e. natural disaster, weather phenomenon (wind, tide), animal (Al Qaida tentacles, 
biting). 
Terrorism as Sickness in Society [2]  
i.e. terrorism is like cancer, insanity, or other illnesses on a social level. 
Terrorism as Toxic/Poisonous [1]  
i.e. terrorism as a toxic or poisonous element leaking into and/or corrupting society. 
 
Speaker [0] Who are the speakers in the article? Organizing code. 
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Speaker: literal speaker, i.e. one who is quoted directly ("speaking" to the audience via 
the reporter), OR source, when the type of source is mentioned ("govt officials say", 
"accused's brother stated", police revealed" etc.). 
Political Speaker [187]  
Article quotes a politician or political representative. 
Victim Speaker [37]  
Victim of terrorist is quoted in the article. 
Academic Speaker [73]  
Article quotes academic perspectives on domestic terrorism. 
e.g. "University of Toronto law professor Kent Roach also raised concerns about the 
investigative hearings and preventative arrest provisions. While the Supreme Court of 
Canada upheld investigative hearings as constitutional, he believes there is a “danger” 
that using them against an uncooperative witness might “alienate” them. He believes 
that’s exactly what happened during the Air India bombing investigation which ended in 
an acquittal in large part, he said, due to the fact “witnesses felt forced to testify.”" - 
terror bill becomes law 
Terrorist Speaker [88]  
Quotes from the terrorist(s) or suspect(s) are used. Terrorist(s) get to explain/defend their 
actions and/or perspectives. Might not be at all sympathetic to them, however; I expect 
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quotes will often be snippets of radical statements used to punctuate the article with proof 
of their deviancy. 
Defending self: ""Yes, there has been the odd person here and there that has actually 
fought back and done some stupid things, but those are individuals. And to paint all 
Freemen as terrorists, it would be the same as painting all Frenchmen FLQ or all 
Germans Nazis. It's kind of ridiculous," he said." - freemen (brian alexander) 
INTERESTING b/c is white, non-religiously oriented Canadian citizen- Freemen are 
given more positive quotes/opportunities to defend themselves and promote an opposing 
point of view than are other (i.e. Islamic) terrorists? 
Community Speaker [230]  
Article quotes members of the community (laypeople) reacting to or commenting on the 
terrorist event. May be people who knew the terrorist(s), non-radicalized family members 
of terrorist, victims' family members, or members of the community the terrorist(s) were 
from. 
E.g. "Like many teens, both youths engaged in drinking, smoking and dating, said a 
former friend who attended South Collegiate Institute with the two young men. But they 
also talked about Islam all the time, as though they were faithful Muslims, said the 
aquaintance, who described them as "bipolar" in their faith. 
To some young people, it's an "attractive bravado," said London Mosque board member 
Dr. Wael Haddara. "There's an old saying, 'it's much easier to die for your faith than to 
live up to it.' Those groups probably provide a sense of belonging, esprit d'corps. . . a 
quick way to God. A shortcut." - Londoners in Algeria 
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Police Speaker [278]  
Quotes from police, CSIS, RCMP, or their official spokespeople featured in the article. 
E.g. ""The RCMP is aware of the Freemanon-the-Land ideology and the interaction that 
some police jurisdictions have had with individuals who follow this movement. 
Additionally, in recent years, the RCMP has received correspondence directly from 
followers of this movement," RCMP spokeswoman Julie Gagnon said in an email." - 
Freemen (brian alexander) 
Legal Speaker [119]  
Quotes from a lawyer discussing, defending, or prosecuting the case/issue in the article. 
E.g. ""We've seen that escalation already," said Ron Usher, general counsel for the 
Society of Notaries Public of BC." - freemen (Brian Alexander) 
Media Speaker [49]  
Article references another media outlet or quotes another publication. 
E.g. "On Monday, CBC said the duo travelled overseas with two other Londoners but the 
report has not been confirmed." - Questions surround Londoners' role in Algeria 
 
Terrorists Competent/Fearsome [29]  
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Terrorists on the Internet [38] Mention of terrorists using the internet to spread their 
messages, recruit others, and/or communicate with co conspirators, OR using the internet 
to combat terrorists.  
Complex View of Terrorism [31]  
Article offers an analysis/explanation of terrorism that takes into account the complex 
and diverse array of situations, perpetrators, methods, and/or motives that are part of the 
terrorism phenomena. 
E.g. "Supt. Richer told reporters that violent radicalization was not new, nor was it 
"exclusive to any single ethnic or interest group, any one religion, any specific socio-
economic class, ideology or political world view." 
- Nat Post, 'Overwhelming interest' leads RCMP to confirm 
Terrorism Act of Revenge, War, or Defense [24]  
Mentions terrorism as revenge or vengence against actual or percieved slights or attacks 
against the terrorist or their people. 
E.g. "After running over and trying to behead Pte. Rigby with a meat cleaver, the killers 
said they were avenging the deaths of Muslims by British soldiers."- Nat Post, Military 
feared Canadian soldiers could also be 
Includes driving non-Muslims out of Muslim lands, e.g. 
But he is all for waging what he calls "defensive jihad," which he defined as "defending 
against people who are in Muslim lands who shouldn't be." While he once wanted to 
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travel to Yemen, because Awlaki was there, he said he decided against it. "I was going to 
go but I thought of my kids," he said. Instead, he encourages other Canadians to make 
their way to places like Somalia to take up arms. 
- Nat Post, Cree jihadist 
also, terrorism as rightfully defending Muslims and protecting the community, e.g. 
"For us as Muslims, our religion teaches that we're brothers and sisters," said Dawood, 
33, who said he feared repercussions if his last name was published. "You have to stand 
up for your brothers and sisters, you have to defend them."- Nat Post, Cree jihadist; How 
a boy from a reserve became 
Economic Causes of Terrorism [3]  
article mentions economic factors such as poverty, inequality, etc. as fuel for terrorism or 
an underlying cause. 
E.G. "[FBI] And it warns the movement will likely grow, fuelled by the recent economic 
downturn..."- Tor Star, Antigovernment soverign citizen movement 
Anti-Western Goals or Motives [18]  
Article provides terrorists' anti-Western goals, motives, ideologies, manifesto, etc. 
Applies to both individuals and groups. 
E.g., "... Al-Shabab, described by Public Safety Canada as "an organized but shifting 
Islamist group dedicated to establishing a Somali caliphate, waging war against the 
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enemies of Islam, and removing all foreign forces and Western influence from Somalia."- 
Nat Post, Somali MP wants canadian parents to keep close 
Terrorists had Good Home Life [20]  
Statements telling the reader of the terrorist(s) happy, average, or otherwise good home 
life.  
All the more confusing why they turned to terrorism. 
Terrorists as Alienated or Had Poor Home Life [37]  
Terrorist(s) as victims of an abusive environment or some other harsh living 
circumstances which helped produce the violent/radicalized person they became. 
"The teens all came from homes filled with violence, drinking and drugs and were in and 
out of foster care." - Hobbema, Alta teens recieve maximum sentence 
Terrorists Dissatisfied [42]  
Terrorists described as being dissatisfied or unhappy with themselves, their lives, the 
West, political situations, and/or the world as a whole - and turning to radicalization as a 
way to change that. Boredom, alienation, and the desire for excitement may also turn up 
as forms of dissatisfaction that may underline a person’s radicalization. 
E.g. ““A big motivation for Richard and a lot of the guys who end up becoming 
radicalized is this idea of identity, and transformation, and becoming something,” Leech 
said. “Not liking who they are, wanting to become something else.””  
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““If you take somebody who is slightly disenchanted and inclined to think the West is not 
very good, and you put them in with these people, the next thing you know you want 
people to do violence.” When asked if Canadians need to “readjust” their thinking about 
what makes a terrorist, Fadden said most young recruits are those “who feel that the 
Muslim world is under attack and that somehow Canada is contributing to that.”” 
It’s a major concern for security services, said Pantucci, who called Syria a “magnet” for 
those who are disaffected or simply looking for some excitement. 
“That is 100 per cent a substantial consideration, no doubt about it,” he said. “If you’re a 
bored young man from some place and are going nowhere, and don’t do anything 
exciting and then someone comes along and says, ‘You, my son, can be a warrior, you 
can fight on the battlefield,’ it sounds very exciting.- the road to radicalization 
Terrorists Socially Motivated [41]  
Article explains terrorists as being socially motivated: wanting to 'fit in', to prove 
themselves to the primary group (a community of radicals). Related to charasmatic 
figure, but more personalized to the terrorist - charismatic figure 'seduces', whereas 
community motivates. Includes mentions of terrorists as people insecure with their status 
in an adoptive group, such as new converts, who feel like they have a lot to prove. 
e.g. Prof. Christian Leuprecht, a terrorism expert at Queen's University and Royal 
Military College, said it was difficult to say whether converts were more prone to 
radicalization. He said their involvement in terrorism could stem from a need to prove 
themselves. "This is partially, conceivably, what may be driving some of this, that you've 
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got to show that you're willing to do things for the cause that other people aren't, to show 
that you're a true believer, as a sort of litmus test," he said. 
and 
he compared their situation to that of a "striker," a prospective member of an outlaw biker 
gang. "The guy is not patched yet and feels he has to work twice as hard to demonstrate 
his worthiness. So I think the convert might be inclined to go fast, go hard because they 
feel they have to prove to others ... 'I'm a true believer.'"- Nat Post, Desire to fit in with 
the Muslim community can push 
or "Aaron Yoon, who went to the same high school as the others"- Macleans, Terror 
raises questions about us 
Terrorists Penitent/Reject 'Terrorist' label [4]  
Terrorists are penitient or apologetic about their past actions, explaining that they are 
sorry for what they have done/what they planned to do and/or that they no longer believe 
in terrorism. 
e.g. "... Dirie had claimed at his sentencing that he no longer believed in terrorism or 
violence."- Nat Post, Alberta high school dropout explains why he, an [STARTED 
USING THIS CODE AT THE ABOVE ARTICLE] 
OR 
Terrorists or terror suspects are reported as claiming to be against terrorism/violence, 
despite charges against them. 
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e.g. "The brother said he even asked Aaron at the time about Islamic-linked terrorism; he 
responded that such violence is contrary to Muslim beliefs and that he was "100%" 
opposed to it." 
- Nat Post, Aaron Yoon, friend of Canadian suspects in Alge 
Terrorists Un-Canadian/Betrayed Canada [14]  
Statements casting terrorists as inherently non-Canadian; Canadian-ness something they 
sacrifice when they resort to terrorism. 
e.g. "“Canadian citizenship is predicated on loyalty to this country and I cannot think of a 
more obvious act of renouncing one’s sense of loyalty than going and committing acts of 
terror,” Kenney told reporters." - Immigration minister eyes move to strip terrorists 
Also: article explains/implies/asks how terrorist has somehow 'betrayed' Canada - the 
land which has given them so much. 
e.g. "Why would someone whose family has been offered a safe haven from the strife 
that has marked their life, turn against that very country? Why kill the people who have 
embraced you? As the Jaser's history shows, if they were excluded from anywhere, it was 
the region of their birth; Canada is the country that gave them acceptance."- Nat Post, 
Why would VIA 'plotter' turn against Canada 
Terrorists Ideologically Motivated [82]  
*** NOT USED. Intended to describe the multiple instances of IDEOLOGY of various 
or indiscriminate sorts described as a motivator or root cause of terrorism, but had too 
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much overlap with Al-Qaida Ideology as Motive. Al-Qaida Ideology and self-radicalized 
codes better considered on their own. 
Original definition: Mentions Al-Qaida or Al-Qaida affiliates by name as an influence on 
the domestic terrorist(s). Terrorist(s) may be in communication with Al-Qaida/affiliated 
groups, OR may have researched and adopted the ideologies on their own (self-
radicalized).  
Al-Qaida Ideology as a Motive [95]  
Al-Qaida Ideology specifically mentioned as a motive by the terrorists themselves or 
authorities (i.e. police or academics). 
 E.g. "two Canadian citizens, driven by an "al-Qaida ideology" - B.C. Canada Day 
bombers 
Self-Radicalized [26]  
Domestic terrorists introduced themselves to Al-Qaida ideology and pursued it 
independently. Were not (at least initially) recruited by or in contact with established 
radicals. 
Radicalized Through Recruitment [63]  
Domestic terrorists had personal contact with, were taught, and/or were given instructions 
("radicalized") by an existing radical. Could be over the internet, through a Mosque, or 
while on vacation.  
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Had CONTACT/PARTICIPATION/INTERACTION with terrorist mentors, as opposed 
to wholly self-radicalized. 
NOT Al-Qaida Ideology [26]  
Domestic terrorists discussed are not affiliated with or inspired by Al-Qaida. Examples 
include Freemen-on-the-Land, environmental or animal rights activists, or other non-
religiously-motivated violence/threats labelled as domestic terrorism (e.g. Pickering 
terror hoax, Alberta reserve shooting). 
E.g. Wiebo Ludwig “claimed that sour gas on his Alberta property was to blame for 
animal deaths and miscarriages among family members and took aim at the oil and gas 
industry.” - Canadians with terror ties 
Law Enforcement Successes - Public Protected [135]  
Article tells of law enforcement successes in combatting terrorism and foiling specific 
plots. Emphasizes the efficacy of Canadian police and intelligence services. 
"RCMP say they have foiled a domestic terror attack hatched by two Canadian citizens, 
driven by an "al-Qaida ideology" to blow up the British Columbia legislature during 
Canada Day celebrations. 
Police were informed of the alleged plot in February by the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service, and a five-month investigation culminated with the arrests of two 
people in Abbotsford, B.C., on Monday, RCMP announced on Tuesday." 
The police successes are keeping the public safe. 
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"At no time during the investigation was public security at risk, Malizia said. 
The devices shown in the photographs were inert, and posed no public threat, police 
said."  
- B.C. canada day terror plot 
Law Enforcement Failures [7]  
Examples of law enforcement/intelligence agencies failing to identify, monitor, foil, or 
arrest terrorists. Not necessarily a blatant criticism, but pointing out to the reader a 
potential lapse that could have cost lives. 
e.g. “CSIS did not, however, have the pair under surveillance when they left Canada last 
year.” - London residents shocked by news that Canadians 
And "Responses have ranged from incredulity to accusations of incompetence aimed at 
law-enforcement agencies. A Vancouver Sun editorial last week claimed the incident 
reflects poorly on all Canadians: “We failed to prevent an international terrorist 
movement from recruiting our young men, and we failed to prevent them from taking 
human life.”- Macleans, "Why terrorism can grow in any soil" 
Police Following Procedure [34]  
Article presents police and intelligence agencies as following procedure. Contrary to 
extreme measures. Often in the form of police officers describing/justifying their 
investigations to media. 
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E.g. "There are investigative processes that police must follow in gathering evidence to 
determine any potential involvement by Canadians," Supt. Richer said."- Nat Post, 
'Overwhelming interest' leads RCMP to confirm 
Terrorists ARE Canadian Citizens [170]  
Terrorists discussed are Canadian citizens or legal residents. 
Perhaps irrelevant. If relevant: code means the Canadian status pointed out, or the 
Canadianness of the terrorists/suspects discussed explicitly in the article. Expect they will 
all have this to some degree. 
e.g. "Brian Alexander is a self-proclaimed Freeman-on-the-Land and one of a growing 
number of Canadian followers of the so-called "sovereign citizen" or "Natural Persons" 
movement." - freemen (brian alexander) 
Omar Khadr “returned to Canada following his repatriation in September of 2012.”  
“Two Canadian men from London, Ont., have been linked to a terror attack at an 
Algerian gas plant in January 2013” - Canadians with terror ties 
Terrorists NOT Canadian Citizens [22]  
Article specifically mentions that the terrorist(s) are not Canadian citizens, despite 
living/working in Canada at the time of the plot/attack. Articles that only mention the 
terrorists as being "of [Canadian city]" do not count, even if the terrorists are known (by 
me) not to be citizens, because as far as the reader can tell, they are from that city. 
Preventative Methods [46]  
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Article carries the idea that cautionary behavior or preventative methods can/should be 
used to protect oneself or one’s community from domestic terror. Includes quotes or 
pointers explaining how this can be done. May cover techniques on spotting or stopping 
terrorists, or what to do in case of suspected terrorism, or just reminders that the public 
should take "an active role in intervention".- Tor Star, Algeria terrorist attack: third 
canadian believe 
E.g. [Police] “said the case is a prime example of why both renters and landlords need to 
fill out the appropriate forms. "If you are a renter or, on the other side, a person who is 
doing the renting, you need to make sure that you are doing the right thing," he said. 
"When there is no paperwork, it causes significant issues for the authories to deal with." - 
Freemen, Calgary police arrest sovereign renter 
and, 
“It’s something I think we need to get serious about. We need to co-ordinate our efforts 
in our communities and make sure we’re able to prevent these things.” 
- Nat Post, Forth former student from London, Ont high sch 
or 
"He said converts needed more guidance and support to make sure they did not fall into 
what he called the "jihad trap.""- Nat Post, Desire to fit in with Muslim community can 
push 
Domestic Terror Less Serious or Not Serious [28]  
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Article conveys viewpoints that domestic terror is not a big problem or serious threat in 
Canada, overall or at least relatively (compared to other threats like international 
terrorism or other violent crime). Might be a general statement or in reference to specific 
alleged/potential terrorist groups. 
E.g. “"We're not seeing that really being a huge issue for us right now."” - Freemen, 
police consider charges 
Terrorists at Large/Released [20]  
Terrorists going uncaptured, still free and potentially dangerous. Also, terrorist suspects 
being released from prison or without charges (in cases where article does not portray 
them as innocent, just not proven guilty). 
"Two others indicted in the case remain at large." - rebecca rubin case 
“Of the group, seven have been released without charges” - Toronto 18, Canadians with 
terror ties 
Terrorists Arrested [116]  
Describes the arrest of terrorist(s); not necessarily charges or sentence. 
Terrorists Charged/In Court [116]  
Describes terrorist(s) being charged in court. 
Terrorists Convicted/Sentenced [65]  
Article discusses domestic terrorist(s) being convicted and/or sentenced in a court of law. 
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E.g. "Three teens involved in the shooting death of a five-year-old boy on an Alberta 
reserve have received the maximum youth sentence - three years of supervised custody - 
for manslaughter in a crime the judge called "domestic terrorism." 
Terrorists Typical/Normal People [41]  
Article describes at least some parts of the terrorist(s) lives, histories, aims, and/or 
motivations as normal or understandable. Author may seemingly show pity or sympathy 
towards the terrorist(s); story might be of how they fell onto the wrong path. This might 
make the turn to radicalism more tragic - esp. if terrorist(s) are young. 
E.g. "The path Xristos Katsiroubas and Ali Medlej took likely began with a typical 
teenage need to make a difference and a sense of invincibility, then passed through the 
Internet before intense indoctrination in a group setting run by a "radicalizer."" - 
Londoners' role in Algeria terror attack 
Terrorists Integrated into Society [99]  
Article describes terrorists as having normal jobs, families, and/or roles in society.  
“She said the Katsiroubas family, who are Greek Orthodox, had been coming to her shop 
for about 30 years and she had watched young Xristos and his brother grow up.” - 
London residents shocked by news that Canadians 
Many possible implications: 1. they can blend in, insidious and dangerous 2. they may 
not have been that different from normal Canadians before becoming radicalized 3. they 
are to be found in all our communities; they could be among us now 
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E.g. “In 2010, Esseghaier began working toward his doctorate at one of the province’s 
jewels of advanced research, the National Institute for Scientific Research (INRS), 
located just south of Montreal.” 
“There was a large RCMP presence Monday at an industrial plaza in North York. 
According to an automatic email signature, an “R. Jaser” is a customer service 
representative at a moving company located in the plaza.” 
 - Toronto terror plot suspects were religious men 
Islamic Conversion or Beliefs as a Factor [132] 
The Islamic faith, background, and/or conversion of the terrorist(s) is noted by the article 
as relevant to their terrorist activities and ideology. The intensity or extremism of the 
beliefs may be emphasized. Popular conception... 
EVEN THOUGH! Lorne Dawson says of homegrown terrorist radicalization, "It has 
little to do with geography, religion or heritage" 
- Macleans, Why terrorism can grow in any soil 
E.g. "But they also talked about Islam all the time, as though they were faithful Muslims, 
said the aquaintance, who described them as "bipolar" in their faith." - Londoners in 
Algeria 
“Esseghaier’s devout adherence to Islam reportedly set apart him from colleagues at a 
high-tech research facility.” - Toronto terror plot suspects were religious men 
Race or National/Ethnic Origin as Relevant [65]  
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Article mentions the terror suspect's race, ethnicity or national origin (separate from 
Canadian/non-Canadian citizenship) as a notable or relevant part of the person's 
backstory, or as an (implicit or explicit) factor in their radicalization. 
e.g. Middle Eastern here: 
"The three, despite the diverse backgrounds, were part of a clique dominated by Muslim 
students of Middle Eastern descent, part of a subtle racial division at the school, a 
classmate said. 
“They had their own little group. I was more at the side of the school with all the skaters 
and jocks. All the ‘inter-racial people’ were at the front of the school — that’s where they 
hung out.” 
- Nat Post, How three Canadians graduated from a rebellious 
Korean here: 
"The young man's conversion to Islam - though highly unusual in Korean culture - seems 
to have been welcomed by his surprised relatives, defusing trouble with Aaron that his 
brother declined to detail."- Nat Post, 'He's 100% against terrorism'; Man wants to cle 
 White here: 
"I've never seen one white Canadian come to the musallah," he said 
- Nat Post, 'I_will_die_a_martyr'_B 
PROBABLY NOT UNIQUE TO TERRORISM. Media have long been known to 
emphasize the race or ethnicity of criminals as a matter of course - compare, "Vietnamese 
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gangs in Toronto" vs white gangs, or "Biker gangs" i.e. Hell's Angels, whose membership 
is overwhelmingly white. 
Obscurity of Truth/Details/Motivation [217]  
Article describes the terrorist situation as being shrouded in mystery, confusion, 
vagueness from official commentators, and/or otherwise missing a lot of information. 
"Little else was released. And months on, more questions than answers remain." - BC 
canada day plot 
"When asked whether the alleged plot had a religious motive or was instead driven by 
something else, Malizia was vague." - BC duo planned canada day attack 
“There are also unconfirmed reports under investigation that a second Canadian was part 
of the squad, along with Somali fighters from Sweden.” - Probe focuses on Canadian as 
suspect 
Terrorists’ own motives or reasons for radicalization can be cast as obscure. Often, 
quotes from family/community members struggling to come to terms with the terrorist 
incident are used to portray the bafflement and lack of understanding of the general 
public. 
“Why did the 29-year-old, who grew up in a nonreligious family in a sleepy seaside town 
on England’s south coast, turn to such an extreme form of Islam? Leech, who made a 
film about Dart called  My Brother the Islamist, has spent years thinking about it and still 
isn’t sure.” - The road to radicalization 
 
 
179 
 
IT IS POSSIBLE that articles use quotes/stories/reactions from fmr friends, colleagues, 
or neighbours of terrorist(s), Muslim or local community members, etc. to fill out an 
article when official sources are not forthcoming with information 
"Thinking of" Committing Terrorism [10]  
Article references opinions/statements supporting the investigation and prosecution of 
people who are merely THINKING of committing terrorism, joining terrorist groups, etc. 
Deterrence not just for action but seemingly for thought. Suspicion becomes closer to 
being accepted as truth/reasonable grounds. Often to do with the "foreign fighter 
problem". 
e.g. "Queen’s University and Royal Military College terrorism expert Christian 
Leuprecht said the bill does two key things. It “prevents the foreign fighter problem,” like 
the recent incident involving two Canadian youngsters who took part in a deadly attack in 
Algeria, and “lowers the threshold” of proof so those thinking of training abroad to 
commit an act of terror can be prosecuted, not just those who actually do it." - terror bill 
becomes law 
"As part of S-7, the government has also introduced four new terrorism offences to the 
Criminal Code, all of which have to do with leaving or attempting to leave Canada to 
commit several of the existing terrorism offences in the Code." 
- CBC, Bill to restore sunsetted anti-terrorism laws debated 
Eco-Terrorism [12]  
Terrorists mentioned in article are motivated by environmentalist/animal rights causes.  
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For example, "A Canadian woman who surrendered after a decade hiding in Western 
Canada is expected to enter guilty pleas in the largest eco-terrorism case in U.S. history, 
court records show. 
Rebecca Rubin, 39, originally from North Vancouver, was accused in a federal 
indictment of being a member of cells of the Earth Liberation Front and Animal 
Liberation Front known as The Family." - Rebecca rubin case 
Political Dissidence [49]  
Framing domestic terror as connected to or resulting from political dissidence. Dissidence 
means notable, vocal disagreement with the laws and/or practices of the Canadian 
government. May entail active rebellion against these laws/practices in the form of doing 
illegal acts. 
E.g. Freemen on the land who "drives without licenses and does not pay income tax" 
OUTLIER: Toronto 18 "claiming they opposed Canada's military mission in 
Afghanistan" - Nat Post, Unemployed techie created fake evidence of terror ... most 
suitably fits under political dissidence, though most accounts attribute a more Jihadist 
motive to their plot. 
Charismatic Figure(s) [35]  
Article makes reference to a charismatic figure in charge of/responsible for a terrorist 
organization, movement, cell, etc. May be either by name, or their existence mentioned as 
a generalized explanation/theory.  
ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT: draws new members into radical/terrorist ideologies: 
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"If there is a guru of the Freeman movement in Canada these days it's a man named Dean 
Clifford from Manitoba. In June, about 80 people paid to hear Clifford spread the 
sovereign gospel at a seminar in Victoria and tickets are now available on his website to 
another scheduled for Toronto this November."- Tor Star, Antigovernment soverign 
citizen movement 
Can sound romanticized and larger-than-life. E.G., 
""The influencer is a respected person. It could be a person with some pedigree, relative 
to where they've been and what they've done. They could have a gunslinger moxy to 
them," Boisvert said." 
- The Observer, Homegrown Terrorism 
Muslim Community Distances/Condemns Terrorism [78]  
Article includes quotes from people in the Muslim community or mentions reaction 
distancing the Muslim community from terrorists and their acts. Mentions of the Muslim 
community helping the RCMP and CSIS, and keeping watch for radicals and extremists 
among them, portray the Muslim community as distinct from terrorists. Some overlap 
with Vigilance/Suspicion is expected. 
"Several leading members of B.C.'s Muslim community were shocked at the alleged 
homegrown plot. 
"These names don't ring a bell at all. They're not even Muslim names," said Adam Buksh, 
president of Surrey Jamiyah Mosque." 
OR statements condemning terrorism and disavowing themselves from radicalism 
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"Buksh said members of his mosque and the B.C. Muslim Association do not condone 
radicalism." 
OR affirming the Muslim community's committment to Canadian law, order, and values. 
"In my mosque, if I see any kind of things like that happening ... I will stop them in their 
tracks and report them to the authorities," he said. 
"We are law-abiding."- B.C. Canada day plot 
““Many times we have been at the RCMP facilities and the government agencies for 
input, for sensitivity training,” said Badat. In turn, Mounties are invited visit mosques and 
community centres so Muslims in Canada “get a sense of how we can communicate and 
how we can contribute in the best interests of the country.” The role of imams, he said, is 
to “motivate our congregations that we are not to be blamed but we have to do our part. 
“Terrorists generally isolate themselves and are learning and being inspired by jihadi 
videos on the Internet. Terrorism and these crimes don’t really have a religion.” - Terror 
plot; Toronto muslim leader tipped off RCMP 
Vigilance/Suspicion [100]  
Article mentions the past or ongoing vigilance of Canadians or promotes the need for 
vigilance in identifying and/or stopping domestic terrorism. Including suspicion of 
people/places/things previously thought of as innocuous or new on the radar. 
E.g. "It may have been a phone call from a suspicious Surrey neighbour, a tip from a 
police informant or the product of electronic intelligence." - BC Canada day terror plot 
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""That's what we keep thinking about," said one London Muslim Mosque member. "If 
they (terrorist teachers) are here, it's a very curious thing. Where are they from? Does 
anybody know them? Who talked to them?" asked the man, who didn't want to be 
named." - Algerians in London 
May refer to vigilance on the part of police/intelligence organizations as well as civilians.  
""We're monitoring to make sure it doesn't become as big a problem as it has been in the 
United States and obviously we work with our partner agencies south of the border as 
well to help us gauge the trends," he said." - Police consider charges in rental embassy 
“Once it gets to the attention of authorities, it’s usually too late, somebody’s already gone 
way too far down a path. Once somebody starts to withdraw, shifting their friendships, 
shifting away from typical activities, becoming intolerant, dogmatic in their political 
religious views . . . when that happens, you’ve got good cause to intervene... You need to 
be your brother’s keeper.”- Canada will 'recommit' to combating homegrown terrorism 
Criminal/Immoral/Disreputable Past Behavior or Character [148] 
Instances of terrorists displaying poor morals or character outside of terrorist activities or 
beliefs; stories showing how the terrorist(s) did wrong things in the past. Includes being 
in trouble with the law (previous arrest warrants, a criminal record pre-terrorism), drug 
addiction, theft, and/or violence. 
E.g."A friend recommended the man and he promised to do some work on the place in 
exchange for a few months' free rent. A few months later, Caverhill went to inspect the 
property and said she found the kitchen and bathroom had been gutted, all the inside 
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doors removed and the floor of one bedroom painted black." - freemen on the land, 
calgary 
"He was charged with pushing a landlady down a flight of stairs in Montreal in 2007." - 
freemen, calgary 
Instances of terrorists doing wrong/illegal things in the present or as an ongoing 
phenomena also count. 
E.g. "one official who has followed the rise of the sovereign citizen movement in Canada 
says there have been a number of confrontations in B.C. and elsewhere during routine 
traffic stops or legal proceedings." - freemen 
Immature, Ignorant, or Ridiculous [115]  
Examples of terrorists being uneducated or stupid; making commonplace mistakes or 
worse. 
E.g. "Alphabet magnets on the refrigerator spelled out the word "respect" and a sign on 
the door of one room called it a meeting place for people of the "First Nations Sovran 
Embassy of Earth."" -freemen on the land, calgary 
article mocks terrorists; its language makes light of them using jokes, puns, etc. 
Reminiscient of Herman & Chomsky’s propaganda framing, newspapers saying things 
like “Clobba Slobba” to make fun of Slobodan Milosevic during the Bosnian conflict. 
E.g. “A Calgary home that the owner says was claimed as an "embassy" by a follower of 
the Freemen-on-the-Land movement is now freemen free.” - Freeman frat house now 
freeman free (title of article) 
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Broken English or fragmented sentences can also be used to this effect. 
e.g. “Toronto terrorism plot: ‘Criminal Code is not holy book,’ Chiheb Esseghaier tells 
court” - headline 
The holy book comment alone is somewhat ridiculous in context... 
"[Esseghaier] told a judge that criminal law was "imperfect" because it was not derived 
from a holy book." 
- Nat Post, Man charged in VIA derailment plot fled Germany 
Disgusting/Irrational/Abnormal Behavior or Psychology [79]  
Domestic terrorist behavior or appearance weird, disgusting, abnormal, and otherwise 
appalling. Above and beyond differing political or religious ideologies, bridging into 
common sense knowledge and practices. Domestic terrorists' lives and habits presented 
as remarkably unhygenic, derelict, irrational, etc. References to their past or current 
history of mental illness also reinforce the idea that there is something deeply and 
severely wrong with domestic terrorists. 
E.g. "Windows were covered with towels, clothing was heaped on floors and dirty dishes 
were piled in the kitchen that smelled like rotten food." - freemen on the land, calgary 
abnormal behavior: "claimed the home as an embassy" - freemen, calgary  
ridiculous: "Notaries have found themselves embroiled as many Freemen attach 
inexplicable importance to having notaries authorize documents the Freemen have 
invented to declare their status." - freemen, bc (brian alexander) 
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Mental illness: "Nuttall may be found not criminally responsible for his alleged actions 
due to a mental disorder. In late July, he was transferred to a psychiatric hospital in 
Coquitlam for assessment." - BC canada day plot 
Description/Detail of Weapons [218]  
Article describes what sort of weapons the terrorist(s) used/were planning to use. Detail 
may vary, i.e.: "a bomb", "a homemade bomb", "a homemade pressure cooker bomb". 
"Nuttall and Korody are alleged to have made three explosive devices out of pressure 
cookers, similar in make to the type of bombs used in the recent Boston Marathon 
bombings that killed three people and injured more than 260, and placed them or 
arranged to have them placed around the legislative buildings in Victoria." - bc canada 
day plot 
“...for his role in a fertilizer bomb plot in the U.K. in 2004” - Momin Khawaja, Canadians 
with terror ties 
Potential Damage/Violence to People [168]  
The plot or attack described included damage to human beings (death or injury) as part of 
its goal or as an anticipated side effect, but did not actually kill anyone (that the article 
mentions). To code mention of attacks that were successful in killing people, use Deadly 
Attack. 
E.g. “Esseghaier is co-accused with a 35-year-old Toronto man, Raed Jaser, of conspiring 
to attack and murder persons unknown for the benefit of a terrorist group, and of 
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conspiring to interfere with transportation facilities — a plot that police allege was 
supported by Al Qaeda in Iran.” - Toronto Terrorism plot; criminal code is not holy book 
Also includes the mention of violence as an acceptable/encouraged part of an 
organization, group, or individual's worldview/credo. 
E.g. ""Individuals associated to this movement are a concern because some followers 
advocate violence to promote their views and this may involve violence toward police 
officers." - freemen (brian alexander) 
Deadly Attack [107]  
ONLY use this for when actual deaths occurred as a result of terrorism; otherwise, use 
Damage/Violence to People. Deaths may be Canadians, or foreigners if killed by a 
Canadian-connected terrorist. How old/recent the deaths are is irrelevant (i.e., the FLQ 
and Air India deaths are still relevant) as long as the article itself was published in 2013. 
Damage to Property [37]  
Domestic terrorism is linked to property issues or property damages in the article. theft, 
vandalism, sabotage, illegal occupation, and the like are discussed as the goals and/or 
activities of domestic terrorists. attack or threats to home, business, equipment, or 
institution(s). 
E.g. "A woman has seen her Calgary rental home for the first time since a self-
proclaimed sovereign citizen was removed from the property last week." 
Animals released from fur farm 
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Sabotage of pipelines or equipment 
Potential or planned damage to property will be included under this code. 
e.g. "... if they would fund his plan to bomb an oil pipeline in Canada, he set in motion a 
cautionary tale about prosecuting terrorism before it has been committed." 
- Nat Post, the difficulty in prosecuting terrorism before 
questioning the "average Canadian" image [31] Article makes a point of how "average", 
"normal", or "unassuming" the terrorists were. Describes them as typical, possibly 
including accounts of "normal" activities, habits, or character traits terrorists were known 
to have. 
e.g. "Last week, former London residents Ali Medlej and Xristos Katsiroubas were 
publicly identified as participants in the al-Qaeda attack this past January on a natural-gas 
plant in Algeria that left 29 insurgents and 39 hostages dead. Both young men, aged 24 
and 22, respectively, were friends at London South Collegiate Institute. And like their 
hometown, their upbringing seems, from the outside, utterly average. Medlej played 
football and was known for being boisterous and having a quick temper. Katsiroubas, 
raised in a Greek Orthodox family, was quieter but enjoyed road hockey and video 
games. A third friend, Aaron Yoon of Korean-Catholic descent, was similarly 
recognizable as a typical teen." 
"If the upbringings of Medlej and Katsiroubas seem remarkably unremarkable, this 
comes as no surprise to Lorne Dawson, co-director of the Canadian Network for 
Research on Terrorism, Security and Society and chairman of the department of 
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sociology and legal studies at the University of Waterloo. He says most homegrown 
terrorists share similarly unassuming backgrounds."- Macleans, Why terrorism can grow 
in any soil 
anti-Muslim racial profiling [17]  
anti-Muslim racial profiling (or official sentiment) mentioned as a possibility and/or a 
concern.  
terrorism experts [29] 
article presents certain speakers and/or sources as experts on terrorism, either by stating 
this verbatim, or by explaining that they have a background in terrorism research. 
Past instances of Canadian terror [57]  
i.e. Air India, the FLQ… mentioned in the article alongside current terrorist events. 
linking Canadian to non-Canadian domestic terror [130]  
Article mentions attacks outside of Canada and by non-Canadians alongside Canadian 
instances, drawing explicit or implicit parallels to the Canadian situation. Most frequently 
this appears to be references to the Boston Marathon bombings. 
This quote draws clear parallels between the Bush govt in the U.S. and the Harper govt in 
Canada; not only does it compare U.S. policy on terror to our own, but it posits that a 
U.S. terror event, the Boston bombings, in fact affect Canadian policy: 
e.g. “The former George W. Bush government in the U.S. used to change the colour of its 
“terror threat” if it was marching into headwinds on other matters. In this case, by 
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abruptly changing gears last Friday and deciding to move on its long-neglected anti-
terrorist legislation, Conservatives immediately faced charges of using the Boston 
Marathon bombings for political expediency.” - Toronto terrorism plot takedown helps 
Conservatives 
Canadian domestic terror as symptom of a global problem [51]  
Article mentions Canadian-connected terror incidents as part of a larger global 
phenomenon: enabled/influenced by, happening because of, or appearing as a 
manifestation of violent radicalism internationally. Canadian terror incidents can be 
understood as parts of a bigger movement. 
Contrast with: "Assistant Commissioner Wayne Rideout said the charges involved a 
"domestic threat" to target Canada Day festivities on the grounds of the provincial 
legislature in Victoria. There were no links to international organizations, said Rideout." 
- The Guardian, BC Mounties say duo planned to blow up legislature 
Even though later in the same article, the RCMP "repeatedly" claim that "the plot was 
linked to an "al-Qaida ideology" - in some ways contradictory to the characterizing of 
plot as an entirely domestic threat 
 
law/legal responses [37] Primarily organizing code. Initially used as a catch-all code for 
discussion of law and legal responses to terrorism, but abandoned as nearly all instances 
of this could fit under the more specific subcodes listed below. 
terrorism used to justify emergency/special powers or measures [72] 
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mentions terrorism as (rightly or wrongly) being used to justify or defend the 
implementation or continued use of special powers above and beyond traditional 
canadian criminal law. 
terrorism used for political profit/advancement [23]  
political parties framed as using the threat of terrorism to advance their own interests, 
including using the law to footholds of power and/or disregard civil rights. 
e.g. "The high-profile terror arrests play to the Conservatives’ strength, allowing them to 
preach their tough law-and-order agenda and their no-mercy-for-terrorists talking points. 
And maybe add a few bucks to their coffers." - Toronto terrorism plot takedown helps 
Conservatives 
opposition or dissent silenced/crushed [14]  
political opposition or dissent to counter-terrorism measures silenced or crushed. 
may include opponents withdrawing their objections for fear of seeming sympathetic to 
terrorists. 
e.g. "But when it came time to question Stephen Harper, during a time when Canadians 
might be watching — and in the clip that would likely make newscasts — NDP Leader 
Tom Mulcair pulled back, offering only congratulations to the police and the “brave” 
Toronto imam who tipped police." - Toronto terrorism plot takedown helps 
Conservatives 
possibility of dissent already precluded. 
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Security expert Wesley Wark believes there was a degree of opportunism in the 
Conservative move to bring the anti-terror debate to the Commons floor Monday, “but 
not a desperate opportunism; they added a degree of triumph to a victory already at 
hand.’’” -  Toronto terrorism plot takedown helps Conservatives 
legal safety nets/honourable prosecution [19]  
mention of a legal measure as being a "safety net" designed to prevent abuses of anti-
terrorism legislation. Justifying the "safety" of such legislation by explaining that even 
though it has incredible powers and reach, it is reasonable, and the average Canadian 
need not fear it. 
E.g. "For example, he said, peace officers can’t just jail an individual for three days, but 
must make a case before the courts for ongoing detention after 24 hours. He believes the 
plan to sunset the measures after five years pending another review is also a good safety 
net." - terror bill becomes law 
legal responses supported/reccomended [33]  
legal responses harsh/problematic/controversial [58] New laws or legal responses to 
terrorism cited as controversial or overly harsh. Examples include laws that infringe on 
Canadian civil rights or extreme measures taken to detain/punish suspected terrorists. 
“[Omar Khadr] The convicted terrorist, who some argued was a child soldier at the time 
and shouldn’t face charges” - Canadians with terror ties 
 
emotional response [134]  
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Speakers or author talk about feelings in reaction to a terrorist case. E.g., expressing 
"shock", horror, or other emotions, like 
"Premier Christy Clark said it was "profoundly shocking" to think that anyone would 
want to harm "thousands of people who were gathered on Canada Day with their families 
and their children."" - bc canada day plot 
Journalist attempt to foster a sentimental, emotional reaction, for instance, by expounding 
upon the lives of the victims, or providing an emotionally charged hypothetical sceanerio, 
e.g. 
"I looked upon the crowd. Who would have been "the face of Canada's terror bombing," 
as eight-year-old Martin Richard has been called Boston's, had it proceeded along 
lickety-split? Could it have been the teenager with the small clutch of flowers? The 
young man who made animals-in-the-jungle noises to amuse his girl as they said 
goodbye? The older couple, he sweating and breathless, she organized and clearly in 
charge but quietly frantic, who went off to find out where they should go next?" 
- Nat Post, Who would have become 'the face of Canada's terror' 
(I have been using it as a catch-all for public reaction, including interest, and some other 
things that may be best conceptualized as "opinion" or "beliefs about" rather than 
feeling.) 
e.g. interest: "The RCMP acknowledges that there is an overwhelming interest in the 
matter concerning an attack on an Algerian gas plant in January, and that this issue is 
captivating the Canadian public," Supt. Marc Richer said." 
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- Nat Post, 'Overwhelming interest' leads RCMP to confirm 
NOT referring to the emotions of the terrorist or speculation thereof. 
punitive response [39]  
Describing or advocating a punitive response to terror threats. 
“The kidnappings sparked an increase in military presence and Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau implementing the War Measures Act, which allowed police to arrest citizens and 
to hold them without bail.” - FLQ Crises, Canadians with terror ties 
citizen condemnation [6]  
Non-govt/police affiliated citizens making statements of condemnation or defiance 
against terrorism. 
E.g. "To quote the magnificent words uttered just a few days ago by the Boston Red Sox 
designated hitter David Ortiz, "This is our f--ing city, and nobody gonna dictate our 
freedom.""- Nat Post, Who would have become 'the face of Canada's terror' 
official condemnation [23]  
Political, law enforcement, military, or other officials go on record condemning the 
terrorists. OFTEN SIMULTANEOUSLY REINFORCING CANADIAN VALUES/THE 
STRENGTH OF CANADIAN INSTITUTIONS. Declaring that terrorist efforts are/will 
be futile. 
"B.C. Premier Christy Clark said she was profoundly shocked by news of the arrests. 
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"But let me say this to those who resort to terror: You will not succeed," Clark told 
reporters at the legislature in Victoria. "You will not succeed in damaging our democratic 
institutions. Just as importantly, you will not succeed in tearing down the values that 
make this country strong."" -B.C. Canada day plot 
serious/escalating threat [200]  
Can be either a direct statement of an individual's/group's/phenomenon's growing impact 
on or danger to society... 
OR a statement about escalating legal/official responses to deal with a particular 
individual/group/phenomenon. 
E.g. "RCMP and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police officers are developing 
awareness materials for frontline officers, and the movement is the subject of upcoming 
policing seminars in Vancouver and Toronto." - freed or falling; some wonder 
the fact that the RCMP and Canadian police are paying more attention to the freemen and 
spending time and effort to make their members aware = they deserve attention and 
control. 
politics [33]  
article focuses primarily around politics or political concerns. 
politicians vow to combat terrorism [28]  
Quotes from politicians reaffirming, vowing, or demanding action against terrorism. May 
be used as a rhetorical tool to slam another party for being soft on terrorism. 
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politicians evaluated negatively [8]  
Article criticizes politicians. 
E.g. "It is a discredit to the Canadian political body as a whole that while our neighbours 
to the south were dealing with death, casualties and a manhunt which locked down a 
major U.S. city, our political leaders were consumed with parsing terrorism comments 
made on the CBC by Trudeau." 
- Toronto Star, Conservatives playing politics with anti-terror bill: Tim Harper 
politicians evaluated positively [3]  
Article praises politicians. 
